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Abstract
In the last decades, intelligent transport systems have gained importance. We consider a subarea of
cooperative traffic management, namely collective decision-making in groups of traffic participants. In
the scenario we are studying, tourists visiting a city are asked to form travel groups and to agree on
common points of interest. We focus on voting as a collective decision-making process. Our question is
how different algorithms for the formation of travel groups and for determining common travel destinations
differ with respect to system and user goals, where we define as system goal large groups and as user goals
high preference satisfaction and low organisational effort. We aim at achieving a compromise between
system and user goals.
What is new is that we investigate the inherent effects of different voting rules, voting protocols and
grouping algorithms on user and system goals. Older works on collective decision-making in traffic focus
on other target quantities, do not consider group formation, do not compare the effects of several voting
algorithms, use other voting algorithms, do not consider clearly defined groups of vehicles, use voting for
other applications or use other collective decision-making algorithms than voting.
In the main simulation series, we examine different grouping algorithms, voting protocols and committee
voting rules. We consider sequential grouping vs. coordinated grouping, basic protocol vs. iterative
protocol and the committee voting rules Minisum-Approval, Minimax-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum.
The simulations were conducted using the newly developed simulation tool LightVoting, which is based
on the multi-agent framework LightJason.
The experiments of the main simulation series show that the committee voting rule Minisum-Ranksum
in most cases yields better than or as good results as the committee voting rules Minisum-Approval
and Minimax-Approval. The iterative protocol tends to yield an improvement regarding preference
satisfaction, at the cost of strong deterioriation regarding the group size. The coordinated grouping
tends to yield an improvement regarding the preference satisfaction at relative small cost regarding the
group size. This leads us to recommend the committee voting rule Minisum-Ranksum, the basic protocol
and coordinated grouping in order to achieve a compromise between system and user goals. We also
demonstrate the effect of different combinations of grouping algorithms and voting protocols on travel
costs. Here, the combination of the basic protocol and coordinated grouping yields a compromise between
preference satisfaction and traveller costs.
Additionally to the main simulation series, we provide an extended model which generates traveller
preferences by combining attractiveness of the points of interest and distance costs based on the distances
between the points of interest.
As further application of voting, we consider a meeting-point scenario where a range voting rule and a
minimax voting rule are used to agree on meeting points. For smaller groups, the average maximum
travel time is clearly higher for range voting. For larger groups, the difference decreases. For smaller
groups, the average lateness for the group using minimax voting is high, for larger groups it decreases.
Hence, it makes sense for smaller groups to use the minimax voting rule if one aims at fairer distribution
of travel times, and to use the range voting rule if the goal is instead to avoid delay for the group.
For future work, it would be useful to adapt the simulation concept to take real-world conditions and re-
quirements into account. Further possibilities for future work would be considering additional algorithms
and models, such as considering combinatorial voting or running simulations based on the extended
model, considering the role of financial incentives to encourage ridesharing or platooning and using the
LightVoting tool for further research applications.

Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahrzehnten haben intelligente Verkehrssysteme an Bedeutung gewonnen. Wir betrachten einen Teilbereich
des kooperativen Verkehrsmanagements, nämlich kollektive Entscheidungsfindung in Gruppen von Verkehrsteilnehmern. In
dem uns interessierenden Szenario werden Touristen, die eine Stadt besuchen, gebeten, Reisegruppen zu bilden und sich auf
gemeinsame Besuchsziele (Points of Interest) zu einigen. Wir konzentrieren uns auf Wählen als Gruppenentscheidungsver-
fahren. Unsere Fragestellung ist, wie sich verschiedene Algorithmen zur Bildung von Reisegruppen und zur Bestimmung
gemeinsamer Reiseziele hinsichtlich der System- und Benutzerziele unterscheiden, wobei wir als Systemziel große Gruppen
und als Benutzerziele hohe präferenzbasierte Zufriedenheit und geringen organisatorischen Aufwand definieren. Wir streben
an, einen Kompromiss zwischen System- und Benutzerzielen zu erreichen.
Neu ist, dass wir die inhärenten Auswirkungen verschiedener Wahlregeln, Wahlprotokolle und Gruppenbildungsalgorithmen
auf Benutzer- und Systemziele untersuchen. Ältere Arbeiten zur kollektiven Entscheidungsfindung im Verkehr konzentrieren
sich auf andere Zielgrößen, betrachten nicht die Gruppenbildung, vergleichen nicht die Auswirkungen mehrerer Wahlalgorith-
men, benutzen andere Wahlalgorithmen, berücksichtigen nicht klar definierte Gruppen von Verkehrsteilnehmern, verwenden
Wahlen für andere Anwendungen oder betrachten andere Algorithmen zur kollektiven Entscheidungsfindung als Wahlen.
Wir untersuchen in der Hauptsimulationsreihe verschiedene Gruppenbildungsalgorithmen, Wahlprotokolle und Komitee-
wahlregeln. Wir betrachten sequentielle Gruppenbildung vs. koordinierte Gruppenbildung, Basisprotokoll vs. iteratives
Protokoll und die Komiteewahlregeln Minisum-Approval, Minimax-Approval und Minisum-Ranksum. Die Simulationen
wurden mit dem neu entwickelten Simulationswerkzeug LightVoting durchgeführt, das auf dem Multi-Agenten-Framework
LightJason basiert.
Die Experimente der Hauptsimulationsreihe zeigen, dass die Komiteewahlregel Minisum-Ranksum in den meisten Fällen
bessere oder ebenso gute Ergebnisse erzielt wie die Komiteewahlregeln Minisum-Approval und Minimax-Approval. Das
iterative Protokoll tendiert dazu, eine Verbesserung hinsichtlich der präferenzbasierten Zufriedenheit zu erbringen, auf
Kosten einer deutlichen Verschlechterung hinsichtlich der Gruppengröße. Die koordinierte Gruppenbildung tendiert dazu,
eine Verbesserung hinsichtlich der präferenzbasierten Zufriedenheit zu erbringen bei relativ geringen Kosten in Bezug auf
die Gruppengröße. Dies führt uns dazu, die Komiteewahlregel Minisum-Ranksum, das Basisprotokoll und die koordinierte
Gruppenbildung zu empfehlen, um einen Kompromiss zwischen System- und Benutzerzielen zu erreichen. Wir demonstri-
eren auch die Auswirkungen verschiedener Kombinationen von Gruppenbildungsalgorithmen und Wahlprotokollen auf die
Reisekosten. Hier bietet die Kombination aus Basisprotokoll und koordinierter Gruppenbildung einen Kompromiss zwischen
der präferenzbasierten Zufriedenheit und den Reisekosten.
Zusätzlich zur Hauptsimulationsreihe bieten wir ein erweitertes Modell an, das die Präferenzen der Reisenden generiert,
indem es die Attraktivität der möglichen Ziele und Distanzkosten, basierend auf den Entfernungen zwischen den möglichen
Zielen, kombiniert.
Als weiteren Anwendungsfall von Wahlverfahren betrachten wir ein Verfahren zur Treffpunktempfehlung, bei dem eine
Bewertungs-Wahlregel und eine Minimax-Wahlregel zur Bestimmung von Treffpunkten verwendet werden. Bei kleineren
Gruppen ist die durchschnittliche maximale Reisezeit unter der Bewertungs-Wahlregel deutlich höher. Bei größeren Gruppen
nimmt der Unterschied ab. Bei kleineren Gruppen ist die durchschnittliche Verspätung für die Gruppe unter der Minimax-
Wahlregel hoch, bei größeren Gruppen nimmt sie ab. Es ist also sinnvoll für kleinere Gruppen, die Minimax-Wahlregel zu
verwenden, wenn man eine fairere Verteilung der Reisezeiten anstrebt, und die Bewertungs-Wahlregel zu verwenden, wenn
das Ziel stattdessen ist, Verzögerungen für die Gruppe zu vermeiden.
Für zukünftige Arbeiten wäre es sinnvoll, das Simulationskonzept anzupassen, um reale Bedingungen und Anforderungen
berücksichtigen zu können. Weitere Möglichkeiten für zukünftige Arbeiten wären die Betrachtung zusätzlicher Algorithmen
und Modelle, wie zum Beispiel die Betrachtung kombinatorischer Wahlen oder die Durchführung von Simulationen auf der
Grundlage des erweiterten Modells, die Berücksichtigung der Rolle finanzieller Anreize zur Förderung von Ridesharing oder
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past decades, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) have gained increasing im-
portance because of the proliferation of autonomous vehicles.
Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010
defined ITS as advanced applications providing innovative services related to different
modes of transport and traffic management. The intent is to enable a variety of user
types to be better informed so that they can make safer, more coordinated and smarter
usage of transport networks. [EU, 2010]
[Singh and Gupta, 2015] described four main areas of ITS:
• Advanced Traveller Information System: provides travellers with information both
pre-trip and en route
• Advanced Traffic Management System: optimises vehicle movement using real-time
information
• Advanced Public Transportation System: aims to make public transport more reli-
able
• Emergency Management System: develops transport systems that can provide help
during emergency situations
[Sanderson et al., 2012] added another point of view and used a micro-meso-macro ap-
proach to describe the levels of ITS. Figure 1.1, which is taken from [Sanderson et al., 2012,
p.78], gives a schematic overview of the approach. The three levels can be described as
follows [Sanderson et al., 2012, p.77]:
• The micro level deals with and models individual behaviour, providing intelligence
to the vehicle. At this level, the individual agents utilise all sensing equipment and
on-board technology in order to construct a decision-making system concerned with
the actual execution of driving. This may include safety issues (such as emergency
breaking, steering and collision warning) and fulfilment of goals and preferences of
drivers and passengers (such as driving speed and safety distance).
• The meso level deals with collective decision-making in groups or vehicle clusters.
This level relies on Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication, because the cluster
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Figure 1.1: Micro-meso-macro framework
members need to inform each other about their intentions while negotiating to reach
an agreement.
• The macro level deals with infrastructure or system-wide goals such as reducing
congestion and pollution, making efficient use of the road network or managing the
interaction of the network and other infrastructures such as energy systems, public
transportation and emergency services.
With the emergence of intelligent autonomous traffic systems that can exchange informa-
tion via Vehicle-to-X (V2X) communication, possible realisations of the meso level have
gained relevance.
Parallel to the emergence of ITS, the development and usage of autonomous vehicles
has recently been on the rise. These vehicles are autonomous insofar that they conduct
traffic manoeuvres after eliciting the users’ preferences. A prominent example is the de-
velopment of the Google Car, which was presented in 2010 [Poczter and Jankovic, 2014].
In the 2010s, several partially autonomous vehicles were released by Mercedes (2013)
[Stenquist, 2013] and Tesla (2015) [Nelson, 2015]. In 2016, Singapore launched a self-
driving taxi service, implemented by nuTonomy [Watts, 2016]. Many car providers have
plans regarding (further) development of autonomous vehicles. For example, Volkswagen
is planning to reveal an autonomous production version of the Volkswagen microbus in
2022 [Bomey, 2021].
Classically, when investigating traffic situations, one either considers the effects of top-
down, centralised management strategies (e.g. traffic-light management) that aim to im-
prove target quantities such as emission or bottom-up, decentralised user strategies that
aim to improve target quantities such as individual travel time. The availability of V2X
communication enables coordination and cooperation in vehicle groups so that strategies
or methods at the meso level can be developed, considering both the user and system
perspectives. It can support collective decision-making for groups of traffic participants.
In the context of cooperative traffic management, several questions arise. For one, there
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is the question of how to conduct coordination between autonomous vehicles to handle
real-time traffic manoeuvres. One possibility for coordination is the application of policy-
based approaches, see e.g. the paper by [Aschermann et al., 2017], which investigated the
optimisation potential for policy-based traffic management on 2+1 roadways. Another
question is how to enable cooperation between several autonomous vehicles based on user
preferences.
We focus on collective decision-making in the areas of platooning and ridesharing1. There
are several arguments for using platoons. [Bergenhem et al., 2012] quoted the study by
[Carbaugh et al., 1998], which found that the crash probability of severe crashes was lower
on highways with platoons of autonomous vehicles than with individual ones. Addi-
tionally, [Bergenhem et al., 2012] showed that platooning led to higher road through-
put, owing to the spacing between vehicles (2011 GCDC). As mentioned for example in
[Haas and Friedrich, 2017], platooning is considered promising in terms of road utilisation
and fuel reduction.
There are several possible methods for collective decisions at the meso level. We briefly
describe some options.
• Reservation-based approaches: In reserved-based approaches as investigated by
[Dresner and Stone, 2008] and [Vasirani and Ossowski, 2009], driver agents reserve
resources by communicating with intersection managers.
• Market-based approaches: In the approach by [Grimaldo et al., 2012], each travel
alternative is viewed as an allocation. Auctions are used as the allocation procedure,
and for winner determination, a multi-criteria winner determination approach is
used to merge the collected preferences.
• Negotiations: According to [Beer et al., 1999, p.1], “negotiation is a key form of
interaction that enables groups of agents to arrive at a mutual agreement regard-
ing some belief, goal or plan, for example. Particularly because the agents are au-
tonomous and cannot be assumed to be benevolent, agents must influence others to
convince them to act in certain ways.” They also explain that there are different
forms of negotiation, including auctions, contract net protocols and argumentation.
• Auctions: [Kokkinogenis et al., 2019] used auction rules as a mechanism for tactical-
level collective decision-making in platooning applications.
• Voting: This refers to an agreement to a common decision/goal/action via holding
an election.
This dissertation investigates voting as a method for collective decision-making in trans-
port systems. Thus far, we have described some recent technological developments nec-
essary for applying collective decision-making in traffic management and have provided a
short overview of collective decision-making approaches that can be applied to traffic. To
continue this introduction, in Section 1.1, we describe how voting can be applied in traffic.
In Section 1.2, we list some possible applications for voting in traffic management. Section
1While we consider platooning for our main application, we consider ridesharing in an excursus.
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1.3 describes the problem we focus on in this dissertation, namely common destinations
for travel groups. Section 1.4 depicts how the problem can be solved using voting with
an example. The methodology is briefly described in Section 1.5. Finally, Section 1.6
outlines the structure of this dissertation.
1.1 Voting in traffic
Historically, a common way to achieve consensus regarding a common decision/goal/action
for a clearly defined group where the members have differing preferences has been to hold
an election. Applying voting in traffic makes sense when groups of traffic participants
(e.g. for ridesharing or platooning) must agree on a common goal or action.
When applying voting to traffic management, we consider automated vehicle agents who
represent the respective travellers. For example, if three travellers need to agree on two
of three possible destinations to visit as a group, each preference must be elicited by
the vehicle agents and aggregated in an automated manner. Based on the aggregated
preferences of the group, the travel group executes an itinerary. To agree on common
destinations, different voting rules can be used.
1.2 Applications for voting in traffic management
There are several scenarios of cooperative traffic management in which the application of
voting can be useful:
1. Leader election in platoons, for example in [Singh et al., 2018].
2. Election of a common platoon speed [Teixeira et al., 2018].
3. Meeting-point election for drivers and riders [Czioska et al., 2017]. This application
is described in an excursus in Chapter 9.
4. Election of common destinations by visitors of an intraurban area as described by
[Dennisen and Müller, 2015] and [Dennisen and Müller, 2016]. In this dissertation,
the focus is on this last scenario.
1.3 Problem description: common destinations for travel
groups
We illustrate the concept of voting in urban traffic management using a future traffic
scenario. In this scenario, there are three types of stakeholders: travellers, vehicles and
traffic management. The travellers arrive with their vehicles to visit Points of Interest
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(POIs) in a city. We assume that the vehicles are autonomous pods which can be coupled
for physical platooning. In the following, we give some examples for the development in
the areas of pods, autonomous vehicles and vehicles which can be coupled.
Figure 1.2 depicts a miniature electric vehicle developed by the Micro company; it was
announced in 2018 and has two seats [Sierzputowski, 2018] Figure 1.3 shows automated
electric logistics vehicles which can be virtually coupled [DroidDrive GmbH, 2021a]. Fig-
ure 1.4 depicts the process of joining modular electric vehicles by Next Logistics. In 2018,
two fully functional Next pods were presented at the Dubai World Government Summit
[Next, 2020a].
Figure 1.2: Mini electric vehicle [Micro Mobility Systems AG, 2018]
Figure 1.3: Virtual coupling of logistics vehicles [DroidDrive GmbH, 2021b]
Figure 1.4: Coupling of pods [Next, 2020b]
These technologies enable it to make traffic more modular: travellers can use pods to visit
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cities and technologies for physical coupling enable organising travellers into groups that
can communicate via V2X.
As mentioned above, there are advantages to platooning. In our scenario, we assume that,
due to energy, environmental and safety concerns, urban traffic management encourages
visitors to form travel groups at predefined assembly points. Especially with automation,
fewer large platoons can be more easily managed than many small groups. This leads us
to consider large groups as system goal in our scenario. As user goals in our scenario,
we consider high preference fulfilment and low organisational effort. Preference fulfilment
measures, given a traveller’s preferences and a chosen set of common destinations for a
platoon, how satisfied the traveller is with this choice. As for organisational effort, con-
sider a set of travellers which arrive at a predefined assembly point and need to decide
with whom to form groups and to agree on common destinations to visit. The more ac-
tions a traveller has to conduct and the longer the traveller has to wait for other travellers,
the higher the organisational effort is for this traveller. The interaction between traffic
management and user behaviour is guided by the overall goal of establishing a situation
where there is a compromise between user and system goals to achieve acceptable levels
of efficiency and safety.
In Figure 1.5, we schematically show the overall process for the urban visitors scenario.
We have travellers with preferences who arrive at an assembly point and need to form
travel groups, which have to agree on common destinations to visit.
This dissertation considers the following problem for the urban visitors scenario: Given
the traveller preferences, how should the travellers be grouped together and which POIs
should they visit?
Figure 1.5: Process for the urban visitors scenario
Note that trip-planning is viewed as a downstream problem in this dissertation. We con-
sider some examples for demonstrating how driving in groups can decrease individual
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travel costs, see Chapter 7. We also describe an extended model in Chapter 8 that con-
siders distance costs. However, for the examples and the extended model, we assume that
Travelling Salesperson Problem (TSP) approximations are used for the actual routing.
1.4 Solving the problem using voting
In this section, we use a small example to demonstrate how the problem described in
Section 1.3 can be solved by using voting, see Figure 1.6, which is slightly adapted from
[Dennisen and Müller, 2015, p.207]. Because several POIs have to be selected, we focus
on committee elections.
Figure 1.6: Example for urban visitors scenario
Six travellers t1, ..., t6 arrive at a defined assembly point desiring to visit an intraurban
area. Each traveller ti has a vote vi that represents their preferences over the set of possi-
ble POIs P = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H} in the intraurban area. In this example, we assume
the votes to be Approval votes, which can be written as 01-vectors or as set representa-
tion. For example, vote v1 is specified as ACFH, short for {A,C, F,H}. Thus, traveller
t1 approves of POIs A, C, F and H and disapproves of B, D, E and G. This can also
be expressed (assuming the the fixed order A, ..., H) via the 01-vector (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1).
[Dennisen and Müller, 2015, p.207]
It is assumed that the travellers are sequentially grouped. Travellers t1, t2 and t3 are
grouped together into group G1. The others (t4, t5 and t6) are grouped into G2. We call
this straightforward grouping algorithm sequential grouping.
Furthermore, we assume a basic voting protocol, meaning that once the election for the
filled group has been conducted, it can leave.
Lastly, we assume a committee voting rule, k-Minisum-Approval, where k specifies the
8 Chapter 1 - Introduction
size of the to-be-elected committee. We consider k = 4.
For our main study, we have those three important parameters: grouping algorithm,
voting protocol and voting rule, and will consider further options for each.
In k-Minisum-Approval, a winning committee consists of k most often approved alter-
natives. In this example, in group G1, POIs C, E, F and H are each approved by two
travellers, whereas POIs A, B, D and G are each approved by one traveller, making
{C,E, F,H} a unique winning committee. In group G2, the POIs D and G are each
approved by three travellers, whereas POIs A and B are each approved by two. POIs
C, E and H are approved by zero travellers. This makes {A,B,D,G} a unique winning
committee. [Dennisen and Müller, 2015, p.207f.]
Focusing on voting as a collective decision-making mechanism, we consider the following
research question: How do different algorithms used for creating travel groups and for
determining common destinations compare regarding system and user goals?
1.5 Methodology
For evaluation of the proposed algorithms, we conduct agent-based simulations based
on two forms of preference generation. The first includes the generation of uniform dis-
tributed preferences; the second includes a more realistic type of preference generation
that relies on the platform Foursquare, as described in Chapter 4. We compare several
voting rules, voting protocols and grouping algorithms with respect to the quantities group
size, preference dissatisfaction and organisational effort. We follow an approach similar
to [Carley, 1999], where we use the simulation results to generate hypotheses.
1.6 Structure
This dissertation is structured as depicted in Figure 1.7. Chapter 2 and 3 yield a problem
description. Chapter 2 yields fundamental definitions and describes related work from
areas of Computational Social Choice, transport applications, collective decision-making
in traffic management and multi-agent systems. In Chapter 3, we describe the research
gap and our research question. Chapter 4 explains the used approaches in detail, i.e.
our assumptions and the applied algorithms: voting rules, voting protocols and grouping
algorithms. Chapters 5 and 6 comprise the evaluation part of the dissertation. Chapter
5 gives details on the implementation. Here, we describe the simulation architecture of
the agent-based tool as well as the preferences generation and the statistical component.
In Chapter 6, the experiments and results are discussed. In Chapter 7, we consider the
effects of different combinations of voting protocols and grouping algorithms on travel
costs. Chapter 8 describes an extension of the model described in Chapter 4 by taking
distance costs into account when defining traveller preferences. In an excursus in Chapter
9, an alternative application for voting rules for cooperative traffic is described (i.e. voting
to agree on meeting points for ridesharing). This application is part of Paul Czioska’s
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PhD research and was investigated in a joint paper. Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and
gives an outlook on possible future works.
Figure 1.7: Dissertation structure
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Figure 2.1: Topic overview
The research in this dissertation can be viewed as research on a specific type of socio-
technical systems. A socio-technical system is defined by [Singh, 2013] as “a microsociety
in which autonomous parties interact with and about technical objects”. According to
Singh, a challenge of socio-technical systems is to enable the effective collaboration of
autonomous stakeholders whose interests may be imperfectly aligned. One possibility for
achieving collaboration is the application of collective decision-making mechanisms. In
our research topic, we consider socio-technical systems consisting of traffic participants
who use voting as collective decision-making mechanism for collaboration. Hence, the
research topic considered in this dissertation lies at the intersection of two domains:
1) Collective decision-making/Computational Social Choice
2) Transport applications
An overview of the classification scheme is shown in Figure 2.1. This leads us to consider
related works in the area ComSoc, including voting, as well as related works on trans-
port research in the areas ridesharing and platooning. We also consider related works on
existing approaches for collective decision-making in traffic. Additionally, as described in
Chapter 1, we use a multi-agent simulation for the evaluation of several voting algorithms
for collective decisions in traffic-participant groups. Hence, we consider the subtopics col-
lective decision-making/Computational Social Choice, transport applications, collective
decision-making in traffic and agents.
In this chapter, we present necessary definitions and discuss related works. In the first
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section, related collective decision-making models are described, and in the second section,
relevant transport applications are presented. The third section focuses on existing ap-
plications of collective decision-making methods in traffic, including voting applications.
The fourth section explains agent definitions and considers related simulation frameworks
and tools.
2.1 Collective decision-making & Computational Social
Choice
In this section, we introduce the topic Computational Social Choice, based on
[Brandt et al., 2016a] and [Rothe et al., 2012].
Classical Social Choice Theory is an old field which investigates the aggregation of indi-
vidual preferences into a common choice. The paradigmatic situation in Social Choice
Theory is the conduction of an election, i.e. creating consensus with the help of a voting
rule. A voting rule is an algorithm that yields one or several winners from a candidate
set based on a list of votes.
An early representative of the field Social Choice Theory is Ramon Llull, who proposed
an early variant of the Copeland voting rule in the 13th century, as discussed e.g. by
[Faliszewski et al., 2008]. Other prominent researchers are Condorcet, who proposed the
Condorcet voting rule in 1785 [Condorcet, 1785] and Dodgson1, who created the Dodg-
son rule [Dodgson, 1876]. In all of these voting rules, winner determination is based on
pairwise comparisons.
A big group of voting rules is the group of position-based voting rules. Scoring protocols
such as Plurality, Borda (proposed by [Borda, 1781]) and Veto belong to this group. In
these rules, voters submit their preferences by ranking the candidates, and each candidate
receives for each vote a score dependent upon its position in the vote.
Approval voting is another fundamental rule. As proposed by [Brams and Fishburn, 1978],
a candidate is either disapproved or approved by a voter, and the candidate receives one
point for approval and zero points for disapproval. The candidate(s) with the highest
Approval score win(s).
Modern Social Choice Theory goes back to the impossibility theorem of Arrow, which was
originally formulated in 1951 and revised in 1963 [Arrow, 1963]. It was later rephrased by
[Taylor, 1995, Taylor, 2005]. It states that for elections with at least three candidates, it
is impossible to find a preference-based voting rule that is simultaneously non-dictatorial,
weakly Pareto-efficient and independent from irrelevant alternatives. This can be crudely
interpreted as “the perfect voting rule does not exist”.
Compared with classical Social Choice Theory, the area Computational Social Choice
is relatively young. As described by [Brandt et al., 2016a, p.8], “by the early 2000s
1Better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’
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(the) trend towards studying collective decision-making in the tradition of classical So-
cial Choice Theory [...] with a specific focus on computational concerns had reached
substantial momentum.” It should be noted that there were precursors in the 60s and
80s, such as the Gale–Shapley algorithm by [Gale and Shapley, 1962] and publications by
[Bartholdi et al., 1989b] and [Bartholdi et al., 1989a] on the complexity of manipulating
elections and winner determination.
While much of classical Social Choice Theory relates to voting, resource allocation and
coalition formation gained importance with the emergence of Computational Social Choice.
The area resource allocation can be viewed as related to our scenario because we assign
POIs to travellers in the urban visitors scenario. In resource allocation, divisible or indi-
visible resources are allocated to agents based on their preferences. Coalition formation
is related to our application because we aim to divide the set of agents into subsets. In
coalition formation, agents are divided into subsets based on their preferences.
Collective decision-making algorithms can be used for all types of agents. In the con-
text of this dissertation, these algorithms are applied for vehicle agents based on the
preferences of their passengers.
In the following subsections, we define several terms from Computational Social Choice,
namely basic concepts and definitions, committee voting rules, coalition formation, group-
activity selection problems and resource allocation.
2.1.1 Voting: basic concepts and definitions
Here, we recapitulate some voting definitions. Apart from the definition of voting proto-
cols and grouping algorithms, these stem from [Rothe et al., 2012, p.122f., p.135f.]. The
explanations also closely follow this source.
An election or preference profile (C, V ) consists of
• a set of candidates C
• a list of voters V
How the preferences of the voters are represented as votes depends on the voting rule. In
this dissertation, we restrict ourselves to two types of votes: Approval votes and complete
linear orders.
An Approval vote for a voter v and candidates C = {c1, ..., cm} is a {0, 1}m vector.
For position i in the vote, a ‘0’ means that voter v disapproves of candidate ci, and a ‘1’
means that voter v approves of candidate ci.
A complete linear order for voter v and candidates C = {c1, ..., cm} specifies a strict
ranking over all candidates, with the most liked candidate ranked first.
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Mathematically, a complete linear order is defined as a relation > with the following
properties [Rothe et al., 2012, p.123, translated and punctuation adapted]:
• Total: for any two candidates c and d in C, it either holds c > d or d > c
• Transitive: for any three candidates c, d and e in C, it follows from c > d and d > e
that c > e
• Symmetrical: for any two candidates c and d in C, it follows from c > d that d > c
does not hold
A voting rule is a rule that determines the winner(s) of a given election (C, V ) and is
defined as a social choice correspondence
{(C, V )|(C, V ) is a preference profile} → P(C).
[Rothe et al., 2012, p.122, translated]
A social choice function is defined as a mapping
{(C, V )|(C, V ) is a preference profile} → C
[Rothe et al., 2012, p.123, translated] that assigns to each given election exactly one win-
ner.
Let R(C) denote the set of all complete linear orders over C. Then, a social welfare
function is a mapping
{(C, V )|(C, V ) is a preference profile} → R(C).
[Rothe et al., 2012, p.123, translated and corrected]
In the context of this dissertation, a grouping algorithm is an algorithm defining how an
agent is assigned to a voter group.
A voting protocol is an interaction protocol used when applying a voting rule; it describes
the interaction between the chair and the voters once they have joined the electorate.
Next, we provide examples for some voting rules mentioned in Section 2.1: Condorcet,
Copeland/Llull, Dodgson, Plurality, Veto and Borda. All examples and the respective
explanations are taken or slightly adapted from [Rothe et al., 2012].
2.1.1.1 Condorcet
As defined by [Condorcet, 1785], in a Condorcet election, a Condorcet winner is the
candidate that defeats all other candidates by a strict majority in pairwise comparisons.
The example in Table 2.1 is adapted from [Rothe et al., 2012, p.127]. The votes are
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given in form of complete linear orders. In this example, candidate A wins each pairwise
comparison it is involved in and is thus the Condorcet winner of the election.
Vote A : B A : C A : D B : C B : D C : D
v1: D > B > A > C B A D B D D
v2: B > D > A > C B A D B B D
v3: A > C > D > B A A A C D D
v4: C > A > D > B A C A C D C
v5: C > A > B > D A C A C B C
Winner of pairwise comparison A A A C D D
Table 2.1: Election with results for pairwise comparisons
2.1.1.2 Copeland and Llull
In this section, we closely follow [Rothe et al., 2012, p.128ff.] and explain the Copeland
and Llull voting rule. The Copeland voting rule respects the Condorcet winner, that is,
if a Condorcet winner exists, Copeland chooses this candidate. The Copeland voting rule
as proposed by [Copeland, 1951] works like this. If for a pairwise comparison there is a
winner with a strict majority, this candidate is rewarded with one point, and the other
candidate obtains zero points. If in a pairwise comparison there is no winner having a
strict majority, both candidates get one-half point each. The candidate with the highest
score wins.
[Faliszewski et al., 2009] proposed the Copeland family of voting rules. For a rational
number α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Copelandα works similar to the Copeland voting rule, except
that for a tie in a pairwise comparison, the candidate receives α points. The Llull voting
rule corresponds to Copeland1 with α set to 1.
Table 2.2 shows an election without Condorcet winner, as taken from [Rothe et al., 2012,
p.130]. The votes are again given in form of complete linear orders, and we consider the
original Copeland voting rule, Copeland1/2. Candidates A and C are the Copeland1/2
winners with the following Copeland1/2 scores for the election:
C1/2Score(A) = 1 + 2 ∗ 1/2 = 2
C1/2Score(B) = 1/2
C1/2Score(C) = 2
C1/2Score(D) = 1 + 1/2 = 1.5
2.1.1.3 Dodgson voting rule
In this section, we explain the Dodgson voting rule, closely following [Rothe et al., 2012,
p.131]. In the Dodgson voting rule, the votes are given in form of complete linear orders,
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Vote A : B A : C A : D B : C B : D C : D
v1: A > D > C > B A A A C D D
v2: C > D > B > A B C D C D C
v3: B > D > A > C B C D C D C
v4: A > C > D > B B A D B B D
v5: A > C > D > B A A A C D C
v6: A > C > B > D A A A C B C
Winner of pairwise comparison ? A ? C D C
Table 2.2: Election without Condorcet winner with results for pairwise comparisons
and the rule uses pairwise comparisons. It respects the Condorcet winner and always
has at least one winner. To determine a winner, the Dodgson score of a candidate is
determined as the minimal number of candidate swaps in the votes to make this candidate
a Condorcet winner. The candidates with the lowest Dodgson score win.
For the election in Table 2.2, candidate A has a Dodgson score of two. It is not possible
to make A a Condorcet winner with only one swap, and it is possible to make them a
Condorcet winner with two swaps, such as in v2:
C > D > B > A → C > D > A > B → C > A > D > B.
Candidate C also has a Dodgson score of two with the following two swaps:
v5 : A > C > D > B → C > A > D > B
v6 : A > C > B > D → C > A > B > D
Because the Dodgson scores for B and D are greater than two, A and C are the Dodgson
winners in this election.
2.1.1.4 Scoring rules
Next, we explain the concept of scoring rules and provide an example for an election
and the results under three well-known scoring rules, closely following [Rothe et al., 2012,
p.124f.]. A scoring vector determines how many points a candidate gains depending on
its position in the respective vote, which has the form of a complete linear order. As
described in [Rothe et al., 2012, p.124, translated], “[a] scoring vector for m candidates
has the form
~α = (α1, ..., αm),
where αi are natural numbers fulfilling the inequation α1 ≥ ... ≥ αm.” A candidate on
position i in a vote receives αi points from the corresponding voter. The winners of an
election are the candidates with the most points over all votes.
We briefly list three well-known scoring rules and the corresponding scoring vectors:
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• Plurality: (1, 0, ..., 0)
• Veto: (1, ..., 1, 0)
• Borda: (m− 1,m− 2, ..., 0)
The following tables are adapted from [Rothe et al., 2012, p.125]. As can be seen in Table
2.3, under Plurality, candidate A wins with a score of two. Table 2.4 shows that under
Veto, candidate B wins with a score of three. Under Borda, both candidates A and B
win with a score of four (see Table 2.5).
v1: A > B > C 1 0 0
v2: B > C > A 0 1 0
v3: A > B > C 1 0 0
Scores 2 1 0
Table 2.3: Election under Plurality
v1: A > B > C 1 1 0
v2: B > C > A 0 1 1
v3: A > B > C 1 1 0
Scores 2 3 1
Table 2.4: Election under Veto
v1: A > B > C 2 1 0
v2: B > C > A 0 2 1
v3: A > B > C 2 1 0
Scores 4 4 1
Table 2.5: Election under Borda
2.1.2 Committee elections
We aim to create consensus on a fixed number of destinations for travel groups. To this
end, we will use committee voting rules. Committee elections have been considered in
several works, such as the master’s thesis by Dennisen2, where the following definition
was used:
A committee election (C, V, k) consists of
• A set of candidates C
2Messung und Minimierung der Wählerunzufriedenheit in Komiteewahlen. S. Dennisen. Master’s thesis.
Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany, 2014.
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• A list of voters V
• A committee size k
Let Fk(C) denote the set of all subsets of C of size k. Then, we define a committee voting
rule as a mapping
{(C, V, k)|(C, V, k) is a committee election} → P(Fk(C))
that assigns to each committee election a set of committees of size k. Via tie-breaking,
one can determine a unique winning committee.
Similar to the master’s thesis of Dennisen, for a committee K, the vector representation
vec(K) can be defined as follows: For a fixed order (c1, ...cm) of the candidates in C,
we represent in the vector representation a candidate ci by placing a zero at the i − th
position if the candidate was not elected and by placing a one at i− th position otherwise.
We will focus on comparing two well-known committee voting rules, both based on Ap-
proval votes, namely k-Minisum-Approval and k-Minimax-Approval3, as well as a com-
mittee voting rule based on complete linear orders, namely k-Minisum-Ranksum4. The
subsequent formulations follow the master’s thesis by Dennisen5.











For Approval votes, we define the disagreement of voter v with committee K as
disag(v,K)
= HD(v, vec(K))
where HD(veci, vecj) is the Hamming distance between two (0, 1)-vectors veci and vecj,
which counts the number of positions where the two vectors differ and which was origi-
nally developed as a means of error detection in binary sequences by [Hamming, 1950].
3Both approaches have been considered by [Brams et al., 2004]. In this paper, Brams et al. proposed
the minimax approach.
4k-Minisum-Ranksum was presented in [Baumeister and Dennisen, 2015].
5Messung und Minimierung der Wählerunzufriedenheit in Komiteewahlen. S. Dennisen. Master’s thesis.
Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany, 2014.
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This corresponds to a utilitarian approach and is equivalent to selecting a committee K∗






For a candidate c ∈ K, the Approval score is defined as
AScore(c, V )
= {v ∈ V |v approves of c}.
The following example is adapted from the master’s thesis by Dennisen (p.22). We con-
sider an example election with k = 2 and C = {A,B,C,D} (see Table 2.6). The winning




1110 0101 1010 Sum
1100 1 2 2 5
1010 1 4 0 5
1001 3 2 2 7
0110 1 2 2 5
0101 3 0 4 7
0011 3 2 2 7
Table 2.6: Example for k-Minisum-Approval with Hamming distances










This corresponds to an egalitarian approach.
The following example election is again adapted from the master’s thesis by Dennisen
(p.35). We consider k = 2 and C = {A,B,C,D} (see Table 2.7). The winning committees
are {A,B} and {B,C} with the minimum maximum Hamming distance of two.
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XXXXXXXXXXXXCommittee
Vote
1110 0101 1010 Maximum
1100 1 2 2 2
1010 1 4 0 4
1001 3 2 2 3
0110 1 2 2 2
0101 3 0 4 4
0011 3 2 2 3
Table 2.7: Example for k-Minimax-Approval with Hamming distances
For complete linear orders, we define the disagreement between voter v and committee K
via a normalised ranksum. Let pos(c, v) be the position of candidate c in vote v. Then,




















The following example is again taken from the master’s thesis by Dennisen (p.25). We
consider k = 2 and C = {A,B,C,D,E} (see Table 2.8). Here, we write linear orders of
the form A > B > C > D > E in the form ABCDE for better readability. The winning
committee in this election is {B,E} with a minimum sum of 14.
`````````̀Committee
Vote
ABEDC BECAD DECAB EABCD CDEAB EDCBA EBACD Sum
{A,B} 0 2 6 2 6 6 2 24
{A,C} 3 4 4 3 2 5 4 25
{A,D} 2 6 2 4 3 4 5 26
{A,E} 1 3 3 0 4 3 1 15
{B,C} 4 1 5 4 3 4 3 24
{B,D} 3 3 3 5 4 3 4 25
{B,E} 2 0 4 1 5 2 0 14
{C,D} 6 5 1 6 0 2 6 26
{C,E} 5 2 2 2 1 1 2 15
{D,E} 4 4 0 3 2 0 3 17
Table 2.8: Example for k-Minisum-Ranksum with ranksums
For the sake of readability, we will shorten k-Minisum-Approval to Minisum-Approval, k-
Minimax-Approval to Minimax-Approval and k-Minisum-Ranksum to Minisum-Ranksum
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in the further course of the text.
2.1.3 Coalition formation
Another important topic in Computational Social Choice is the formation of coalitions.
What happens when agents can form coalitions and each agent has preferences over these
coalitions? This relates to our topic insofar as we consider the question of how to form
travel groups. There are three subtopics of the topic coalition formation:
• Matching under preferences
• Hedonic games
• Weighted voting games
To explain the three different classes, we closely follow the three corresponding chapters
in [Brandt et al., 2016b].
2.1.3.1 Matching under preferences
The assignment of POIs to travellers seems to be similar to matching problems, which
are considered by [Klaus et al., 2016] in [Brandt et al., 2016b, p.333-355]. In this section,
we closely follow their explanation.
A prominent example for matching under preferences is the Stable Marriage Algorithm
by [Gale and Shapley, 1962], as mentioned in Section 2.1. Matching problems can be
subdivided into bipartite and non-bipartite. In bipartite matching problems, the agent
set consists of two separate sets A and B, where the members of A have only preferences
over the members of B. It is possible that the members of B have preferences over the
members of A. In non-bipartite matching problems, there is a single set of agents, where
each has a ranking over some or all of the other agents. Bipartite problems can be further
subdivided into two-sided and one-sided. In the two-sided case, members of both A and
B have preferences over one another. In the one-sided case, only the members of one set
(A) have preferences over the members of the other one (B).
The Stable Marriage problem is a two-sided bipartite matching problem, because it as-
sumes two sets, A and B, where the agents in each have preferences over only the agents
in the other set. It is a special case of the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, which is
formally defined as follows [Brandt et al., 2016b, p.336f., verbatim]:
Definition 1. An instance I of HR involves a set R = {r1, ...rn1} of residents and a
set H = {h1, ..., hn2} of hospitals. Each hospital hj ∈ H has a positive integer capacity,
denoted by cj, indicating the number of posts for hj. E ⊆ R ×H is the set of acceptable
resident-hospital pairs. Let m = |E|. Each resident ri ∈ R has an acceptable set of
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hospitals A(ri) where A(ri) = {hj ∈ H : (ri, hj) ∈ E}. Similarly, each hospital hj ∈ H
has an acceptable set of residents A(hj) where A(hj) = {ri ∈ R : (ri, hj) ∈ E}.
The agents in I are residents at hospitals in R ∪ H. Each agent ak ∈ R ∪ H has a
preference list in which they rank A(ak) in strict order. Given any resident ri ∈ R and
any hospitals hj, hk ∈ H, ri prefers hj to hk if {hj, hk} ⊆ A(ri) and hj precedes hk on
ri’s preference list. The prefers relation is defined similarly for a hospital.
An assignment M in I is a subset of E. If (ri, rj) ∈ M , ri is said to be assigned to hj,
and hj is assigned ri. For each ak ∈ R ∪ H, the set of assignees of ak in M is denoted
by M(ak). If ri ∈ R and M(ri) = ∅, then ri is said to be unassigned. Otherwise, ri is
assigned. Similarly, a hospital hj ∈ H is undersubscribed or full if |M(hj)| is less than
or equal to cj, respectively. A matching M in I is an assignment such that |M(ri)| ≤ 1
for each ri ∈ R and |M(hj)| ≤ cj for each hj ∈ H. Given a matching M and a resident
ri ∈ R such that M(ri) 6= ∅, if there is no ambiguity, the notation M(ri) is also used to
refer to a single member of the set M(ri).
Given an instance I of HR and a matching M , a pair (ri, hj) ∈ E \M blocks M (or
is a blocking pair for M) if (i) ri is unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri) and (ii) hj is
undersubscribed or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj). M is said to be stable if it
admits no blocking pair. If a resident–hospital pair, (rj, hj), belongs to a stable matching
in I, ri is a stable partner of hj and vice versa.
The Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI) [Gale and Shapley, 1962] is a
special case of HR in which cj = 1 for all hj, and the classical Stable Marriage problem
is a restriction of SMI in which n1 = n2 and E = R×H.
Additionally to describing the different classes of matching problems and discussing the
Stable Marriage problem and HR, [Klaus et al., 2016] mention that there are several
variants of many-to-many matching problems considered in the literature and that those
variants are often considered in the context of assigning workers to firms, meaning that
each agent can be assigned multiple times according to a given capacity. Usually, both
workers and firms have preferences in form of strict rankings over the agents in the other
set (or over subsets of agents). In these problems, the aim is to find stable matchings.
[Brandt et al., 2016b, p.344f.]
The problem considered in this dissertation is similar to bipartite matching with one-sided
preferences: One can interpret the travellers as members of the set A which have prefer-
ences over the members of set B, the POIs. Unlike in this matching problem, we consider
a scenario where a traveller chooses several POIs. The problem of assigning travellers
to POIs is similar to many-to-many matching problems. However, in this dissertation
the focus does not lie on finding stable matchings but rather on comparing the effects of
several voting algorithms on user and system goals.
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2.1.3.2 Hedonic games
[Aziz et al., 2016] consider hedonic games in [Brandt et al., 2016b, p.356–376]. In this
section, we closely follow their explanation.
Hedonic games can be used to model research-team formation ([Alcalde and Revilla, 2004]),
scheduling group activities, see [Darmann et al., 2012], forming coalition governments
as described by [Le Breton et al., 2008], clustering in social networks as described by
[Aziz et al., 2019] and distributed task allocation, see [Saad et al., 2010]. Hedonic games
are coalition formation games with hedonic preferences, where the outcome of a coalition
formation game is the partitioning of agents into disjoint coalitions. Having hedonic pref-
erences means that an agent only cares about what agents are in its coalition and does not
care about the group composition in other coalitions, see [Dreze and Greenberg, 1980].
A hedonic game can be formally defined as follows [Brandt et al., 2016b, p.357, verba-
tim]:
Definition 2. Let N be a finite set of agents. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N . Let
Ni = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S} be the set of all coalitions (subsets of N) that include agent i ∈ N .
A coalitional structure is a partition π of agents N into disjoint coalitions. A hedonic
coalition formation game is a pair (N,%) where % is a preference profile that specifies for
every agent i ∈ N a reflexive, complete and transitive binary relation, % on Ni. We call
%i a preference relation.
Agents have an incentive to deviate if there exist deviations to new coalitions they prefer
to their old one. These are called profitable deviations. [Bogomolnaia et al., 2005] define
a coalition structure as “stable with respect to a class of allowable single-agent deviations
if no agent has a profitable allowable deviation”.
Additionally to the view of [Aziz et al., 2016] in [Brandt et al., 2016b], hedonic games
are described by [Darmann and Lang, 2016] in another context, as explained in Subsec-
tion 2.1.4.
The situation considered in this dissertation could theoretically be modelled as a hedonic
game in which every possible coalition of travellers implies, given a voting rule, a certain
set of POIs for this coalition. Each traveller has a certain satisfaction value for each such
POI set, implying a ranking over different coalitions. The condition that each agent only
cares about which agents are in their coalition is fulfilled implicitly when assuming a fixed
voting rule. However, we aim to draw comparisons between several voting algorithms.
2.1.3.3 Weighted voting games
For the sake of completeness, we also briefly describe the last subarea of coalition forma-
tion, weighted voting games, which are considered by [Chalkiadakis and Wooldridge, 2016]
in [Brandt et al., 2016b, p.377–395]. We closely follow their explanation.
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Weighted voting games are a special form of cooperative games that can be used to model
decision-making situations in which a set of voters make a binary (yes/no) decision on
a particular issue. Each voter has a numeric weight, and the decision is carried out if
the number of voters favouring this decision meets or exceeds a given threshold (i.e. the
quota).
Next, we describe a short example. Following [Bilbao et al., 2002], [Taylor, 1995] and
[Taylor and Zwicker, 1999], both the U.S. federal system and the voting system of the
European Union can be modelled as weighted voting games, where, in the first case, the
participating agents are the president, vice president, senators and representatives. The
senators have zero weight regarding the House of Representatives game and the repre-
sentatives have zero weight regarding the Senate game, and the president has a non-zero
weight in both games. In the case of the European Union voting system, we have a three-
weighted voting game: each member state is a player. The law requires the support of
50% of the member countries, 62% of the population and 74% of the European Union
commissioners. In the first component of the game, the weights for the member states are
assigned according to the number of commissioners of the respective member state. In
the second component, we have a simple majority game where every state has one vote.
In the third component, the weights for the states are proportional to the population of
the respective state. [Brandt et al., 2016b, p.393]
[Brandt et al., 2016b, p.378, verbatim] formally define cooperative games as follows:
Definition 3. A cooperative game, G, is given by a pair G = (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n}
is the set of players of the game and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function of the game.
A cooperative game G = (N, v) is simple if v(C) ∈ [0, 1] for all C ⊆ N . In this case, we
say C ⊆ N are winning if v(C) = 1 and losing otherwise. A simple game is nontrivial if
v(N) = 1.
[Brandt et al., 2016b, p.379, verbatim] formally define a weighted voting game as fol-
lows:
Definition 4. A weighted voting game G with a set of players N = {1, ..., n} is given by
a list of weights w = (w1, ..., wn) ∈ Rn and a quota q ∈ R. The characteristic function








2.1.4 Group activity selection problems
Another topic considered in Computational Social Choice is the selection of activities for
a group of agents. Our situation is similar, because we need to select POIs for a group of
traffic participants. The explanations regarding group activity selection problems in this
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section closely follow the formulations by [Darmann and Lang, 2016] in [Endriss, 2017,
p.87–101].
Group activity selection means that one or several activities are selected for a set of
agents, and the agents are assigned to one of the different selected activities according to
their preferences. In group activity selection problems, one considers agents’ preferences
over both activities and the number of participants for an activity.
The authors give as an example a group activity selection problem known as the “Dagstuhl
group activity selection problem” among the Dagstuhl staff. It is described as follows in
[Endriss, 2017, p.87]. The organisers of a workshop plan to have a set of group activities
during a free afternoon. They have the following conditions:
• The activities are held in parallel, and each participant can take part in at most one
activity.
• The possible activities include hiking, a bus trip to a nearby city and a table-tennis
competition.
• There can be several hiking groups, and analogously, several buses can be rented for
the trip. As for the table-tennis competition, there can only be one group, because
there is only one table.
• Because the cost of renting bus(es) must be shared among the participants, a bus
trip with more participants will be preferred to a bus trip with fewer participants.
• Considering the table-tennis competition, is is assumed that the participants pre-
fer the number of participants to be neither too small nor too large, because the
participants neither will want to wait long to play nor to play without breaks.
Furthermore, the authors explain that there are several natural variations of this problem.
For example, [Lee and Shoham, 2015] defined the stable invitation problem as follows:
There is only one activity for which the organiser looks for a set of invitees. The potential
invitees have preferences about the number of invitees; they can also have preferences
about the other invitees. [Lee and Shoham, 2014] further defined an extension of this
problem where the invitee preferences additionally also depend on the date the event
takes place.
Darmann and Lang explain that if there are no distinct activity types, which is equivalent
to every group being assigned to the same activity, one gets an anonymous hedonic game,
meaning that agents have only preferences regarding the number of agents in the group
they belong to. If the agents can additionally have preferences about the identity of their
group members, one gets the general case of a hedonic game. In the following, some
problems are formally defined considering a set of agents N = {1, ..., n}.
Definition 5. Activities and Assignments [Endriss, 2017, p.88f., verbatim].
We consider a set of activities A = A∗ ∪ {a∅}, where A∗ = {a1, ..., am}. Activity a∅ is
called the void activity. An agent being assigned to a∅ will not participate in any concrete
activity.
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An assignment for (N,A) is a mapping π : N → A. π0 denotes the set of agents i such that
π(i) = a∅ and for each j ≤ m,πj is the set of agents i such that π(i) = aj. The coalition
structure induced by π is defined as CSπ = {{i}|i ∈ π0} ∪ {πj|1 ≤ j ≤ m,πj 6= ∅}.
Definition 6. Alternatives and Preference Profiles [Endriss, 2017, p.89, ver-
batim] Agents have preferences that bear both on the activity to which they will be assigned
and on the set of agents who will participate in the same activity. An alternative for agent
i is either an a∅ or a pair (a, S) ∈ Ni, where Ni is the set of all subsets of N containing
i. Xi is the set of alternatives for i.
Each agent i has some preferences over Xi. A preference relation for agent i %i is a
reflexive and transitive order over Xi. A preference profile is an n-tuple P = (%1, ...,%n)
where % is a preference relation for i.
In the following, several classes of Group Activity Selection Problems (GASPs) are de-
scribed.
Hedonic Games As mentioned in Subsubsection 2.1.3.2, hedonic games cannot only be
viewed as coalition formation, as in [Aziz et al., 2016], but also as group activity selection
problem. As group activity selection problem, hedonic games can formally be defined as
follows:
Definition 7. Hedonic Games [Endriss, 2017, p.89, verbatim] We say that %i
is activity-independent if (a, S) ∼i (a′, S) for all activities a, a′ and coalitions S. i′s
preference relation %i depends only on the set of agents in i′s coalition and not on
the activity to which i is assigned. When P = (%1, ...,%n) and every %i is activity-
independent, (N,A, P ) degenerates into a hedonic game, where agents only care about
which agents are in their coalition [Dreze and Greenberg, 1980, Banerjee et al., 2001,
Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002].
Anonymous Group Activity Selection: GASP [Endriss, 2017, p.90] In anonymous
group activity selection, agents care only about the activity to which they belong and the
number of participants in that activity. For consistency with existing literature, Darmann
and Lang referred to the general model, where agents care about both the assigned activity
and the identity of the agents in their group, as generalised group activity selection and
the anonymous model as group activity selection (GASP). If in a GASP, all agents have
approval-based preferences, it is called an approval-based group activity selection problem,
or an a-GASP [Darmann et al., 2012]. If all agents have as preferences complete linear
orders, the GASP is called an ordinal group activity selection problem, or an o-GASP
[Darmann, 2015].
Stable invitations [Endriss, 2017, p.91f.] In the case where only one non-void activity
exists, we have a stable invitation problem. If the preferences are anonymous, we have an
anonymous stable invitation problem.
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Group Activity Selection on Social Networks: gGASP [Endriss, 2017, p.92] Another
problem is the one described by [Igarashi et al., 2017a, Igarashi et al., 2017b]. It is a
constrained group activity problem where the agents are linked through an undirected
graph G which represents social interactions. A coalition of agents being assigned to an
activity is feasible only if the coalition is connected with respect to this graph. GASP
corresponds to the special case where G is a complete graph.
Simplified GASP [Endriss, 2017, p.92] Additionally to the above-presented problems,
there is an even simpler one. When agents’ preferences depend only on the activity to
which they are assigned, we have a simplified GASP.
Simplified GASP is similar to our considered problem insofar as the agents’ preferences
only depend on the POIs they are assigned to. Unlike in group activity selection, where
each agent is assigned to at most one activity, we consider a scenario where agents can
be assigned to several POIs.
Overview of problem classes Figure 2.2 which is taken from [Darmann and Lang, 2016]
in [Endriss, 2017, p.92] depicts the relation between the different group selection activity
problems.
Figure 2.2: GASP: overview
Solution Concepts There are different solution concepts for the above-defined group
activity selection problems.
Maximum Individual Rationality and Pareto Optimality[Endriss, 2017, p.94] : A possible
solution approach is to find a maximum individually rational assignment. This would be
an individually rational assignment that maximises the number of agents assigned to a
non-void activity. Another approach is to find a Pareto-optimal partition for a hedonic
game. This would require a partition such that it could not be improved for some agents
without other agents being worse off.
Stability Notions [Endriss, 2017, p.94ff.] : Another solution concept is to consider sta-
bility regarding incentive for agents to deviate from an assignment. For hedonic games
and group activity selection, there exist several notions of stability: Nash, individual,
contractual individual, core and strict core.
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2.1.5 Allocation of indivisible, non-shareable resources
The assignment of POIs to agents is reminiscent of another area considered in Com-
putational Social Choice (ComSoc), namely the allocation of indivisible, non-shareable
resources. These resources can be single items or bundles. In this section, we follow the
definitions for auctions and multi-agent resource allocation given in [Rothe et al., 2012].
Note that in Multi-agent Resource Allocation (MARA) and auctions, each item or bundle
can be allocated exactly once. However, in our scenario, a POI can be assigned to several
agents.
2.1.5.1 Single-item auctions
In this section, we explain single-item auctions following [Rothe et al., 2012, p.327-332].
To allocate single objects, one needs an allocation procedure, which can be distributed or
centralised. While in distributed allocation procedures, the agents follow a negotiation
protocol to agree on an allocation of the items amongst themselves, in centralised allo-
cation procedures, a central authority conducts the allocation based on the submitted
individual valuations of the agents regarding the objects. Auctions are centralised allo-
cation procedures. Some examples of single-item auctions are first-price sealed, English,
Dutch, Vickrey and all-pay auctions.
2.1.5.2 Multi-agent resource allocation (MARA)
In this section, we give a brief description of the area MARA, using the definitions and
explanations in [Rothe et al., 2012, p.333f.]. MARA investigates the allocation of bundles
of resources.
In order to define MARA settings, we assume a set of agents A = {a1, ..., an} and a set of
resources R = {r1, ..., rm}. As described in [Rothe et al., 2012, p.333f., translated], “[f ]or
each bundle B ⊆ R of resources, the utility function ui : P(C)→ Q, defines the utility of
agent ai ∈ A independently of the utility values of other agents.” Agents can have prefer-
ences over single bundles, either ordinal or cardinal. As described in [Rothe et al., 2012,
p.334, translated], “[a]n ordinal preference over R is based on a binary relation  over
R, which is reflexive and transitive and usually, but not necessarily, complete. B i B′
means that bundle B has at least the same value as B′ to agent ai. In contrast, a cardinal
preference over R is defined by the utility function of agent ai.” Note that each cardinal
preference ui induces an ordinal preference i by B i B′ ↔ ui(B) ≤ ui(B′). Based
on these assumptions, allocations can be formally defined as follows [Rothe et al., 2012,
p.334, translated and adapted]:
Definition 8. Allocations An allocation for A and R is a mapping X : A→ P(R) with
X(aj)∩X(ak) = ∅ for any pair of agents aj and ak where j 6= k. That is, X(ai) = B ⊆ R
is the bundle of resources allocated to agent ai, and the bundles different agents receive
are disjunct. [Let U = {u1, ..., un} denote the set of all utility functions ui for the agents.]
Then, the triple (A,R, U) is called a MARA setting.
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2.2 Transport applications
As depicted in the classification in Figure 2.1, we apply voting approaches in the traffic
domain. Thus, we need to consider the relationship to existing transport applications.
Here, two traffic research areas are relevant, because they deal with groups of traffic
participants: ridesharing and platooning research.
2.2.1 Ridesharing
Because we consider traveller groups, our research is related to ridesharing research. In
the following, we describe a selection from a broad range of works regarding ridesharing.
[Furuhata et al., 2013], defines ridesharing as follows: Each traveller has a demand for
their trip consisting of the origin and the destination, and ridesharing is a joint-trip of at
least two participants sharing a vehicle.
As [Agatz et al., 2012, p.297] outlined, most studies on ridesharing considered one or
a combination of the following goals; we closely follow their formulations:
• Minimise system-wide vehicle miles : the system-wide vehicle miles are the total
vehicle miles driven by all participants travelling to their destinations either by
ridesharing or by driving alone. This goal is important at the societal level, because
it helps reduce pollution and congestion. It is also compatible with minimising total
travel costs, which is an important consideration for the participating drivers and
riders and the ride-share provider.
• Minimise the system-wide travel time: the travel time is the time spent in the vehicle
while travelling between origin and destination. Apart from being an important
consideration for the participants, it is also an important measure at the societal
level, because vehicle emissions relate to both vehicle miles and vehicle speeds.
• Maximise the number of participants : this goal maximises the number of satisfied
drivers and riders in the system. This goal is relevant for private ride-share providers
whose gain is linked to the number of successful ride-share arrangements. The
matching success rate is also an important performance indicator for users of ride-
share services, and a high success rate can lead to larger participant pools in the
future.
[Furuhata et al., 2013, p.34f.] listed and explained classes of ridesharing; we closely follow
their formulations:
Dynamic ridesharing: here, an automated process of ride-matching (routing, scheduling,
and pricing) between drivers and passengers is provided on very short notice or even
en route [Agatz et al., 2012].
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Carpooling: this defines services for commuters who share transportation to work in a
private vehicle with other workers, see for example [Ferguson, 1997].
Long-distance ride-match: this defines services for travellers taking long-distance trips.
Typically, long-distance travellers have more flexible travel schedules than on-demand
travellers and commuters. Some providers in this class offer a list-based search as
an alternative search choice. Users of this service specify the departure region and
then search for candidates in the list. This means rather than specifying a preferred
departure time, they choose their departure time based on availability of rides.
One-shot ride-match: this is a hybrid of carpooling and long-distance ride-matching,
where choices for a ride-matching method are offered according to trip types. The
matching methods are similar to those used in carpooling and long-distance rideshar-
ing. Matching agencies in this class provide not only the search criteria OD-Pair
and Time, but also additional search criteria lists and keywords, as well as routes.
Bulletin-board: here, ridesharing opportunities are provided based on notice boards.
Some providers try to keep the ridesharing offers and requests as flexible as possible
and base the decision on what type of information should be included in the offers
and requests on the users, meaning that most ridesharing conditions are fixed by
negotiation among the users. See also [Beroldo, 1991].
Flexible carpooling: this form is semi-organised, where the users meet at predetermined
locations to organise shared rides, see for example [Kelley, 2007].
Note that unlike in ridesharing, in our scenario, the destinations or activities are not fixed
a priori, but they must be determined based on the preferences of the travellers over all
possible destinations. Additionally, rather than considering space-time interdependencies
for the determination of travel groups, we consider routing a downstream problem.
Generally, there are two types of ridesharing: trip-based and activity-based, as described
in the following subsections.
2.2.1.1 Trip-based vs. activity-based ridesharing
[Wang et al., 2016] considered activity-based ridesharing, as opposed to trip-based rideshar-
ing. In the following paragraphs, we briefly explain the differences and describe the solu-
tion approach for activity-based ridesharing by [Wang et al., 2016].
Trip-based ridesharing A common assumption of trip-based ridesharing is that a trav-
eller has a demand for a trip consisting of an origin and a destination. In trip-based
ridesharing, the trips are defined a priori, and journeys from one unique location to an-
other are matched. [Wang et al., 2016, p.2]
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Activity-based ridesharing Analogue to defining trips a priori in trip-based rideshar-
ing, activity-based travel planning categorises activities as fixed (e.g. workplace-related
activities) and flexible activities (e.g. shopping)[Wang et al., 2016, p.1].
[Wang et al., 2016] proposed an activity-based ridesharing algorithm (ABRA), which aims
to efficiently increase matching rates by considering alternative destinations for flexible
activities while keeping detour costs tolerable. As the authors explained, ABRA includes
two steps:
1. Build a pool of alternative destinations and trips for the targeted activities based
on the trip’s space–time budgets
2. Find feasible matchings considering these alternatives in addition to the original
ones.
Matching is conducted as static pre-planning with all daily schedules as input. A daily
schedule includes one or multiple trip chains consisting of multiple trips. [Wang et al., 2016,
p.2]
In their study, they considered a centralised approach to show the theoretical poten-
tial of the activity-based approach. ABRA centrally computes the global maximum of all
feasible matches. They pointed out that cheaper (i.e. heuristic or decentralised) solutions
may exist.[Wang et al., 2016, p.2]
An important assumption in their paper was that each person has a complete list of
full-day activities with a predefined running order. Thus, the activity sequence and plan-
ning were outside of their study scope. [Wang et al., 2016, p.3]
2.2.2 Platooning
Another traffic research area relevant in the context of the considered topic is platooning.
The Cambridge Dictionary defines platooning as “a method of connecting vehicles either
physically or using computer technology so they can travel close together in a group, as a
way of saving space, fuel, or money” [Cambridge Dictionary, 2021]. In this dissertation,
we assume platoons consisting of pods which are physically coupled.
In recent years, the relevance of platooning has increased. [Bergenhem et al., 2012] pro-
vided an overview of platooning projects until 2012. The projects aimed at utilising
platoons in order to make improvements such as increasing fuel and traffic efficiency,
safety and driver comfort. Although the focus was often placed on truck platooning
and/or highways, there were also projects that focused on urban scenarios. For example,
the GCDC (Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge) of 2011 considered both urban and
highway scenarios [Mårtensson et al., 2012]. In the GCDC, one challenge was to increase
road throughput by reducing the spacing between vehicles.
[Haas and Friedrich, 2017] gave a short outline of platooning research until 2017. They
determined that platoons were mostly used for freight purposes [Ramakers et al., 2011,
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Alam et al., 2015, Liang et al., 2016] and were considered promising in terms of road util-
isation, road safety [Varaiya, 1993, Alam et al., 2015] and reduction of fuel consump-
tion [Tsugawa et al., 2011, Janssen et al., 2015, Van De Hoef et al., 2015]. While early
studies regarding platooning techniques focused on Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) sys-
tems, later studies focused on Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) systems,
which enable increasing the road throughput even further [Ploeg et al., 2011]. While
there have been many studies on the environmental benefits of using platoons, see e.g.
[Bonnet and Fritz, 2000, Al Alam et al., 2010, Liang et al., 2013], there have been com-
parably few studies regarding traffic-related aspects (e.g. travel time). In this context,
[Haas and Friedrich, 2017] considered autonomous connected vehicle platoons for city lo-
gistics, focusing on the effect of different platoon configurations on travel time.
The target quantities considered in the works reviewed by [Bergenhem et al., 2012] and
[Haas and Friedrich, 2017] included fuel and traffic efficiency, safety, driver comfort, road
throughput and travel time. In our approach, we consider other target quantities: pref-
erence dissatisfaction, group size and organisational effort.
2.3 Collective decision-making in transport
Next, we consider approaches that combine both domains/areas, i.e. investigate collective
decision-making in traffic applications.
These approaches include reservation-based approaches in road-traffic management (Sub-
section 2.3.1), a model for urban mobility social simulation (Subsection 2.3.2), joint deci-
sions in transport (Subsection 2.3.3), the joint-travel problem (Subsection 2.3.4), tactical-
level decision-making for platoons of autonomous vehicles using auction mechanisms (Sub-
section 2.3.5) and existing voting applications in traffic management (Subsection 2.3.6).
2.3.1 Reservation-based approaches in traffic management
As prominent example for collective decision-making in traffic management, we highlight
the works by Dresner, Stone, Vasirani and Ossowski on reservation-based approaches. In
these approaches, driver agents need to reserve resources by communicating with inter-
section managers.
[Dresner and Stone, 2008] proposed a multi-agent approach for autonomous intersection
management. In this approach, drivers crossing intersections are coordinated with the
help of intersection managers. At each intersection, the driver agents call ahead in order
to reserve a block of space-time in the intersection. According to an intersection control
policy, the respective intersection manager decides whether to grant or reject reservation
requests.
Based on Dresner and Stone’s approach, [Vasirani and Ossowski, 2009] proposed a market-
inspired approach to reservation-based urban road-traffic management. They extended
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the approach to networks of intersections using market-inspired control methods. In the
new approach, several intersection managers can act as teams.
Note that in these reservation-based approaches, there is no clear separation of subgroups
of vehicles that need to agree on common plans, as the vehicles at the intersection are
constantly replaced by the following vehicles. In contrast, we consider in our scenario
clearly defined groups of vehicles that need to agree on common destinations.
2.3.2 Model for urban mobility social simulation
[Grimaldo et al., 2012] developed a market-based model for urban mobility social simu-
lation. In their simulation, they implemented social decisions made by the inhabitants of
a town about how to get to work, such as travelling by train, using their own car or via
car sharing.
They compared outcomes produced by societies of individualist and egalitarian agents in
terms of average travel time, usage of urban transportation and CO2 emission. For their
agent-based social simulation of this scenario, they used the Multimodal Agent Decision-
making (MADeM) model described in [Grimaldo et al., 2008].
They followed a preference network approach in which the agents expressed their prefer-
ences using utility functions so that personal attitudes were represented by the differential
utilitarian importance they placed on the utilities of others. They describe the MADeM
approach as a market-based mechanism for social decision-making which is capable of
simulating different kinds of social welfare, such as elitist or utilitarian as well as different
social attitudes, such as egoism or altruism. [Grimaldo et al., 2012, p.150]
In this approach, agents are required to express their preferences with regard to the differ-
ent solutions for the respective decision problem. Because MADeM is based on the MARA
theory, it represents each solution as a set of resource allocations. MADeM can consider
both tasks and objects as resources to be allocated and uses first-sealed one-round auc-
tions as the allocation procedure. The winner determination uses a multi-criteria winner
determination problem to merge the collected preferences according to the kind of agent
or society simulated. [Grimaldo et al., 2012, p.151]
In the considered scenario, each inhabitant is represented by an agent that uses the
J-MADeM library as defined in [Grimaldo et al., 2010] to make decisions that balance in-
dividual and social preferences, and inhabitants are randomly organised in decision groups
comprising family, friends, neighbours, etc. The maximum capacity of cars is set to four
people, which is also the size of the decision groups. An allocation is a travel alternative,
and J-MADeM collects the preferences of the group for every possible alternative. Every
agent computes three utility functions for each allocation: monetary cost, travel time,
and ecological impact. For winner determination in this scenario, J-MADeM used the
utilitarian collective utility function of social welfare to reflect the aggregate impact of
the type of allocations considered. [Grimaldo et al., 2012, p.152f.]
The authors considered three world views. Agents with a hierarchical worldview as-
34 Chapter 2 - Background and Related Work
sumed that nature was stable in most cases, but that it can collapse if the capacity is
exceeded. Egalitarian agents assumed that nature is highly unstable, each human inter-
vention can lead to a collapse, and individualists assumed that nature provides plenty
of resources and will remain stable. To model these types, utility weights were used.
[Grimaldo et al., 2012, p.154]
In [Grimaldo et al., 2010], the bidding phase is described in more detail. Because the
auctioneer informs the bidders about both the task-slot allocation and the used utility
functions, bidders only need to compute the specified utility functions and return the
values for each auction to the auctioneer.
In J-MADeM, each solution to the considered decision problems is represented as a set of
resource allocations. In our model, we consider the agreement on a common decision via
voting, not resource allocation. We focus on comparing several voting algorithms. Fur-
thermore, we consider defined vote forms, whereas the MADeM model can use arbitrary
utility functions. Note that some elections could probably also be modelled using the
MADeM model: returning the utility values to the auctioneer is similar to submitting a
vote. One could define some vote forms using J-MADeM by only allowing certain utility
values to represent different vote forms, for example [0,1] utility functions for Approval
votes. However, the winner determination in J-MADeM is conducted via a multi-criteria
approach.
2.3.3 Joint decisions in transport
[Dubernet and Axhausen, 2012] and [Dubernet and Axhausen, 2013] developed a multi-
agent simulation for modelling joint-travel behaviour. In this section, we closely follow
their formulations.
[Dubernet and Axhausen, 2012] modelled behaviour for the case where several individuals
may travel in the same private vehicle. As they explained, this is both important for
detailed simulations of household behaviour and for the evaluation of policies, including
incentives to perform carpooling. [Dubernet and Axhausen, 2012, p.1]
[Dubernet and Axhausen, 2013] presented an approach for simulating joint decision pro-
cesses, which uses the MATSim framework.
Their model was based on an activity-based approach, where the fact that travel is oriented
toward a goal is explicitly taken into account by assigning agents plans which consist of
located activities. The agents then travel between those activities in a simulated network.
[Dubernet and Axhausen, 2013, p.2]
The authors described different approaches for joint decision modelling, for example the
random utility approach. This approach has been widely used in transportation research
[Ben-Akiva et al., 1985]. In the random utility approach, each alternative is associated
with a numerical utility comprising a systematic part, which is an expectation value, and
a random error term representing unobserved variability. The higher the probability that
the utility of an alternative is higher than the utility of all other alternatives, the higher
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the probability is that an agent chooses this alternative. When considering the choice
problem for joint decision as a group utility maximisation problem, using random utility
is a straightforward approach. For several decades, the random utility approach has been
used for group schedule generation for activity-based transport simulation, mainly for
household-schedule generation, Note that, because the choice set has high dimensionality
with both discrete dimensions (e.g. activity types, joint activity participation, sequence of
activities and modes) and continuous dimensions (e.g. activity duration), different choice
dimensions have been considered by different researchers. [Dubernet and Axhausen, 2013,
p. 4]
In previous approaches for coping with individual coordination, some relied on the actual
simulation of bargaining processes, whereas others considered the utility-based optimisa-
tion of a joint plan. Dubernet and Axhausen proposed a utility-based approach based on
the joint-plan concept, while allowing representation of coordination in arbitrary social
structures. [Dubernet and Axhausen, 2013, p. 6f.].
In their works, Dubernet and Axhausen did not focus on comparing given voting al-
gorithms when modelling joint-travel behaviour, whereas in our approach, we focus on
comparing the effects of several voting algorithms.
2.3.4 Joint-travel problem
[Liao, 2017] considered the Joint-Travel Problem (JTP), which is an extension of the
shortest-path problem. Liao proposed a space-time multistate super-network to tackle
JTP for the situation that one joint activity is conducted in a time-dependent context.
Starting with a two-person JTP in a unimodal network, it was extended for both multi-
modal and multiperson transport.
[Liao, 2017, p.2] described the problem as follows: “JTP [...] aims to find the optimal
joint path for a travel group. A joint path involves multiple individual paths with multiple
origins and destinations. Some parts of the individual paths may be shared by a subset of
the travel group.”
When a group of individuals decides to travel together, they must agree on where and
when to meet and depart. If more than two persons are involved, decisions regarding the
meeting/departing sequence are also necessary. [Liao, 2017, p.2f.]
In an example of joint-travel scheduling for one joint activity, [Liao, 2017, p.5] described
how, for the two-person case, two persons might agree on a meeting point from two al-
ternatives, an activity location from two alternatives and a departing point from two
alternatives, i.e. the algorithm can be used to choose one activity location from several
alternatives.
Liao defined the disutility of an individual or a joint path as the sum of the associated
link disutilities. To minimise group disutility, JTP aims to find the optimal joint path
that includes choices regarding departure time, route, meeting/departing time/point/se-
quencing, as well as activity location and duration for the travel group. [Liao, 2017, p. 6]
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This paper focuses on finding the optimal joint path for different variants, namely, for
two or more persons for no joint activity or one joint activity, considering both unimodal
and multimodal transport.
Rather than determining the optimal path for joint activities, we focus on comparing
the effect of several voting algorithms on system and user goals. Liao does not explicitly
consider the case in which the group conducts more than one joint activity, whereas we aim
to achieve consensus on several destinations. Furthermore, we assume a fixed assembly
point rather than the question of where the agents should meet and depart. Additionally,
we do not consider time windows.
2.3.5 Tactical-level decision-making for platoons of autonomous
vehicles using auction mechanisms
[Kokkinogenis et al., 2019] proposed the application of market-based mechanisms for es-
tablishing cooperative behaviour in traffic scenarios involving autonomous vehicles. This
paper aimed to show the suitability of well-known auction rules as a mechanism for
tactical-level collective decision-making in platooning applications by comparing two auc-
tion rules as proof of concept: first- and second-price sealed bid auctions. They evaluated
the effects of the auction rules on the quantities monetary flows, platoon welfare from
utilitarian and egalitarian perspectives (measured in average and minimum utility) and
time to consensus. As a concrete scenario, they considered an already formed platoon
whose members needed to come to an agreement regarding two contexts: cruising speed
and route. Each platoon member had a preferred cruising speed and route for the same
origin and destination, a certain willingness to pay for each resource and an endowment
that reflected the available amount of monetary units. In the context of route choice,
each platoon member considered the sequences of vertices which represent the preferred
route and an alternative route. The Hamming distance was used to measure the similarity
between the two routes. This was then compared with the desired maximum similarity
between routes to compute the utility for the route context.
In contrast to the approach of Kokkinogeneis et al., we use voting instead of auction
rules to agree on destinations for the platoon. Furthermore, instead of assuming already
formed platoons, we take consider several grouping algorithms.
2.3.6 Existing voting applications in traffic management
In this subsection, we provide an overview of existing voting approaches for traffic ap-
plications. Those include institutional consensus in vehicular networks, leader elections
in platoons, voting-based approaches for autonomous vehicles coordination and group
aggregation strategies for tourism.
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2.3.6.1 Institutionalised consensus in vehicular networks
An example of the application of voting algorithms in traffic management is found in the
work by [Sanderson and Pitt, 2012, Sanderson et al., 2012]. [Sanderson and Pitt, 2012]
proposed the management of consensus formation in open, decentralised and resource-
constrained systems (e.g. vehicular networks) using self-organising electronic institutions.
To this end, they adapted the Paxos algorithm for fault-tolerant consensus in distributed
databases [Lamport, 1998] to the Institutionalised Paxos Consensus (IPCon) algorithm
for robust collective choice in electronic institutions. They aimed at fault-tolerance in
regard to inadvertent failure, non-compliant behaviour and environmental changes. In
their paper, they demonstrated that the IPCon algorithm is a viable method for coordi-
nation, consensus formation and collective choice in self-organising MAS using electronic
institutions.
[Sanderson et al., 2012, p.77] proposed a three-layered framework for providing intelli-
gence at different levels of driving, which they described as follows:
1. The micro level is concerned with the actual execution of driving, which includes
safety issues as well as fulfilling drivers’ and passengers’ goals and preferences such
as driving speed or safety distance.
2. The meso level is concerned with collective decision-making within groups or clusters
of vehicles, where the clusters are created according to some relationship among
the vehicles (e.g. clusters form at every junction) and the vehicles should reach
agreements on decisions such as who passes first or which speed a platoon travels
at
The authors assumed that, owing to the high dynamics of traffic, vehicles are con-
stantly leaving and joining clusters. The meso level relies on V2X communication
for both information exchange between vehicles regarding their intentions and for
carrying out negotiations to reach agreements
3. The macro level deals with infrastructure or system-wide goals, such as reducing
congestion and pollution, making efficient use of the road network and managing
the interaction of the network.
As an example, the authors demonstrated how vehicles in a cluster could reach a consen-
sus on several institutional facts via IPCon to govern their behaviour.
Among other things, IPCon considers that the current value may not always be the best
one. Thus, it may be necessary to revise a chosen value. In the case of platooning, the
vehicles may agree on the travel speed, which would then need to be adjusted depending
on changes in congestion. [Sanderson et al., 2012, p.80]
The focus of Sanderson et al. is on robust implementation of consensus. In contrast to
this, in our scenario, our aim is to compare several voting approaches with regard to user
and system goals.
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2.3.6.2 Leader election in platoons
There are several papers which use voting algorithms for leader election in platoons;
[Teixeira et al., 2019, p.3f.] gave a short overview of some works in this vein:
[Singh et al., 2018] implemented an incentive-based election protocol for agreeing on a
platoon. Furthermore, [Ferreira and d’Orey, 2011] used voting mechanisms to elect pla-
toon leaders in the context of vehicle coordination for intersection-management scenar-
ios. [Asplund et al., 2017] used a consensus mechanism for the vehicle leader election to
achieve vehicular coordination.
In our approach, we also use voting in platooning, but the application is different: we use
voting to determine common destinations for platoons.
2.3.6.3 Autonomous vehicles coordination through voting-based decision-making
[Teixeira et al., 2018] proposed the application of ComSoc mechanisms to establish co-
operative behaviour within traffic scenarios involving autonomous vehicles and used an
integrated simulation platform comprising the agent-based platform LightJason, the mi-
croscopic traffic simulator Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO) and the network sim-
ulator Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ (OMNeT++). They focused on the
usage of single-winner voting rules to reach consensus on a platoon’s cruising speed, as-
suming that platoon formation is given. They investigated the effect of the voting rules
on the quantities time to consensus and average platoon utility under unreliable commu-
nication.
In contrast to Teixeira et al, we assume an ideal situation with perfect communication.
We focus on comparing the inherent effects of several voting algorithms on the target
quantities preference dissatisfaction, group size and organisational effort. In our approach,
we consider committee elections and several grouping algorithms.
2.3.6.4 Simulating collective decision-making for autonomous vehicle coordination
enabled by vehicular networks
Extending their research in [Teixeira et al., 2018], [Teixeira et al., 2019] presented a sim-
ulation framework that combined vehicular, communication and agent-based simulators
for testing the effects of bargaining and voting mechanisms under realistic conditions with
kinematic and communication constraints. The framework was benchmarked using lane-
merging and platoon scenarios. In the lane-merging scenario, a bargaining mechanism was
used. In the platoon scenario, the members used single-winner voting with an iterative
process as in [Teixeira et al., 2018] to agree on speed and single-round committee voting
to agree on the route. For the committee election, the authors compared the effects of
Minisum- and Minimax-Approval.
Teixeira et al. did not consider the Minisum-Ranksum voting rule. Furthermore, they
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considered different target quantities for the committee elections than in our approach.
They considered the agents’ perceived satisfaction with the chosen route and the channel
busy ratio (CBR) (i.e. the ratio of time during which the communication channel is busy).
The latter is a target quantity that is not relevant to us. Instead, we focused on group size,
preference dissatisfaction and organisational effort. Furthermore, [Teixeira et al., 2019]
did not consider algorithms for group formation.
2.3.6.5 Group aggregation strategies for tourism
[Najafian et al., 2020] evaluated several group aggregation strategies for tourism in order
to recommend POIs to groups of tourists. They considered four different aggregation
strategies, focusing on the target quantities perceived individual satisfaction, perceived
group satisfaction, perceived fairness and user acceptance.
In our approach, we focused on other target quantities: preference dissatisfaction, group
sizes and organisational effort. Furthermore, Najafian et al. did not consider group
formation.
2.4 Multi-agent systems (MAS)
In this dissertation, we model travellers/voters and other components as agents. Next, we
describe agent definitions/paradigms, agent-based modelling/simulation, the LightJason
framework and some frameworks that combine microscopic traffic simulation with multi-
agent simulation.
2.4.1 Agent definitions and paradigms
Adapted from [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995], [Wooldridge, 2009] defined an agent as “a
computer system that is situated in some environment and that is capable of autonomous
action in this environment to meet its design objectives”. According to this model, an
agent uses sensors to perceive its environment and effectors to affect its environment based
on observations. [Wooldridge, 2009] illustrated this using Figure 2.3 (which is adapted
from [Russell and Norvig, 1995, p.32]).
[Jennings, 2000, p.280] described agents as
1. “clearly identifiable problem-solving entities with well-defined boundaries and inter-
faces
2. situated (embedded) in a particular environment - they receive inputs related to the
state of their environment through sensors, acting on the environment using effectors
3. designed to fulfil a specific purpose - they have particular objectives (goals) to achieve
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Figure 2.3: Agent situated in an environment
4. autonomous - they have control over both their internal state and their own be-
haviour
5. capable of exhibiting flexible problem-solving behaviour in pursuit of their design
objectives - they need to be both reactive (able to respond in a timely fashion to
changes that occur in their environment) and pro-active (able to act in anticipation
of future goals)”
Thus, a MAS is a system consisting of autonomous, flexible problem-solving entities
embedded in a particular environment which are designed to fulfil a specific purpose.
2.4.2 Agent-based modelling and simulation
According to Bordini et al., the predominant approach for implementing intelligent or ra-
tional agents is the Belief–Desire–Intention (BDI) approach [Bordini et al., 2005]. The
BDI model was originally developed in 1987 by [Bratman, 1987] as a psychological-
philosophical theory considering the relation of intentions, plans and practical reasoning.
As [Georgeff et al., 1998] put it, Beliefs represent an agent’s knowledge of the world, and
Desires (or goals) represent some desired end state. Intentions are particular courses of
actions to which agents commit to handle certain events, see [Bordini et al., 2005].
An early BDI architecture was the Intelligent Resource-bounded Machine Architecture
(IRMA), as described by [Bratman et al., 1988]. [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987] developed
a system called Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) for BDI agents, and Figure 2.4 (taken
from [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987, p.679]) shows its basic structure.
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Figure 2.4: Procedural Reasoning System
PRS has several components, namely a database with current beliefs (or facts about the
world), a set of current goals (or desires), a set of procedures (or knowledge areas (KAs))
describing how to achieve goals or to react to certain situations by conducting sequences
of actions and tests and an interpreter (or inference mechanism) to manipulate the other
components. The process stack containing all currently active procedures represents the
current intentions of the system. [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987, p.678]
[Weiss, 1999] describes some properties of PRS as follows. In PRS, each agent performs
mean-ends reasoning by using plans from its library and achieves deliberation by using
meta-level plans. Meta-level plans can modify intention structure in order to shift the
focus of practical reasoning in an agent. Furthermore, PRS uses Prolog-like facts, i.e.
atoms of first-order logic for representing beliefs.
There are several implementations of PRS, for example the AgentSpeak language (Agent-
Speak(L)). This language is used in the commonly used BDI interpreter Jason, which has
been developed by Bordini et al. [Bordini and Hübner, 2005], [Bordini et al., 2005] and
[Bordini and Hübner, 2009].
2.4.2.1 LightJason framework
Another BDI multi-agent framework is LightJason as described by Aschermann et al. in
[Aschermann et al., 2016], which is used to implement the multi-agent simulation tool for
this dissertation. As Aschermann et al. explain, in LightJason, the logic of each agent is
described using the language AgentSpeak(L++), which is a modification and extension
of AgentSpeak(L).
AgentSpeak(L++) is a logic programming language, which means that all elements can be
reduced to terms and literals, representing behaviour and environment data in a symbolic
way. In an agent cycle, all plans with true plan conditions are triggered in parallel. Note
that for beliefs, plans and actions, hierarchical naming structures can be defined using
slashes (/) or minuses (-). [Aschermann et al., 2016, p.7f.]
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The following example code is directly taken from [Aschermann et al., 2016, p.19f.], and
the explanation before and after the code closely follows [Aschermann et al., 2016, p.17,
p.19f.]. In the example, we consider the AgentSpeak(L++) code for a walking agent in
an evacuation scenario. The grid environment contains rectangular obstacles the agents
need to pass in order to reach the defined exit destination. In the code below, all plans
relating to movements are grouped together by naming them ”movement/...”.
1 // initial-goal
2 !main.
4 // initial plan (triggered by the initial-goal)
5 // calculates the initial route
6 +!main <-
7 route/set/start( 140, 140 );
8 !movement/walk/forward.
10 // walk straight forward into the direction of the goal-position
11 +! movement/walk/forward <-
12 move/forward ();
13 !movement/walk/forward.
15 // walk straight forward fails then go left
16 -!movement/walk/forward <-
17 !movement/walk/left.
19 // walk left - direction 90 degree to the goal position
20 +! movement/walk/left <-
21 move/left ();
22 !movement/walk/forward.
24 // walk left fails then go right
25 -!movement/walk/left <-
26 !movement/walk/right.
28 // walk right - direction 90 degree to the goal position
29 +! movement/walk/right <-
30 move/right ();
31 !movement/walk/forward.
33 // walk right fails then sleep and hope everything will be
34 // fine later , wakeup plan will be triggered after sleeping
35 -!movement/walk/right <-
36 T = math/statistic/randomsimple () * 10 + 1;
37 T = generic/type/toint( T );
38 T = math/min( 5, T );
39 generic/sleep( T ).
41 // if the agent is not walking because speed is
42 // low the agent increments the current speed
43 +! movement/standstill <-
44 >>attribute/speed( S );
45 S = generic/type/toint( S ) + 1;
46 +attribute/speed( S );
47 !movement/walk/forward.
49 +! position/achieve( P, D ) <-
50 route/next;
51 !movement/walk/forward.
53 // if the agent woke up the speed is set to 1 and the agent
54 // starts walking to the next goal-position
55 +!wakeup <-
56 +attribute/speed( 1 );
57 !movement/walk/forward.
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The initial plan (which is triggered by the initial goal) is defined in line 4-8 and is respon-
sible for calculating a route for the agent from its initial position to the goal position.
The routing action in line 7 (route/set/start) calculates a list of landmarks as subgoals for
the agent. Subsequently, the agent tries to follow up on each landmark in order to reach
the goal position. After each landmark, the agent uses the plan structure for calculating
the next position. After the completion of the routing, the agent starts a new cycle and
begins walking, see line 8 (!movement/-/walk/forward). The backend triggers the plan
in line 49-51 if the agent is close to (i.e. within a defined radius of) the next landmark.
In this plan, the agent slows down if it is close to the landmark. Finally, a wake-up
plan is defined in line 53-57, which is automatically triggered by the end of the sleeping
time. Waking up, the agent resets its speed to 1 (+attribute/speed(1)) and begins to
walk forward (!movement/walk/forward). [Aschermann et al., 2016, p.20]
2.4.2.2 MAS and microscopic traffic simulation
Agent-based simulation is a useful approach for researching complex situations. MAS can
solve problems that are difficult or impossible to solve for individual agents or monolithic
systems [Alkhateeb et al., 2010]. In the past few decades, MAS have been increasingly
used in traffic research, see for example [Bazzan and Klügl, 2009]. [Teixeira et al., 2019,
p.3] listed some frameworks that combined microscopic traffic simulation and MAS:
[Rossetti et al., 2000] combined a microscopic traffic simulator with a BDI MAS to model
the uncertainty and variability of human behaviour, such as in commuting scenarios. They
used agent-based techniques to model the driver’s decision-making processes to enable a
more accurate prediction of actual departure times, arrival times and routes.
[Soares et al., 2013] presented the integration of a multi-agent development framework,
Java Agent DEvelopment framework (JADE) and the traffic simulator SUMO to build a
simulation framework where drivers and traffic control could be designed as MAS. They
aimed to improve traffic flow analyses by incorporating the cognitive and behavioural
aspects of the drivers.
[Görmer and Müller, 2012] combined JADE and a traffic simulation platform, Advanced
Interactive Microscopic Simulator for Urban and Non-Urban Networks (AIMSUN), to
investigate a decentralised dynamic vehicle-grouping algorithm.
A traffic-management solution for an adaptive green-wave protocol was evaluated using
Jason and SUMO in [de Abreu Batista and Coutinho, 2013]. They proposed a multi-
agent system for urban traffic control that mimics a social organisation. The MAS in this
work includes traffic-light agents and focuses on creating green waves in a dynamic way
that improves local control and coordination of successive intersections.
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Chapter 3
Research Gap and Research Question
3.1 Research gap
As explained in Chapter 1, the main focus of this dissertation lies on the situation where
several agents want to visit a city and are requested to form travel groups in the form of
platoons consisting of autonomous vehicles. This scenario leads to two questions:
1. How can the travel groups be determined?
2. How can the travellers agree on destinations to be visited?
We decided to focus on the approach of using voting to tackle these issues. Note that
we view routing as a downstream problem. We are interested in how different voting
algorithms (voting rules, grouping algorithms and voting protocols) compare regarding
user goals (low organisational effort and high preference fulfilment) and system goals
(large groups). Next, we compare the contribution of this dissertation with the related
work described in Chapter 2.
3.1.1 Collective decision-making
In this subsection, we compare the contribution of this dissertation with the related work
on collective decision-making.
• Coalition formation: the problem considered in this dissertation seems similar to
coalition formation as described in Subsection 2.1.3.
– Matching problems [Klaus et al., 2016]: For example, as mentioned in Subsub-
section 2.1.3.1, it bears a resemblance to matching problems, but other than
in bipartite matching with one-sided preferences, in our scenario a traveller
chooses several POIs. Rather than focusing on finding stable matchings like
in many-to-many matchings, we aim at comparing the effects of several voting
algorithms on user and system goals.
– Hedonic games [Aziz et al., 2016]: As mentioned in Subsubsection 2.1.3.2, the
situation considered in this dissertation could theoretically be modelled as a
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hedonic game if assuming a fixed voting rule. Other than in hedonic games,
we aim at drawing comparisons between several voting algorithms.
• GASP [Darmann and Lang, 2016]: As described in Subsection 2.1.4, simplified GASP
is similar to our considered problem, with the difference that we consider a scenario
where agents can be assigned to several POIs.
• MARA [Rothe et al., 2012]: as described in Subsection 2.1.5, the assignment of POIs
to agents is reminiscent of the allocation of objects to agents, with the difference
that in our situation, a POI can be assigned to several agents.
3.1.2 Transport applications
In this subsection, we compare the contribution of this dissertation with related works on
transport applications.
• Ridesharing [Furuhata et al., 2013]: as described in Subsection 2.2.1, other than in
ridesharing, in our approach, the destinations or activities are determined based
on the preferences of the travellers over all possible destinations, and we consider
routing to be a downstream problem.
• Platooning [Bergenhem et al., 2012, Haas and Friedrich, 2017]: as described in Sub-
section 2.2.2, we focus on other target quantities than in other works on platooning,
namely preference dissatisfaction, group size and organisational effort.
3.1.3 Collective decision-making in transport
In this subsection, we compare the contribution of this dissertation with related works on
collective decision-making in transport.
• Reservation-based approaches for traffic management: As described in Subsec-
tion 2.3.1, other than in the reservation-based approaches presented by the re-
searchers [Dresner and Stone, 2008] and [Vasirani and Ossowski, 2009] where inter-
section managers assign space-time slots to vehicles crossing intersections, we con-
sider a scenario with clearly defined groups of vehicles which need to agree on
common destinations.
• Model for urban mobility simulation [Grimaldo et al., 2012]: As described in Sub-
section 2.3.2, Grimaldo et al. developed a market-based approach for urban mobility
simulation. Other than in this approach, we focus on common decisions via voting
and compare several voting algorithms.
• Modelling joint-travel behaviour [Dubernet and Axhausen, 2012]: As described in
Subsection 2.3.3, Dubernet et al. modelled joint-travel behaviour. Other than in
this approach, we focus on comparing the effects of several voting algorithms.
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• Joint-travel problem [Liao, 2017]: As described in Subsection 2.3.4, rather than
finding an optimal path for joint activities, we aim to achieve consensus on several
destinations and compare several voting algorithms in regard to system and user
goals. Furthermore, we assume a scenario without time windows and with fixed
assembly point.
• Tactical-level decision-making in platoons [Kokkinogenis et al., 2019]: As described
in Subsection 2.3.5, other than in the approach of Kokkinogeneis et al., we use
voting instead of auction rules to agree on destinations for the platoon. We also
consider several grouping algorithms.
3.1.3.1 Existing voting applications in traffic management
• Institutionalised consensus in vehicular networks [Sanderson and Pitt, 2012]: As
described in Subsubsection 2.3.6.1, rather than focusing on a robust implementation
of consensus, we compare several voting approaches with regard to user and system
goals.
• Leader election in platoons (e.g. [Singh et al., 2018]): As described in Subsubsec-
tion 2.3.6.2, voting is often used to determine platoon leaders. In our approach, we
also consider voting for platooning, but for agreeing on common destinations.
• Autonomous vehicle coordination through voting-based decision-making: As de-
scribed in Subsubsection 2.3.6.3, other than in the approach by [Teixeira et al., 2018],
we assume an ideal situation with perfect communication. Our focus is on compar-
ing the inherent effects of several voting algorithms on the target quantities prefer-
ence dissatisfaction, group size and organisational effort. This also includes several
grouping algorithms. We consider committee voting rules.
• Collective decision making for autonomous vehicle coordination: As described in
Subsubsection 2.3.6.4, other than in the approach by [Teixeira et al., 2019], we ad-
ditionally considered the Minisum-Ranksum voting rule. We focused on the target
quantities preference dissatisfaction, group size and organisational effort. We also
considered several grouping algorithms.
• Group aggregation strategied for tourism [Najafian et al., 2020]: As described in
Subsubsection 2.3.6.5, other than in the approach by Najafian et al., we consider
several grouping algorithms and focus on the target quantities preference dissatis-
faction, group size and organisational effort.
3.1.4 Overview research gap
As discussed, there has been a wide range of works in the areas Computational Social
Choice, ridesharing, platooning and collective decision-making in transport.
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Regarding the related works on Computational Social Choice, there is a range of works
considering coalition formation, group activity selection and resource allocation problems.
Unlike in coalition formation, our aim is to compare several voting algorithms in regard
to their effects on system and user goals. Other than in group activity selection, we
consider a situation where a traveller can be assigned to several POIs. Unlike in resource
allocation, POIs can be assigned to several agents.
Regarding ridesharing, situations in which destinations or actions are fixed a priori are
well-researched. In our research application, the destinations or actions are not fixed a
priori but have to be agreed upon by the travellers. We focus on other target quantities
than on the existing range of works on platooning.
Related works on collective decision-making in traffic focused on other target quantities,
did not consider group formation, did not compare the effects of several voting algorithms,
used other voting algorithms, did not consider clearly defined groups of vehicles, used
voting for other applications, or used collective decision-making algorithms other than
voting. It is important to note that we focus on comparing the inherent effects of several
grouping algorithms, voting rules and voting protocols on system and user goals.
In the following table, we provide a summary of the comparisons between related works
and our approach.
SotA Considered approach Reference
Collective decision-making:
Matching under preferences
Other than in bipartite matching
with one-sided preferences, in our
scenario a traveller chooses several
POIs. Rather than focusing on find-
ing stable matchings like in many-to-
many matchings, we aim at compar-
ing the effects of several voting algo-
rithms on user and system goals
[Klaus et al., 2016]
Collective decision-making:
Hedonic games
We aim to draw comparisons be-
tween several voting algorithms
[Aziz et al., 2016]
Collective decision-making:
GASP
Agents can be assigned to several
POIs
[Darmann and Lang, 2016]
Collective decision-making:
MARA and auctions
POIs can be assigned to several trav-
ellers
[Rothe et al., 2012]
Transport applications:
Ridesharing
Destinations are determined based
on the preferences of the travellers
over all possible destinations. We
consider routing to be a downstream
problem
[Furuhata et al., 2013,
Wang et al., 2016]
Transport applications:
Platooning
We consider other target quantities
[Bergenhem et al., 2012,
Haas and Friedrich, 2017]
Collective decision-making
in transport: Reservation-
based approaches for traffic
management
We consider clearly defined groups of
vehicles which need to agree on com-
mon destinations
[Dresner and Stone, 2008,
Vasirani and Ossowski, 2009]
Collective decision-making
in transport: Model for ur-
ban mobility simulation
We focus on common decisions via
voting and compare several voting al-
gorithms
[Grimaldo et al., 2008,
Grimaldo et al., 2012,




We compare several voting algo-
rithms
[Dubernet and Axhausen, 2012,
Dubernet and Axhausen, 2013]




We aim to achieve consensus on sev-
eral destinations for a scenario with-
out time windows and with a fixed
assembly point. We compare several






We use voting rules to agree on des-
tinations for a platoon, and we con-
sider several grouping algorithms
[Kokkinogenis et al., 2019]
Existing voting applications
in traffic management: In-
stitutionalised consensus
We compare several voting ap-
proaches with regard to user and sys-
tem goals
[Sanderson and Pitt, 2012]
Existing voting applica-
tions in traffic management:
Leader election in platoons
We use voting for agreeing on com-
mon destinations
[Singh et al., 2018]
Existing voting applications




We assume perfect communication
and compare the inherent effects of
several voting algorithms on prefer-
ence fulfilment, group size and organ-
isational effort. We consider commit-
tee voting rules and several grouping
algorithms.
[Teixeira et al., 2018]
Existing voting applications




We focus on the target quanti-
ties preference dissatisfaction, group
sizes and organisational effort. We
consider Minisum-Ranksum as well
as several grouping algorithms.
[Teixeira et al., 2019]
Existing voting applica-
tions in traffic manage-
ment: Group Aggregation
Strategies for Tourism
We consider group formation and fo-
cus on the target quantities group
sizes, preference dissatisfaction and
organisational effort. We consider
several grouping algorithms.
[Najafian et al., 2020]
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3.2 Research questions
We aim to investigate the applicability of voting in traffic management for scenarios
with travel groups, focusing on situations where the groups need to agree on common
destinations.
In this dissertation, we investigate several voting algorithms for the purpose of creating
travel groups and a consensus on destinations for the groups. We compare the inherent
effects of several grouping algorithms, voting rules and voting protocols.
We consider the following research question, which we then split into several subquestions
for each type of algorithm.
RQ How do different algorithms used for creating travel groups and for determining com-
mon destinations compare regarding system and user goals?
RQ1 How do different voting rules used for determining common destinations compare
regarding system and user goals?
RQ2 How do different voting protocols used for voting in travel groups compare regarding
system and user goals?
RQ3 How do different grouping algorithms used for creating travel groups compare re-
garding system and user goals?
RQ4 How do different combinations of voting protocols and grouping algorithms used for
creating travel groups and for determining common destinations compare regarding system
and user goals?
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we aim at few large groups from the system perspective,
which leads us to group size as a metric. Furthermore, from the user perspective, we
aim at high preference fulfilment and low organisational effort. The preference fulfilment
measures how satisfied the respective traveller is with the destinations chosen for the
traveller’s group. As mentioned in Chapter 1, organisational effort measures both the
cognitive effort for the traveller and the phases in which the traveller has to wait for
results from other agents.
Considering a traveller who enters the city and is immediately allowed to drive alone
using an autonomous vehicle, preference fulfilment is high and organisational effort is
low. However, from the system side, this is unfavourable because the group has a size of
exactly one, which makes it harder to optimise traffic flow. From the traffic management
perspective, coordinating fewer and larger groups is more favourable.
By contrast, considering a group of travellers that travels together and has to agree
on common destinations using voting, the group size is larger than in the single-driver
case. However, from the user perspective, we have lower preference fulfilment and higher
organisational effort.
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We aim to investigate how these system and user metrics compare for different group-
ing algorithms, voting rules and voting protocols. To this end, we conduct agent-based
simulations. We choose to use agent-based simulation because we consider a dynamic
problem. Also, we want to be able to model human behaviour, in this case preference-
based decision-making. In a similar vein to the approach described by [Carley, 1999],
we use the simulation results to generate hypotheses regarding the effect of the different
algorithms on the quantities preference dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group
size. We use the generated hypotheses both for recommendations for system designers of
real-world applications and as basis for further research.
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Chapter 4
Model
In this chapter, we depict our approach for solving the problem described in Chapter 1.
First, we describe assumptions for our approach, the preferences model and the vote types
we use. Subsequently, we describe the considered algorithms: grouping algorithms, voting
rules and voting protocols. Following this, we explain the models used for preference
fulfilment / preference satisfaction and organisational effort. Lastly, we demonstrate with
an example how the algorithms can be used to solve the problem of assigning travellers
to groups and to find common destinations for these groups.
4.1 Assumptions
We have the following assumptions for the considered scenario. Let P = {p1, ..., pm} be the
available POIs in the urban area. We consider a time span with travellers T = {t1, ..., tn},
where each traveller has preferences over all POIs in P . In reality, travellers might not
have clear preferences over all available POIs. For our investigations, however, we stick to
this assumption in order to keep the mathematical model simple. Furthermore, we assume
that the travellers arrive on different points in time at a pre-defined assembly point where
they are grouped together in groups with maximum size / capacity c. Each group can
visit exactly k POIs. We make this last assumption in order to keep the mathematical
model simple and to make the results of different simulation runs better comparable.
4.2 Traveller preferences
In the following, we describe our preference model. Each traveller ti has a preference
vector prefi with values from [0,1], where prefij is the preference of traveller ti for POI
pj. We consider different possibilities of preference generation and conversion. Note that
we use randomly generated preferences because it would go beyond the scope of this
dissertation to survey real-world preferences.
The simplest way to generate preferences is to create the preference values according to
the uniform distribution on interval [0,1]. We use these uniform preferences as a baseline.
As an extension, we use a second possibility to generate more realistic preferences for
comparison. In order to create realistic preferences, we need an evaluation system. We
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decided to use the platform Foursquare for this. Other researchers used Yelp for this
purpose, see [Wang, 2018]. Foursquare yields properties of POIs such as overall rating
and categories they belong to. To derive realistic preferences, the preference generation
is conducted in a two-stage process as follows:
1. Each agent specifies their preference for the categories (kj ∈ [0, 1] for each category
j).1
2. For each POI pk, its weight weight(pk) ∈ [0, 1] is the tenth of its Foursquare rat-
ing value, which leads to [0,1]-normalised weights since the maximum value for
Foursquare rating values is 10.
Based on this, the preference of traveller ti for POI pk of category j is computed as




The preferences over all categories sum up to 1.
4.3 Vote types
In this dissertation, we consider two different types of votes which are widely used in
ComSoc research, namely Approval votes and complete linear orders, as described in
Section 2.1.1. The private preference vector prefi of traveller i is converted into an
Approval vector avi as follows: If prefij ≤ 0.5, avij is 0, otherwise avij is 1. As for
complete linear orders, prefi is converted into a linear order lvi as follows: prefij > prefik
implies pj  pk. In the case of ties, lexicographic tiebreaking is applied.
4.4 Voting rules
In the following, we describe the voting rules we investigate in this dissertation. Note
that we slightly misuse the term voting rule here, as we use it from now on for commit-
tee voting rules; in this dissertation, we focus on committee voting rules and disregard
single-winner voting rules, except for the excursus in Chapter 9 and for one aspect of the
extended model described in Chapter 8.
We decided to compare the effects of two well known voting rules based on Approval votes,
namely Minisum-Approval and Minimax-Approval. As explained in Subsection 2.1.2,
Minisum-Approval corresponds to a utilitarian approach, whereas Minimax-Approval cor-
responds to an egalitarian approach. Additionally to comparing the effect of utilitarian
1For the main simulation, we assume different agent types, where each agent type has a basis preference
regarding the categories. We use normal distribution to create preferences diverging from the basis
preferences, as described in Chapter 5.
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and egalitarian approaches, we were also interested in comparing the effects of approval-
based vs. linear-order-based voting rules. Hence, we decided to also investigate Minisum-
Ranksum as introduced in Subsection 2.1.2, which is based on complete linear orders. For
determining unique winner committees, lexicographic tie-breaking is used if needed.
Consider as small example for Minisum-Approval an election with three travellers t1, t2
and t3 which hold an election with the votes v1, v2, v3 to choose two out of four POIs p1,
p2, p3 and p4. The POIs p2 and p3 are each approved by two travellers and constitute the
winning committee as the other POIs are each approved by only one traveller.
Vote / POI p1 p2 p3 p4
v1 0 1 0 1
v2 0 1 1 0
v3 1 0 1 0
Sum 1 2 2 1
4.5 Group formation
We consider two different possibilities for group formation. The simplest way to group the
travellers together is to assign them to groups according to the order in which they arrive
at the assembly point. We call this possibility sequential grouping. As second possibility,
we consider coordinated grouping : Each newly arriving traveller chooses the group with the
smallest disagreement between their vote and the current election result of the group, un-
less the disagreement with all election results in all groups exceeds a certain join threshold;
in this case, the traveller creates a new group. Following [Baumeister and Dennisen, 2015],
for approval-based voting rules (i.e. Minisum- and Minimax-Approval), we use the Ham-
ming distance to measure the disagreement and for voting rules based on complete linear
orders (i.e. Minisum-Ranksum), we use the normalised ranksum as described in Chapter
2. The traveller groups accept new agents up to their defined capacity or until a deadline
is reached.
As a small example for coordinated grouping under Minisum-Approval consider three
travellers t1, t2 and t3 with the following votes: v1, v2 and v3.
v1 0 1 0 1
v2 0 1 0 0
v3 1 0 1 0
Assuming that the travellers arrive in the order their indices represent and we have a join
threshold of 2 with capacity 3, we get the following groups.
Traveller t1 arrives first and is assigned to a new group G1 which contains only this
traveller.
v1 0 1 0 1
Result 0 1 0 1
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Next, traveller t2 arrives. The Hamming distance between v2 and the current election re-
sult of Group G1 is HD((0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1)) = 1 < 2, which is the minimal disagreement
of t2 with any group, so t2 is assigned to group G1.
v1 0 1 0 1
v2 0 1 0 0
Result 0 1 0 1
Traveller t3 arrives last. The Hamming distance between v3 and the current election result
of Group G1 is HD((1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1)) = 4 > 2, and there are no other groups, so t3 is
assigned to a new group G2 which contains only this traveller.
v3 1 0 1 0
Result 1 0 1 0
4.6 Voting protocols
We consider two different voting protocols which describe how voters interact with their
chair once they have joined the group. The first protocol we consider is the following
one: In the basic protocol, the group departs as soon as the election result for the filled
group (i.e. either the maximal capacity or a deadline has been reached) is known. The
second protocol, the iterative protocol, aims at reorganising the travellers based on the
election result of the filled group in order to create groups where the travellers’ preference
satisfaction with the election result is higher. The concept for this protocol was also
investigated by [Dennisen and Müller, 2015] and [Dennisen and Müller, 2016].
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 give an overview of the communication models for the both
protocols. These figures have been adapted from [Dennisen and Müller, 2015, p.6] and
[Dennisen and Müller, 2016, p.3].
Figure 4.1: Communication model for basic protocol
Note that each group has a chair who is responsible for collecting the votes, computing
the result of the election and for sending the (current) result to the voters. Once the final
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Figure 4.2: Communication model for iterative protocol
result for a group has been sent to all voters (and is accepted), the group can depart.
Consider for both protocols the election result for the filled group. While in the basic
voting protocol the announcement of this election result means that the group can leave,
there are additional steps in the iterative voting protocol. If there are travellers who
are dissatisfied with the result of the election of the filled group, the most dissatisfied
one leaves the group and the winner determination is immediately repeated. Which
travellers are dissatisfied can be determined via a dissatisfaction threshold. This process
is repeated until there are only satisfied travellers left, and then the group departs, i.e.
the winner determination, the announcement of the election result, the computation of
the dissatisfaction with the result and the removal of voters is iterative2. Travellers who
leave their group are considered similarly to newly arrived travellers; they either join one
of the existing groups they have not belonged to before or are assigned to a new group.
Note that, under the basic protocol, in the case of coordinated grouping, each time a
new traveller joins the group, the chair requests the new voter to submit their vote and
recomputes the winner determination. Once the group is filled, the chair sends the final
election result to the voters.
4.7 Preference fulfilment/satisfaction model
Our preference fulfilment/satisfaction model is defined as follows: For the preference
satisfaction, we sum up the real-valued preferences for the selected candidates, i.e. the
preference satisfaction of traveller ti with commitee K would be
2Note that the well-known term iterative voting in the literature refers to something else, as described
in [Airiau et al., 2017, p.3]: The voters start from a voting situation; a winner is announced based
on the original votes. Then, the voters change their votes, one at time, resulting in several iterations
with the respective preference profiles and winners.











We define a normalised preference dissatisfaction as follows: Let sat(i,K) be defined as
above. Additionally, let maxsat(i, C, k) be the maximum possible satisfaction of traveller
ti. It is defined as




where C(i,k) is the set of k POIs with highest preference value of traveller ti.
The normalised preference satisfaction of traveller ti for K is
nsat(i,K) = sat(i,K)/maxsat(i, C, k)
and analogously, the normalised preference dissatisfaction of traveller ti for K is
ndiss(i,K) = 1− sat(i,K)/maxsat(i, C, k)
In our main simulation series in Chapter 6, we use normalised dissatisfaction.
4.8 Organisational effort
As described in Subsection 2.4.1, we use LightJason agents for the agent-based evalu-
ation simulation. In our approach, we use the number of agent cycles (as defined in
[LightJason, 2019b]) which elapse for each traveller agent to measure their organisational
effort. This includes both the phases where they actively take part (for example by
submitting votes) and the phases where they have to wait for results from other agents.
4.9 Overall voting process
To summarise the overall voting process, we determine the election result for each election
group with a given voting rule. The travellers are either sequentially assigned to groups
or via coordinated grouping. When using the basic protocol, the travellers depart either
when their group has reached its capacity or when a deadline is reached. Under the
iterative protocol, dissatisfied travellers can be reassigned to other groups. The overall
process is schematically presented in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Overall voting process
4.10 Example
In the following, an example for the steps of the overall voting process is described.
We assume three travellers t1, t2, t3 who want to visit Manhattan with the available
POIs P = {pB, pC , pH , pM , pN , pP}. For group formation, we assume sequential grouping,
travellers t1, t2, t3 being assigned to group G1. Furthermore, we assume that the travellers
decide on common destinations with Minisum-Approval using the basic protocol and visit
exactly k = 3 POIs. In this example, we use Foursquare data to generate the preferences,
with the Foursquare ratings/categories being
• pB: Bryant Park/9.7/zoo park
• pC : Central Park/9.8/zoo park
• pH : Carnegie Hall/9.5/historic site
• pM : MoMA/9.5/museum
• pN : American Museum of Natural History/9.2/museum
• pP : St. Patrick’s Cathedral/9.6/historic site
Next, for each traveller, we give the preferences for each of the six POIs and compute the
respective preference values given the function prefik introduced in Section 4.2
The Approval vote of t1 is constructed as follows, see Figure 4.4: In the first stage, we
specify that their preference for the categories historic site and zoo park is 0.5, respectively.
In the second stage, we compute the weights for each POI from the Foursquare ratings.
For example, the weight for St. Patrick’s Cathedral (pP ) is 0.96 since its Foursquare rating
is 9.6. The final preference values are greater than 0.5 for the POIs pB, pC , pH and pP and
lower than 0.5 for the other POIs, which leads to the Approval vector (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1).
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Figure 4.4: Preference generation for t1
Analogously, the Approval vote of t2 is (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), see Figure 4.5
Figure 4.5: Preference generation for t2
Analogously, the Approval vote of t3 is (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1), see Figure 4.6
Chapter 4 - Model 61
Figure 4.6: Preference generation for t3
In the final step, we compute the result of Minisum-Approval election based on the three
traveller votes, see Table 4.1. The members of the winning committee are pH and pP with
Approval score 3 and pB with Approval score 2 via tie-breaking. This means that the
group will visit the POIs Bryant Park, Carnegie Hall and St. Patrick’s Cathedral.
POI pB pC pH pM pN pP
t1 1 1 1 0 0 1
t2 1 1 1 1 1 1
t3 0 0 1 1 1 1
Result 2 2 3 2 2 3
Table 4.1: Minisum-Approval election for real-world example
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Chapter 5
Implementation
In the following, we give an overview of the implementation details for the simulation tool
LightVoting which was newly developed to evaluate the algorithms described in Chapter
4. First, we describe the simulation architecture. Subsequently, we give information on
the LightJason aspect, the execution model, the preferences generation and the statistics
component of the simulation.
5.1 Simulation architecture for LightVoting
For the simulations, the agent-based simulation tool LightVoting was developed, see
[Dennisen, 2021b]. We decided to develop an own tool because existing tools at this time
did not provide a scalable, domain-independent way to simulate elections. The architec-
ture is based on the framework LightJason and has the following components: runtime,
input, voting and statistics. Note that in the implementation for our main simulation, we
decided, to keep the implementation simple, to use a broker agent which is responsible for
creating voter and chair agents and assigning the voter agents to groups. The simulation
architecture is schematically depicted in Figure 5.1.
We briefly describe the input parameters, which are explained in more detail in Sec-
tion 5.3.
• Scenario definition: Number of POIs, number of travellers
• Voting algorithms: Grouping algorithm, voting rule and voting protocol
• Other settings, for example dissatisfaction threshold if applicable
• Preferences of travellers
The input parameters are passed to the voting component which includes voters/trav-
ellers, chairs and broker, which are differently defined according to the respective voting
protocol and grouping algorithm. The agent part of the voting component is built based
on the LightJason framework and has both AgentSpeak(L++) and Java parts: The agents
are defined via AgentSpeak(L++) agent definitions and corresponding Java classes. The
voting rules are defined via Java classes. The output parameters - preference dissatis-
faction and organisational effort values from voters/travellers and group size values from
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Figure 5.1: LightVoting Simulation Architecture
chairs - are evaluated in the statistics component. The simulation is controlled by a
Java runtime class. The Java runtime class reads the input parameters from the input
component, controls the agents and the creation of the statistics component.
5.2 LightJason aspect
LightVoting was implemented based on LightJason. LightJason is described in detail in
the technical report by [Aschermann et al., 2016]. As explained on the project website,
LightJason is a concurrent BDI multi-agent framework inspired by Jason, fine-tuned for
concurrent plan execution suitable for distributed computing environments and aiming at
efficiency and scalability. [LightJason, 2019a]
In the following, we briefly explain the definition of LightJason agents as finite state
machines and describe selected Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) models for agents
in our simulation.
5.2.1 Finite state machines and logic programming
As described on the LightJason project website [LightJason, 2019c], LightJason agents
are defined as “[f ]inite-[s]tate [m]achine[s] in a [l]ogical [p]rogramming language with the
following definition:
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• the initial state is optionally defined with the initial goal
• a state is a set of beliefs if a cycle is not running
• a transition is the execution of a plan (with instantiation of a goal) and is limited
by the plan condition”
5.2.2 DFA models for selected agents in simulation
In this subsection, we explain some Deterministic Finite Automaton models for agents in
our simulation. Each DFA model has the following parts:
• Set Q of states with some end state, marked with double outline
• Transition function: Every transition d corresponds to a plan which leads to the
state change
In the following, we briefly recapitulate the agent types used in the simulation and sub-
sequently present selected, simplified, DFA models for agents under the combination se-
quential basic.
Agent types In our simulation, we have three different agent types: The broker agent
creates the voter and chair agents and assigns the voters to groups. Each chair agent is
responsible for the elections in a group, which means that the chair agent collects the votes,
computes the election result(s) and - in the case of the iterative voting protocol - removes
dissatisfied voter agents from the group. The voter agents submit their preferences in
the form of votes to the chair agent so that it can aggregate the votes to a consensus.
In the following, we focus on how voter and chair agents behave under the combination
sequential basic.
DFA voting agent model for sequential basic Figure 5.2 depicts the behaviour of
a voter agent under the combination sequential basic. The voter agent starts with the
!start plan d0 to reach the state q0. From this state, it can reach the group/joined state
q1 with the corresponding plan d1, i.e. in state q1 it has joined a group. To submit
a vote to the chair and attain the state q2, it conducts the plan d2. Subsequently, it
attains the diss/submitted state q3 by conducting plan d2, i.e. submitting its preference
dissatisfaction. Finally, it reaches the done state q4 by the plan d4.
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Figure 5.2: DFA model for voter, sequential basic
DFA chair agent model for sequential basic Figure 5.3 depicts the behaviour of a
chair agent under the combination sequential basic. The chair agent starts with the !start
plan d0 to reach the state q0. From this state, it can reach the state stored/vote q1 via
collecting votes. From this state, it can reach the started/voting state q2 when all agents
in the group have submitted their vote. From this state, it can reach the state stored/diss
via collecting dissatisfaction values. Finally, it reaches the done state q4.
Figure 5.3: DFA model for chair, sequential basic
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5.3 Execution model for LightVoting
The execution model of LightVoting is defined as depicted in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Execution model for LightVoting
The input for LightVoting consists of two YAML 1. files, one for the experiment configura-
tion and the other for the travellers’ preferences. The experiment configuration contains
the variables as described in Table 5.1.
runs number of conducted runs
setting used combination of grouping algorithm and voting protocol, for example
COORDINATED BASIC
rule used voting rule, for example MINISUM APPROVAL
agnum number of voters/travellers
altnum number of candidates/POIs
comsize size of the committee to be elected
capacity maximum size of traveller groups
dissthr dissatisfaction threshold for the iterative protocol
jointhr join threshold for coordinated grouping
preferences specifies whether the preferences are uniform or Foursquare-based
Table 5.1: Configuration variables
On the execution level, the input data are processed by the Java runtime and the Light-
Jason agents, where we have several voter and chair agents and one broker agent for each
run. The statistical data are stored in a PostgreSQL database. Here, we store the follow-
ing data: Preference dissatisfaction, organisational effort for each traveller and the group
size.
1The name is a recursive acronym standing for YAML Ain’t Markup Language. YAML “is a human
friendly data serialization standard for all programming languages” ( https://yaml.org/, retrieved
06 April 2021).
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5.4 Generation of preferences
As described in Chapter 4, we consider two types of preferences. For the first one, the
uniform preferences, we simply draw preference values from the uniform distribution on
the interval [0,1].
For the generation of Foursquare-based preferences, we use a Python script which gener-
ates a YAML preference file based on a YAML configuration file. This configuration file
specifies the following input parameters:
• Number of POIs
• Foursquare categories
– In each category, specify the names and the popularity of the POIs
• Distribution for generation of preferences, based on agent types with different pref-
erences for the categories
• Number of simulation runs
Figure 5.5: Preferences example
An example for the generation of the travellers’ preferences over the categories can be
seen in Figure 5.5. The bars represent for each agent the probability for choosing the
respective category. These probabilities are used to draw preferences over the categories
from the [0,1] interval and are created as follows.
We have five agent types with different basis preferences. For each agent type, normal
distributed values are drawn for each agent and multiplied with the basis preferences
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for the categories in this type. After drawing the preference values, the preferences are
normalised such that the preferences for an agent over the categories sum up to 1.
If we consider the outermost ten bars on the left side, they represent agents for which
the preference for historic sites and scenic lookouts range around 0.2 and the preference
for museums ranges around 0.6. The other bars represent 40 other agents which are
subdivided in four agent types with other basis preferences.
5.5 Statistics
In the following, we explain the statistics component of the simulation. We needed statis-
tics for evaluating the results from the main simulation series (Chapter 6). We decided to
store the simulation data in a PostgreSQL database and to analyse the simulation data
using R, a popular language for statistical modelling and analysis. In the following sub-
sections, we describe the use case for the statistics component as well as its PostgreSQL
and R elements.
5.5.1 Use case
We have the following use case for the statistics component, UC1, which is depicted in
Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Use Case 1
UC1 relates to the main simulation series. The aim here is to compare the different
algorithms described in Chapter 4 regarding their effects on the quantities preference
dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group size. We need to be able to compare
results from independent simulation runs.
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Figure 5.7: Database model
5.5.2 PostgreSQL
We decided to store the relevant data from the simulation in a PostgreSQL database since
it is straightforward to use PostgreSQL in Java and also easily possible to connect Post-
greSQL to R. The model of this database is depicted in Figure 5.7. Using a PostgreSQL
database enables the analysis of the results from independent simulation runs.
Table 5.2 gives an overview over the different entities in the database.
Entity Notes
Simulation Table Has the attribute number as primary key, has exactly one config-
uration and can have any number of runs
Configuration Table Contains the simulation parameters as attributes, has an id at-
tribute as primary key.
Run Table Belongs to exactly one simulation, has a composite primary key:
number + simulation. Has at least one voter
Voter Table Has a composite primary key: id + run + simulation. A voter
elects at least one election result and is part of at least one group
Group Table Each group has a unique id and either one or no predecessor group
Election Result Table Each election result belongs to exactly one group, and the primary
key is defined by the according group
Table 5.2: Database entities
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5.5.3 Analysis using R
We decided to analyse the simulation data using R, a popular language for statistical
modelling and analysis, because it provided the required statistical functions and inte-
grated well into the simulation toolchain. In the following, we describe an example R
evaluation file (The code is adapted from [Zimmermann, 2015]).
First, we create a connection to the database containing the simulation results.
# install package
require("RPostgreSQL")




# load the PostgreSQL driver
drv <- dbDriver("PostgreSQL")
# create connection to the database
# "con" will be used later in each connection to the database
con <- dbConnect(drv , dbname = "lightvoting", host = "...", port = ...,
user = "...", password = pw)
The following R code determines minimum, 1st quartal, median, 3rd quartal and maxi-
mum values for the output variable preference dissatisfaction.
# determine preference dissatisfaction values for last elections in last
# simulation
df_diss <- dbGetQuery(con ,
"SELECT elects.voter AS voterid , elects.run AS voterrun ,
elects.simulation as votersim ,
elects.diss as diss
FROM election_result , elects
WHERE elects.simulation =
(SELECT max(elects.simulation) from elects)
AND
election_result.group_column = elects.electionresult
AND election_result.lastelection = TRUE




Analogously, the following R code determines minimum, 1st quartal, median, 3rd quartal
and maximum values for the output variable group size.
# determine group size values for last simulation
df_size <- dbGetQuery(con ,
"SELECT simulation.number , election_result.group_column ,
count(distinct (voter_group.voter , voter_group.run ,
voter_group.simulation )) AS size
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FROM voter_group , simulation , election_result
WHERE




AND election_result.lastelection=TRUE AND simulation.number=
voter_group.simulation
GROUP BY simulation.number , election_result.group_column;")
sizeVals <- df_size[’size’]
summary(sizeVals)
Analogously, the following R code determines minimum, 1st quartal, median, 3rd quartal
and maximum values for the output variable organisational effort.
# determine organisational effort values for last simulation
df_orga <- dbGetQuery(con ,
"SELECT simulation.number , voter.id AS voterid , voter.run as voterrun ,
voter.simulation as votersim , voter.orga as voterorga
FROM simulation , voter
WHERE simulation.number =( SELECT max(simulation.number)
from simulation)
AND voter.simulation=simulation.number;")
orgaVals <- df_orga[’voterorga ’]
summary(orgVals)
Finally, we close the connection.
# close the connection
dbDisconnect(con)
dbUnloadDriver(drv)
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Chapter 6
Experiments
In this chapter, we aim at answering the following questions:
Q1 How do the voting rules compare regarding preference dissatisfaction, organisational
effort and group size?
Q2 How do the voting protocols compare regarding preference dissatisfaction, organisa-
tional effort and group size?
Q3 How do the grouping algorithms compare regarding preference dissatisfaction, organi-
sational effort and group size?
Q4 How do the combinations of grouping algorithms and voting protocols compare regard-
ing preference dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group size?
In order to answer these questions, we conducted several experiments, the results for
which can be found in the appendix. For both uniform and Foursquare-based preferences,
we conducted simulations for each voting rule, varying the voting protocol, the grouping
algorithm, the dissatisfaction threshold and the join threshold. As explained in Chapter 3,
we follow an approach similar to the one described in [Carley, 1999], i.e. we use the
simulation results to generate hypotheses. Before we present and discuss the simulation
results, we describe the simulation settings.
6.1 Simulation settings for main simulation series
In this section, we describe the simulation settings, which encompass the study data, the
considered parameters, the output variables and some technical information.
Study Data We considered the following POIs in Manhattan, NY and vicinity. The
POIs and their properties are defined via a YAML file. The categories the POIs belong to
and their popularity values were determined manually based on Foursquare data, which
are listed in Table 6.1
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Category POI Popularity
historic site
St. Patrick’s Cathedral 9.6
Carnegie Hall 9.5
Federal Hall National Memorial 8.8




Metropolitan Museum of Art 9.7
MoMA 9.5
Whitney Museum of American Art 9.4












Top of the Rock Observation Deck 9.6
High Line 10th Ave Amphitheatre 9.5
One World Observatory 9.2
Under The Brooklyn Bridge 9.1
Table 6.1: Foursquare data for considered sites
Figure 6.1 depicts the POIs located in Manhattan. (The POIs City Place and Bronx Zoo
in the vicinity are omitted.) Based on these information, the preferences of the agents
are generated as described in Section 5.4.
Considered parameters In Table 6.2, we depict the considered parameters. Note that
the term “setting” in this table refers to the different combinations of grouping algorithm
and voting protocol. For example, “sequential basic” refers to the combination of sequen-
tial grouping and basic voting protocol. Note that for the considered simulations, the
maximum number of cycles agents spend looking for suitable groups is capped to 500 to
ensure the termination of the simulation.
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Figure 6.1: Considered sites
Map data c© OpenStreetMap contributors (https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright)
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Name Explanation
runs The number of simulation runs
setting The name of the used combination, e.g. sequential iterative
rule The name of the used voting rule, e.g. Minisum-Approval
agnum The number of traveller/voter agents
altnum The number of POIs/alternatives
comsize The size of the to-be-elected POI committee
capacity The capacity, i.e. maximum size of the to-be-created traveller groups
dissthr The (preference) dissatisfaction threshold of the travellers, if applicable
jointhr The join threshold of the travellers, if applicable
preferences The preference type, i.e. uniform or Foursquare-based preferences
Table 6.2: Description of input parameters
We ran simulations with the parameter settings as described in Table 6.3.
Series Settings
1 Minisum-Approval, capacity 20, uniform preferences, agnum 41, altnum 20,
comsize 5
2 Minimax-Approval, capacity 20, uniform preferences, agnum 41, altnum 20,
comsize 5
3 Minisum-Ranksum, capacity 20, uniform preferences, agnum 41, altnum 20,
comsize 5
4 Minisum-Approval, capacity 20, Foursquare-based preferences, agnum 41, alt-
num 20, comsize 5
5 Minimax-Approval, capacity 20, Foursquare-based preferences, agnum 41, alt-
num 20, comsize 5
6 Minisum-Ranksum, capacity 20, Foursquare-based preferences, agnum 41, alt-
num 20, comsize 5
Table 6.3: Considered parameter settings
Output variables As output variables for our main simulation series, we considered the
three quantities preference dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group size.
Technical information The simulations were conducted using LightVoting as described
in Chapter 5, on a Dell Latitude E5440 (Ubuntu Linux).
6.2 Simulation results for main simulation series
In this section, we present the results for the main simulation series. For the different vot-
ing rules, voting protocols, grouping algorithms and combinations of grouping algorithms
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and voting protocols, we compare their effects on preferences dissatisfaction, organisa-
tional effort and group size. Note that in the terms of [Carley, 1999], we consider the
following input parameters to be key input parameters for generating hypotheses: Voting
rule, voting protocol and grouping algorithm.
6.2.1 Voting rules
In this section, we compare the three voting rules regarding their effect on preference
dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group size.
6.2.1.1 Preference dissatisfaction
In this section, we consider the question how the voting rules compare regarding preference
dissatisfaction. We consider this separately for both preference forms.
Uniform preferences We first consider the preference dissatisfaction values under the
combination sequential basic, see Figure 6.2. As the Wilcoxon tests in the appendix show,
the differences between the three rules are significant. We have the relation diss(MS −
RS) < diss(MS − AV ) < diss(MM − AV ): The preference dissatisfaction values for
Minisum-Ranksum are lower than for Minisum-Approval, and they are lower for Minisum-
Approval than for Minimax-Approval.
Figure 6.2: Dissatisfaction values for sequential basic, uniform preferences
We also compared the preference dissatisfaction values under the combination sequen-
tial iterative for median group size 7, see Figure 6.3. As the Wilcoxon tests in the ap-
pendix show, the difference between the three rules are significant. We have the relation
diss(MS − RS) < diss(MS − AV ) < diss(MM − AV ): The preference dissatisfaction
values for Minisum-Ranksum are lower than for Minisum-Approval, and they are lower
for Minisum-Approval than for Minimax-Approval.
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Figure 6.3: Dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative, uniform preferences
Lastly, we compared the preference dissatisfaction values under the combination coordi-
nated basic for the three different rules with median group size 7, see Figure 6.4. As the
Wilcoxon tests in the appendix show, the differences between the three rules are signif-
icant. We have the relation diss(MS − RS) < diss(MS − AV ) < diss(MM − AV ):
The preference dissatisfaction values for Minisum-Ranksum are lower than for Minisum-
Approval, and they are lower for Minisum-Approval than for Minimax-Approval.
Figure 6.4: Dissatisfaction values for coordinated basic, uniform preferences
These results indicate that for uniform preferences, Minisum-Ranksum yields better re-
sults regarding the preference dissatisfaction than Minisum-Approval and Minimax-Ap-
proval, and Minisum-Approval yields better results than Minimax-Approval.
Foursquare-based preferences For Foursquare-based preferences, the results regarding
dissatisfaction values are similar, with one exception, namely the comparison between
Minisum-Approval and Minimax-Approval for sequential basic.
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Like for uniform preferences, we first consider the preference dissatisfaction values un-
der the combination sequential basic, see Figure 6.5. The Wilcoxon test results in the
appendix show that the difference between Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum is
significant, but the difference between Minisum-Approval and Minimax-Approval is not
significant. We have the relation diss(MS−RS) < diss(MS−AV ) = diss(MM−AV ).
Figure 6.5: Dissatisfaction values for sequential basic, Foursquare-based preferences
We also consider the preference dissatisfaction values under the combination sequen-
tial iterative for median size 2, see Figure 6.6. The Wilcoxon test results in the appendix
show that the differences between the three rules are significant. We have the relation
diss(MS −RS) < diss(MS − AV ) < diss(MM − AV ).
Figure 6.6: Dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative, Foursquare-based preferences
Lastly, we consider the preference dissatisfaction values under the combination coordi-
nated basic for median size 5, see Figure 6.7. The Wilcoxon test results in the appendix
show that the differences between the three rules are significant. We have the relation
diss(MS −RS) < diss(MS − AV ) < diss(MM − AV ).
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Figure 6.7: Dissatisfaction values for coordinated basic, Foursquare-based preferences
These results indicate that for Foursquare-based preferences, Minisum-Ranksum always
yields better results regarding the preference dissatisfaction than Minisum-Approval and
Minimax-Approval. For sequential basic, there is no significant difference between Minisum-
Approval and Minimax-Approval. For coordinated basic and sequential iterative, Minisum-
Approval yields better results than Minimax-Approval.
This means that for both preference types, Minisum-Ranksum yields better results than
Minisum-Approval, and Minisum-Approval yields at least as good results as Minimax-
Approval when considering preference dissatisfaction.
6.2.1.2 Group size
In this section we consider the question how the voting rules compare regarding group size.
With group size, we mean the sizes of the groups after the respective last election, directly
before they depart. We consider the target quantity separately for both preference forms.
We omit the combination sequential basic, because the group sizes are, predictably, the
same under this combination for all three voting rules: because we directly fill up all
groups and no voter is ever removed from a group, the groups usually achieve maximum
capacity (unless there are too few travellers left for filling them up).
Uniform preferences First, we compare the group size under sequential iterative, see
Figure 6.8. We compare simulations with comparable median dissatisfaction value. Ac-
cording to the Wilcoxon tests in the appendix, Minisum-Approval yields larger groups
than Minimax-Approval, but there is no significant difference between Minisum-Approval
and Minisum-Ranksum. We have the relation size(MM − AV ) < size(MS − AV ) =
size(MS −RS).
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Figure 6.8: Size values for sequential iterative, uniform preferences, comparable dissatis-
faction
We also compared the group size for comparable dissatisfaction under coordinated basic,
see Figure 6.9. According to the Wilcoxon tests in the appendix, the difference be-
tween Minisum-Approval and Minimax-Approval is significant, whereas there is no signif-
icant difference between Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum. We have the relation
size(MM − AV ) < size(MS − AV ) = size(MS −RS).
Figure 6.9: Size values for coordinated basic, uniform preferences, comparable dissatisfac-
tion
These results indicate that for uniform preferences under both sequential iterative and
coordinated basic, Minisum-Approval yields better results than Minimax-Approval and
Minisum-Ranksum yields as good results as Minisum-Approval regarding the group size.
Foursquare-based preferences First, we compared the size values for the three rules
under sequential iterative with comparable dissatisfaction, see Figure 6.10. According
to the Wilcoxon test in the appendix, the difference between Minisum-Approval and
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Minisum-Ranksum is significant. We have the relation size(MS − RS) = size(MM −
AV ) < size(MS − AV ).
Figure 6.10: Size values for sequential iterative, Foursquare-based preferences, compara-
ble dissatisfaction
We also compared the size values for the three rules under coordinated basic with com-
parable dissatisfaction values, see Figure 6.11.
According to the Wilcoxon test result in the appendix, the difference between Minisum-
Approval and Minimax-Approval is significant. We have the relation size(MS − AV ) =
size(MS −RS) > size(MM − AV ).
Figure 6.11: Size values for coordinated basic, Foursquare-based preferences, comparable
dissatisfaction
These results indicate that for Foursquare-based preferences, Minisum-Approval yields
better results than Minimax-Approval regarding the group size. Minisum-Ranksum yields
at least as good results as Minimax-Approval. For coordinated basic, Minisum-Ranksum
yields as good results as Minisum-Approval. For sequential iterative, Minisum-Approval
yields better results than Minisum-Ranksum.
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When you consider both preference types, Minisum-Approval yields better results than
Minimax-Approval. Minisum-Ranksum yields at least as good results as Minimax-Approval.
Minisum-Ranksum yields as good results as Minisum-Approval regarding the group size
for coordinated basic. For sequential iterative under uniform preferences, Minisum-Ranksum
yields as good results as Minisum-Approval. For sequential iterative under Foursquare-
based preferences, Minisum-Approval yields better results than Minisum-Ranksum.
6.2.1.3 Organisational effort
In this section, we consider the question how the voting rules compare regarding organ-
isational effort. Again, we consider the quantity separately for both preference forms.
We omit the combination sequential basic, because the organisational effort is the same
under this combination for all three voting rules.
Uniform preferences First, we compared the organisational effort under the combina-
tion sequential iterative for the three different rules with comparable dissatisfaction, see
Figure 6.12. We compared three simulations for which the median dissatisfaction value
was similar. According to the Wilcoxon tests in the appendix, the differences between the
three rules are significant. We have the relation orga(MS − RS) < orga(MS − AV ) <
orga(MM − AV ).
Figure 6.12: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative, uniform preferences,
comparable dissatisfaction
We also compared the organisational effort under coordinated basic for the three different
rules with comparable dissatisfaction, see Figure 6.13. According to the Wilcoxon tests
in the appendix, the difference between Minimax-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum is
significant, whereas the difference between Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum is
not significant. We have the relation orga(MS−RS) = orga(MS−AV ) < orga(MM −
AV ).
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Figure 6.13: Organisational effort values for coordinated basic, uniform preferences, com-
parable dissatisfaction
These results for uniform preferences indicate that for both sequential iterative and co-
ordinated basic, Minisum-Approval yields better results than Minimax-Approval. For
sequential iterative, Minisum-Ranksum yields better results than Minisum-Approval. Un-
der coordinated basic, Minisum-Ranksum yields as good results as Minisum-Approval.
Foursquare-based preferences First, we compare the organisational effort values under
sequential iterative for comparable dissatisfaction under Minisum-Approval, Minimax-
Approval and Minisum-Ranksum. In Figure 6.14, Minimax-Approval clearly yields higher
values than Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum. Minisum-Ranksum yields higher
values than Minisum-Approval. According to the Wilcoxon tests in the appendix, the
differences between the three rules are significant. We have the relation orga(MS−AV ) <
orga(MS −RS) < orga(MM − AV ).
Figure 6.14: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative, Foursquare-based pref-
erences, comparable dissatisfaction
We also compared the organisational effort values under coordinated basic for compara-
Chapter 6 - Experiments 85
ble dissatisfaction under Minisum-Approval, Minimax-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum,
see Figure 6.15. According to the Wilcoxon test results in the appendix, the differ-
ences between the three rules are significant. We have the relation orga(MS − RS) <
orga(MS − AV ) < orga(MM − AV ).
Figure 6.15: Organisational effort values for coordinated basic, Foursquare-based prefer-
ences, comparable dissatisfaction
These results indicate that for Foursquare-based preferences under both sequential iterative
and coordinated basic, Minisum-Ranksum and Minisum-Approval yield better results
than Minimax-Approval regarding the organisational effort values. For sequential iterative,
Minisum-Approval yields better results than Minisum-Ranksum. For coordinated basic,
Minisum-Ranksum yields better results than Minisum-Approval.
When you consider both preference types, Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum
yield better results than Minimax-Approval regarding organisational effort. Except for the
case of sequential iterative under Foursquare-based preferences, Minisum-Ranksum yields
at least as good results as Minisum-Approval. For sequential iterative under Foursquare-
based preferences, Minisum-Approval yields better results.
6.2.2 Voting protocols
In this section, we compare the two voting protocols regarding their effect on preference
dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group size. Like in the previous comparisons, we
consider uniform and Foursquare-based preferences separately.
6.2.2.1 Uniform preferences
First, we compare some results for the basic and the iterative protocol under Minisum-
Approval, see Table 6.4, which shows selected results for simulations under the combi-
nations sequential basic (sb) and sequential iterative (si) (with different dissatisfaction
thresholds).
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Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.33 14.00
si, dissThr 0.7 20.00 0.33 15.00
si, dissThr 0.65 7.00 0.32 16.00
si, dissThr 0.6 2.00 0.29 21.00
Table 6.4: Selected results for MS-AV, uniform, sb vs. si
For all dissatisfaction thresholds, it holds
• The iterative protocol yields equal or better results than the basic protocol in terms
of traveller dissatisfaction
• The iterative protocol yields equal or smaller groups than the basic protocol
• The iterative protocol yields higher organisational effort values than the basic pro-
tocol
It can be noted that even for very small median group size, the median dissatisfaction
under the iterative protocol is only slightly smaller than for the basic protocol.
Furthermore, we compare some results for the basic and the iterative protocol under
Minimax-Approval, see Table 6.5.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.39 14.00
si, dissThr 0.8 20.00 0.37 15.00
si, dissThr 0.7 7.00 0.36 16.00
si, dissThr 0.5 2.00 0.28 41.00
Table 6.5: Selected results for MM-AV, uniform, sb vs. si
For all dissatisfaction thresholds, it holds
• The iterative protocol yields equal or better results than the basic protocol in terms
of traveller dissatisfaction
• The iterative protocol yields equal or smaller groups than the basic protocol
• The iterative protocol yields higher organisational effort values than the basic pro-
tocol
It can be seen that larger changes in group size under the iterative protocol do not translate
to a larger improvement in dissatisfaction in comparison to the basic protocol.
Lastly, we compare some results for the basic and the iterative protocol under Minisum-
Ranksum, see Table 6.6.
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Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.32 14.00
si, dissThr 0.8 20.00 0.32 15.00
si, dissThr 0.7 19.00 0.31 16.00
si, dissThr 0.685 7.00 0.30 16.00
si, dissThr 0.5 2.00 0.23 32.00
Table 6.6: Selected results for MS-RS, uniform, sb vs. si
For all dissatisfaction thresholds, it holds
• The iterative protocol yields equal or better results than the basic protocol in terms
of traveller dissatisfaction
• The iterative protocol yields equal or smaller groups than the basic protocol
• The iterative protocol yields higher organisational effort values than the basic pro-
tocol
Again, it can be seen that larger changes in group size under the iterative protocol do not
translate to a larger improvement in dissatisfaction in comparison to the basic protocol.
These results indicate that for uniform preferences, using the iterative protocol leads to
improvement in preference dissatisfaction in comparison to the basic protocol, but this is
gained by severely deteriorating the group size.
6.2.2.2 Foursquare-based preferences
For Foursquare-based preferences, the results of the comparisons between the basic and
iterative protocol under the three voting rules are similar.
First, we compare some results for the basic and the iterative protocol under Minisum-
Approval, see Table 6.7.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.58 14.00
si, dissThr 0.9 2.00 0.45 23.00
si, dissThr 0.5 2.00 0.03 106.50
Table 6.7: Selected results for MS-AV, Foursquare-based, sb vs. si
For all dissatisfaction thresholds, it holds
• The iterative protocol yields equal or better results than the basic protocol in terms
of traveller dissatisfaction
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• The iterative protocol yields equal or smaller groups than the basic protocol
• The iterative protocol yields higher organisational effort values than the basic pro-
tocol
Furthermore, we compare some results for the basic and the iterative protocol under
Minimax-Approval, see Table 6.8.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.60 14.00
si, dissThr 0.65 19.00 0.60 16.00
si, dissThr 0.625 2.00 0.58 28.00
si, dissThr 0.5 2.00 0.31 132.00
Table 6.8: Selected results for MM-AV, Foursquare-based, sb vs. si
For all dissatisfaction thresholds, it holds
• The iterative protocol yields equal or better results than the basic protocol in terms
of traveller dissatisfaction
• The iterative protocol yields equal or smaller groups than the basic protocol
• The iterative protocol yields higher organisational effort values than the basic pro-
tocol
It can be seen that even for very small group sizes, the dissatisfaction for the iterative
protocol can be almost as high as for the basic protocol.
Lastly, we compare some results for the basic and the iterative protocol under Minisum-
Ranksum, see Table 6.9.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.51 14.00
si, dissThr 0.8 20.00 0.51 15.00
si, dissThr 0.7 2.00 0.42 33.00
Table 6.9: Selected results for MS-RS, Foursquare-based, sb vs. si
For all dissatisfaction thresholds, it holds
• The iterative protocol yields equal or better results than the basic protocol in terms
of traveller dissatisfaction
• The iterative protocol yields equal or smaller groups than the basic protocol
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• The iterative protocol yields higher organisational effort values than the basic pro-
tocol
These results indicate that for Foursquare-based preferences, using the iterative protocol
leads to improvement in preference dissatisfaction in comparison to the basic protocol,
which is often gained by severely deteriorating the group size.
6.2.3 Grouping algorithms
In this section, we compare the grouping algorithms regarding their effect on preference
dissatisfaction, organisational effort and group size. Again, we consider uniform and
Foursquare-based preferences separately.
6.2.3.1 Uniform preferences
First, we compare some results for the sequential and the coordinated grouping approach
under Minisum-Approval, see Table 6.10, which shows selected results for simulations
under the combinations sequential basic (sb) and coordinated basic (cb) (with different
join thresholds)
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.33 14.00
cb, joinThr 13 10.00 0.28 25.00
cb, joinThr 12 7.00 0.25 26.00
Table 6.10: Selected results for MS-AV, uniform, sb vs. cb
For all considered join thresholds, it holds
• Coordinated grouping yields better results than sequential grouping in terms of
traveller dissatisfaction
• Coordinated grouping yields smaller groups than sequential grouping
• Coordinated grouping yields higher organisational effort values than sequential group-
ing
Note here that coordinated grouping fares comparatively well in terms of median dissat-
isfaction in relation to median group size.
Furthermore, we compare some results for the sequential and the coordinated grouping
approach under Minimax-Approval, see Table 6.11,
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Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.39 14.00
cb, joinThr 11 5.00 0.27 27.00
cb, joinThr 10 3.00 0.23 27.00
cb, joinThr 9 2.00 0.20 30.00
Table 6.11: Selected results for MM-AV, uniform, sb vs. cb
For all considered join thresholds, it holds
• Coordinated grouping yields better results than sequential grouping in terms of
traveller dissatisfaction
• Coordinated grouping yields smaller groups than sequential grouping
• Coordinated grouping yields higher organisational effort values than sequential group-
ing
Lastly, we compare some results for the sequential and the coordinated grouping approach
under Minisum-Ranksum, see Table 6.12.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.32 14.00
cb, joinThr 50 11.00 0.26 25.00
cb, joinThr 40 7.00 0.21 28.00
cb, joinThr 30 4.00 0.13 34.00
Table 6.12: Selected results for MS-RS, uniform, sb vs. cb
For all considered join thresholds, it holds
• Coordinated grouping yields better results than sequential grouping in terms of
preference dissatisfaction
• Coordinated grouping yields smaller groups than sequential grouping
• Coordinated grouping yields higher organisational effort than sequential grouping
Again, it can be noted that coordinated grouping fares comparatively well in terms of
median dissatisfaction in relation to median group size.
These results indicate that for uniform preferences, coordinated grouping tends to fare
comparatively well in terms of median dissatisfaction in relation to median group size.
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6.2.3.2 Foursquare-based preferences
First, we compare some results for the sequential and the coordinated grouping approach,
see Table 6.13.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.58 14.00
cb, joinThr 7 5.00 0.02 26.00
cb, joinThr 5 3.00 0.01 28.00
Table 6.13: Selected results for MS-AV, Foursquare-based, sb vs. cb
For all considered join thresholds, it holds
• Coordinated grouping yields better results than sequential grouping in terms of
preference dissatisfaction
• Coordinated grouping yields smaller groups than sequential grouping
• Coordinated grouping yields higher organisational effort values than sequential group-
ing
Furthermore, we compare some results for the sequential and the coordinated grouping
approach under Minimax-Approval, see Table 6.14.
Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.60 14.00
cb, joinThr 9 5.00 0.30 25.00
cb, joinThr 6 5.00 0.14 25.00
cb, joinThr 5 3.00 0.03 30.00
Table 6.14: Selected results for MM-AV, Foursquare-based, sb vs. cb
For all considered join thresholds, it holds
• Coordinated grouping yields better results than sequential grouping in terms of
preference dissatisfaction
• Coordinated grouping yields smaller groups than sequential grouping
• Coordinated grouping yields higher organisational effort values than sequential group-
ing
Lastly, we compare some results for the sequential and the coordinated grouping approach,
see Table 6.15.
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Considered Median size Median dissatisfaction Median organisational effort
sb 20.00 0.51 14.00
cb, joinThr 50 10.00 0.33 19.00
cb, joinThr 40 7.00 0.20 21.00
cb, joinThr 30 6.00 0.13 29.00
cb, joinThr 20 5.00 0.00 24.00
Table 6.15: Selected results for MS-RS, Foursquare-based, sb vs. cb
For all considered join thresholds, it holds
• Coordinated grouping yields better results than sequential grouping in terms of
preference dissatisfaction
• Coordinated grouping yields smaller groups than sequential grouping
• Coordinated grouping yields higher organisational effort than sequential grouping
It can be noted here again that the coordinated grouping fares comparatively well: Even
for simulations with median size ≥ 1/2 median size under sequential grouping, the dis-
satisfaction is clearly lower than under sequential grouping.
These results indicate that for Foursquare-based preferences, as for uniform preferences,
the coordinated grouping tends to fare comparatively well in terms of median dissatisfac-
tion in relation to median group size.
6.2.4 Combinations
In this section we investigate how different combinations of grouping algorithms and vot-
ing protocols compare regarding their effects on preference dissatisfaction, organisational
effort and group size.
6.2.4.1 Preference dissatisfaction
In the following, we consider the quantity preference dissatisfaction. We again consider
it separately for uniform and Foursquare-based preferences.
Uniform preferences First, we compared the preference dissatisfaction values under
sequential iterative and coordinated basic for Minisum-Approval with median group size
7. As can be seen in Figure 6.16, coordinated basic yields lower dissatisfaction values than
sequential iterative. As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows, the difference between
sequential iterative and coordinated basic is significant.
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Figure 6.16: Dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MS-
AV
Furthermore, we compared the preference dissatisfaction values under sequential iterative
and coordinated basic for Minimax-Approval with median group size 7. As can be seen
in Figure 6.17, coordinated basic again yields lower dissatisfaction values than sequen-
tial iterative. As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows, the difference between se-
quential iterative and coordinated basic is significant.
Figure 6.17: Dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MM-
AV
Lastly, we compared the dissatisfaction values under sequential iterative and coordi-
nated basic for Minisum-Ranksum with median group size 7. As can be seen in Figure
6.18, coordinated basic again yields lower dissatisfaction values than sequential iterative.
As the Wilcoxon test in Section 10.3.4 shows, the difference between sequential iterative
and coordinated basic is significant.
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Figure 6.18: Dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MS-
RS
These results indicate that under uniform preferences, for comparable group size, coor-
dinated basic yields better results than sequential iterative regarding preference dissatis-
faction for all three voting rules.
Foursquare-based preferences First, we considered the preference dissatisfaction val-
ues for Minisum-Approval. For the considered simulations for Minisum-Approval with
Foursquare-based preferences, coordinated basic is better regarding preference dissatis-
faction than sequential iterative: The maximum median dissatisfaction for simulations
under coordinated basic with median group size 5 is smaller than the minimum median
dissatisfaction for simulations under sequential iterative with median group size 2 (0.02
vs. 0.03).
Furthermore, we considered the preference dissatisfaction values for Minimax-Approval.
For the considered simulations for Minimax-Approval with Foursquare-based preferences,
coordinated basic is better regarding preference dissatisfaction than sequential iterative:
The maximum median dissatisfaction for simulations under coordinated basic with me-
dian group size 3 is smaller than the minimum median dissatisfaction for simulations
under sequential iterative with median group size 2 (0.03 vs. 0.31).
Lastly, we considered the preference dissatisfaction values for Minisum-Ranksum. For the
considered simulations for Minisum-Ranksum with Foursquare-based preferences, coordi-
nated basic is better regarding preference dissatisfaction than sequential iterative: The
maximum median dissatisfaction for simulations under coordinated basic with median
group size 5 is smaller than the minimum median dissatisfaction for simulations under
sequential iterative with median group size 2 (0.00 vs. 0.25).
These results indicate that, as under uniform preferences, under Foursquare-based pref-
erences, for comparable group size, coordinated basic yields better results than sequen-
tial iterative regarding preference dissatisfaction for all three voting rules.
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6.2.4.2 Group size
In the following, we consider the quantity group size, again separately for uniform and
Foursquare-based preferences.
Uniform preferences First, we compared the group size values under sequential iterative
and coordinated basic for Minisum-Approval for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, se-
quential iterative yields smaller groups than coordinated basic. As the Wilcoxon test in
the appendix shows, the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is
significant.
Figure 6.19: Size values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MS-AV, com-
parable dissatisfaction
Furthermore, we compared the size values under sequential iterative and coordinated basic
for Minimax-Approval for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, sequential iterative yields
smaller group sizes than coordinated basic. As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows,
the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is significant.
96 Chapter 6 - Experiments
Figure 6.20: Size values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MM-AV, com-
parable dissatisfaction
Lastly, we compared the size values under sequential iterative and coordinated basic
for Minisum-Ranksum for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, sequential iterative yields
smaller group sizes than coordinated basic. As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows,
the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is significant.
Figure 6.21: Size values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MS-RS, compa-
rable dissatisfaction
These results indicate that for uniform preferences, coordinated basic yields better results
than sequential iterative regarding group size.
Foursquare-based preferences For Foursquare-based preferences, the results regarding
group size are similar.
First, we compared the group size for Minisum-Approval under sequential iterative and co-
ordinated basic for comparable dissatisfaction. Clearly, sequential iterative yields smaller
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group sizes than coordinated basic. Acccording to the Wilcoxon test in the appendix, the
difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is significant.
Figure 6.22: Size values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MS-AV, com-
parable dissatisfaction
Furthermore, we compared the group size for Minimax-Approval under sequential iterative
and coordinated basic for comparable dissatisfaction. As Figure 6.23 shows, the group
sizes for sequential iterative are smaller than for coordinated basic. According to the
Wilcoxon test in the appendix, the difference between sequential iterative and coordi-
nated basic is significant.
Figure 6.23: Size values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MM-AV, com-
parable dissatisfaction
Lastly, we compared the size values for Minisum-Ranksum under sequential iterative
and coordinated basic for comparable dissatisfaction. As Figure 6.24 shows, sequen-
tial iterative yields smaller groups than coordinated basic. According to the Wilcoxon
test in the appendix, the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is
significant.
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Figure 6.24: Size values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for MS-RS, compa-
rable dissatisfaction
These results indicate that, as for uniform preferences, for Foursquare-based preferences,
coordinated basic yields better results than sequential iterative regarding group size. This
also means that for both preference types, coordinated basic yields better results than
sequential iterative regarding group size.
6.2.4.3 Organisational effort
In the following, we consider the quantity organisational effort, again separately for uni-
form and Foursquare-based preferences.
Uniform preferences First, we compared the organisational effort values under sequen-
tial iterative and coordinated basic for Minisum-Approval for comparable dissatisfaction.
Here, sequential iterative yields lower organisational effort values than coordinated basic.
As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows, the difference between sequential iterative
and coordinated basic is significant.
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Figure 6.25: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for
MS-AV, comparable dissatisfaction
Furthermore, we compared the organisational effort values under sequential iterative and
coordinated basic for Minimax-Approval for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, sequen-
tial iterative yields higher organisational effort values than coordinated basic. As the
Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows, the difference between sequential iterative and co-
ordinated basic is significant.
Figure 6.26: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for
MM-AV, comparable dissatisfaction
Lastly, we compared the organisational effort values under sequential iterative and coordi-
nated basic for Minisum-Ranksum for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, sequential iterative
yields higher organisational effort values than coordinated basic. As the Wilcoxon test in
the appendix shows, the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is
significant.
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Figure 6.27: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for
MS-RS, comparable dissatisfaction
These results indicate that for uniform preferences, coordinated basic yields better re-
sults than sequential iterative regarding organisational effort values, except for Minisum-
Approval. For Minisum-Approval, sequential iterative yields better results.
Foursquare-based preferences First, we compared the organisational effort under se-
quential iterative and coordinated basic for Minisum-Approval for comparable dissatisfac-
tion. Here, sequential iterative yields higher organisational effort than coordinated basic.
As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix shows, the difference between sequential iterative
and coordinated basic is significant.
cb
Figure 6.28: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for
MS-AV, comparable dissatisfaction
Furthermore, we compared the organisational effort under sequential iterative and coordi-
nated basic for Minimax-Approval for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, sequential iterative
yields higher organisational effort than coordinated basic. As the Wilcoxon test in the
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appendix shows, the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is sig-
nificant.
Figure 6.29: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for
MM-AV, comparable dissatisfaction
Lastly, we compared the organisational effort under sequential iterative and coordinated basic
for Minisum-Ranksum for comparable dissatisfaction. Here, sequential iterative yields
higher organisational effort than coordinated basic. As the Wilcoxon test in the appendix
shows, the difference between sequential iterative and coordinated basic is significant.
Figure 6.30: Organisational effort values for sequential iterative and coordinated basic for
MS-RS, comparable dissatisfaction
These results indicate that for Foursquare-based preferences, coordinated basic always
yields better results than sequential iterative regarding organisational effort.
This means that for both preference types, coordinated basic yields better results than se-
quential iterative regarding organisational effort, except for Minisum-Approval under uni-
form preferences. For Minisum-Approval under uniform preferences, sequential iterative
yields better results.
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6.2.5 Summary of results for main series
The following table and the following paragraphs summarise the results for the main
series.
Comparing Uniform preferences Foursquare-based
preferences
























































Voting protocols, dissatisfaction for
all rules
diss(si) < diss(sb) diss(si) < diss(sb)
Voting protocols, size for all rules size(si) < size(sb) size(si) < size(sb)
Voting protocols, org. effort for all
rules
orga(si) > orga(sb) orga(si) > orga(sb)
Grouping algorithms, dissatisfaction
for all rules
diss(cb) < diss(sb) diss(cb) < diss(sb)
Grouping algorithms, size for all
rules
size(cb) < size(sb) size(cb) < size(sb)
Grouping algorithms, org. effort for
all rules
orga(cb) > orga(sb) orga(cb) > orga(sb)
Combinations, dissatisfaction for all
rules
diss(cb) < diss(si) diss(cb) < diss(si)
Combinations, size for all rules size(cb) > size(si) size(cb) > size(si)
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Voting rules For the considered simulations, Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum
yielded at least as good results as Minimax-Approval. Minisum-Ranksum yielded at least
as good results as Minisum-Approval, except for effort and size for sequential iterative un-
der Foursquare-based preferences. This means that we have the following observations.
O1.1: Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum yielded better or as good results as
Minimax-Approval.
O1.2: Minisum-Ranksum yielded at least as good results as Minisum-Approval, except for
effort and size for sequential iterative under Foursquare-based preferences.
Voting protocols We compared the basic protocol with the iterative protocol under all
three rules for both uniform and Foursquare-based preferences. The iterative protocol
always yielded at most as high dissatisfaction values as the basic protocol, at most as
large groups as the basic protocol and at least as high organisational effort values as the
basic protocol.
Note that under the iterative voting protocol, lower dissatisfaction thresholds lead to
lower preference dissatisfaction, but to smaller groups and higher organisational effort.
In many cases, the improvement in dissatisfaction values came at the cost of very small
groups. This means that we have the following observation:
O2: The iterative protocol often led to an improvement in preference dissatisfaction at
the price of a strong deterioration in group size.
Grouping algorithms We compared the sequential grouping with the coordinated group-
ing for all three voting rules for both uniform and Foursquare-based preferences. The
coordinated grouping always yielded at most as high dissatisfaction values as the basic
protocol, at most as large groups as the basic protocol and at least as high organisational
effort as the basic protocol.
When using coordinated grouping, lower join thresholds lead to lower preference dissat-
isfaction, but to smaller groups and higher organisational effort. It can be noted that in
many cases, there is an improvement in dissatisfaction values for the coordinated grouping
in comparison to the sequential grouping, for relatively large groups. This means that we
have the following observation:
O3: The coordinated grouping often led to an improvement in preference dissatisfaction,
while there was no strong deterioration in group size.
Combinations Lastly, we compared the combinations sequential iterative and coordi-
nated basic for all three voting rules for both uniform and Foursquare-based preferences.
For the considered simulations we found that coordinated basic always yielded smaller
dissatisfaction values than sequential iterative for comparable group size values, coor-
dinated basic always yielded larger groups than sequential iterative for comparable dis-
satisfaction values and coordinated basic yielded in most cases lower organisational effort
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values than sequential iterative for comparable dissatisfaction, except for the case uniform
preferences, Minisum-Approval. This means that we have the following observations:
O4: In most cases, coordinated basic yielded better results than sequential iterative.
O4.1: coordinated basic always yielded better results than sequential iterative regarding
the quantities preference dissatisfaction and group size.
O4.2: coordinated basic yielded better results than sequential iterative regarding the quan-
tity organisational effort, except for the case uniform preferences, Minisum-Approval.
6.2.6 Discussion for main simulation series
We compared the impact of different voting algorithms (voting rules, voting protocols,
grouping algorithms and combinations) on the preference dissatisfaction of the travellers,
the sizes of the resulting travel groups and the organisational effort for the travellers.
From our observations regarding the results, we generate the following hypotheses:
H1: Minisum-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum yield better than or as good results as
Minimax-Approval, and except for sequential iterative under Foursquare-based preferences,
Minisum-Ranksum yields at least as good results as Minisum-Approval.
H2: The iterative protocol tends to lead to an improvement in preference dissatisfaction
which comes at the price of a strong deterioration in group size.
H3: The coordinated grouping tends to lead to an improvement in preference dissatisfac-
tion, while there is no strong deterioration in group size.
H4: The combination coordinated basic tends to yield better results than sequential iter-
ative.
H4.1: The combination coordinated basic yields better results than sequential iterative
regarding the quantities preference dissatisfaction and group size.
H4.2: The combination coordinated basic tends to yield better results than sequential it-
erative regarding the quantity organisational effort.
In the terms of [Carley, 1999], we considered the key input parameters voting rule, voting
protocol and grouping algorithm for the outputs preference dissatisfaction, group size and
organisational effort.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we suggest to use the hypotheses formulated here for both gen-
erating recommendations for designers of real-world applications and as basis for further
research. Based on the results on hand, we formulate the following recommendations:
For already defined groups, we recommend using Minisum-Ranksum to reduce dissatis-
faction. If the aim were to create large groups with low dissatisfaction, one could use the
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combination sequential basic with Minisum-Ranksum. However, if one aims at a com-
promise between user and system goals, i.e. at improving preference satisfaction without
reducing the group sizes too much, it would be recommended to use Minisum-Ranksum
with the basic protocol and the coordinated grouping algorithm1. This means that, assum-
ing that the goal is to achieve a compromise between the goals of the traffic management
and the traffic participants, it would make sense in a real-world implementation to use the
voting rule Minisum-Ranksum in combination with coordinated grouping and the basic
voting protocol.
Based on the hypotheses, we formulate some recommendations for designers of real-world
voting-based applications for building groups of vehicles and agreeing on common des-
tinations. The last recommendation is of particular interest for us because it yields a
compromise between system and user goals.
We formulate one recommendation for the case that we consider already defined groups
and two recommendations for the case that we consider how the groups are obtained.
IF the requirement is low dissatisfaction for defined groups,
THEN the recommended configuration is the voting rule Minisum-Ranksum
IF the requirement is as large groups as possible with avoiding high dissatisfaction,
THEN the recommended configuration is the voting rule Minisum-Ranksum with
the combination sequential basic
IF the requirement is low dissatisfaction with avoiding small groups,
THEN the recommended configuration is the voting rule Minisum-Ranksum with
the combination coordinated basic
Regarding further research, the results suggest that it makes sense to conduct additional
experiments for Minisum-Ranksum under the combination coordinated basic, because the
results for Minisum-Ranksum under coordinated basic seem promising in regard to a com-
promise between system and user goals. In particular, it would be useful to compare the
effects of Minisum-Ranksum under coordinated basic with other algorithms, conducting
simulations with different numbers of travellers, different numbers of alternatives and dif-
ferent group capacities to investigate whether the hypotheses generated here hold true for
other settings and under which conditions they hold true. Further research also should
include a more thorough investigation of the effects of different thresholds.
A limitation of our investigations is that only some selected voting algorithms were con-
sidered. For further research, additionally to further exploring Minisum-Ranksum under
coordinated basic, it might be reasonable to investigate additional voting algorithms, for
example further voting rules, more refined iterative voting protocols or more refined co-
ordinated grouping algorithms.
1Note that according to observation O4.2, this configuration is also expected to lead to lower organisa-
tional effort than when applying sequential iterative.

Chapter 7 - Travel costs under different combinations 107
Chapter 7
Travel costs under different combinations
One advantage of the voting-based approach is that grouping travellers together in groups
leads to lower travel costs. In the main simulation series, we did not investigate travel
costs and disregarded the actual routing of the travellers. In this section, we demonstrate
by means of some examples how the travel costs (based on travel time) differ for single
traveller agents and travel groups under different combinations of grouping algorithms
and voting protocols. In order to do so, we use TSP approximations for computing the
routes.
OSM node POI name
6018 POI 1 American Museum of Natural History
6895 POI 2 Aritzia Mall 600 5th Ave
6115 POI 3 Brookfield Place
5559 POI 4 Bryant Park
2702 POI 5 Carnegie Hall
4986 POI 6 Central Park
4476 POI 7 Chelsea Market
5461 POI 8 Federal Hall National Memorial
2145 POI 9 Former Location of Edward Hopper’s Studio
6963 POI 10 High Line 10th Ave Amphitheatre
3290 POI 11 Madison Square Park
5276 POI 12 Metropolitan Museum of Art
4657 POI 13 Museum of Modern Art (MoMA)
6119 POI 14 One World Observatory
6157 POI 15 St. Patrick’s Cathedral
4729 POI 16 Top of the Rock Observation Deck
6361 POI 17 TurnStyle Underground Market
3505 POI 18 Under The Brooklyn Bridge
3291 POI 19 Union Square Park
3321 POI 20 Whitney Museum of American Art
7090 Start and End - Grand Central Terminal
Table 7.1: Considered sites as table
To this end, we use a Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS)1 database con-
1https://www.qgis.org/en/site/
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taining the Manhattan network of OpenStreetMap (OSM)2 nodes. In particular, we
consider the POIs\OSM nodes in Table 7.1, which are also depicted in Figure 7.1. Note
that we assume the Grand Central Terminal as start and end point for the tour and that
the travel groups are formed there.
Figure 7.1: Considered sites
Map data c© OpenStreetMap contributors (https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright)
In QGIS, it is possible to conduct TSP approximations using pgrouting3. We give an
example for a TSP approximation using all 21 OSM nodes:
SELECT * FROM pgr_TSP(
$$
SELECT * FROM pgr_dijkstraCostMatrix(
’SELECT osm_id as id , source , target , to_time_cost as cost ,
reverse_time_cost as reverse_cost , x1 , y1 , x2 , y2
FROM manhattan_ways’,
ARRAY [6018 , 6895, 3291, 6115, 5559, 2702, 4986, 4476, 6361,










We compare the travel costs for the case that travellers drive alone with the case that trav-
ellers drive in groups. For better comparability of the results we only consider Minisum-
k-Approval, a variant where each voter/traveller accepts exactly k candidates/POIs, so
that each traveller will always visit exactly k POIs, even if driving alone.
From the travel times and group sizes, we derive the costs: For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that a time unit corresponds to a cost unit. The travel cost for a visitor is
computed as the sum of cost units for the route divided by group size. The larger the
groups, the smaller the travel costs will be.
7.1 Example simulation - driving alone
The first simulation aims at yielding an example how travel costs behave for the case that
the travellers travel alone. To this end, we run a simulation series with 1 run, 41 travellers,
20 POIs, group capacity of 1, committee size of 5 and Foursquare-based preferences. In
the following table, we present the resulting committees for the different travellers, the
corresponding OSM nodes and the travel cost for each committee. For this example
simulation with all agents driving alone, the median individual travel cost is 1,351.
agent committee corresponding OSM nodes cost
0 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
1 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
2 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
3 {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986, 4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
4 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
5 {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
6 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
7 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
8 {0, 1, 2, 3, 8} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2145] 1,362.42
9 {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
10 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
11 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
12 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
13 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
14 {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
15 {0, 1, 2, 3, 8} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2145] 1,362.42
16 {0, 1, 2, 3, 8} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2145] 1,362.42
17 {0, 1, 2, 3, 8} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2145] 1,362.42
18 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
19 {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
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20 {0, 1, 2, 3, 8} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2145] 1,362.42
21 {8, 9, 10, 11, 16} [2145, 6963, 3290, 5276, 6361] 1,081.41
22 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
23 {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
24 {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
25 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
26 {8, 9, 10, 11, 16} [2145, 6963, 3290, 5276, 6361] 1,081.41
27 {4, 8, 9, 10, 11} [2702, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,039.84
28 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
29 {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986, 4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
30 {4, 8, 9, 10, 11} [2702, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,083.44
31 {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
32 {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986, 4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
33 {0, 8, 9, 10, 11} [6018, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,104,21
34 {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986, 4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
35 {8, 9, 10, 11, 16} [2145, 6963, 3290, 5276, 6361] 1,081.41
36 {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
37 {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986, 4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
38 {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
39 {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
40 {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
7.2 Example simulation - driving in groups,
sequential basic
The second simulation series aims at yielding an example how travel costs behave for the
combination of sequential grouping and the basic voting protocol. We run a simulation
series with 1 run, 41 travellers, 20 POIs, group capacity of 20, committee size k of 5 and
Foursquare-based preferences.
In the following, we present the resulting committees for the different groups.
Group 0 with 20 agents elects the committee {0, 1, 2, 3, 8}, which corresponds to the
POIs as shown in Table 7.3.
OSM node POI name
6018 POI 1 American Museum of Natural History
6115 POI 3 Brookfield Place
5559 POI 4 Bryant Park
2145 POI 9 Former Location of Edward Hopper’s Studio
Table 7.3: POIs for sequential basic, group 0
Group 1 with 20 agents elects the committee {0, 4, 5, 6, 8}, which corresponds to thePOIs
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as shown in Table 7.4.
OSM node POI name
6018 POI 1 American Museum of Natural History
2702 POI 5 Carnegie Hall
4986 POI 6 Central Park
4476 POI 7 Chelsea Market
2145 POI 9 Former Location of Edward Hopper’s Studio
Table 7.4: POIs for sequential basic, group 1
Finally, Group 2 with one agent elects the committee {8, 16, 17, 18, 19}, which corre-
sponds to the POIs as shown in Table 7.5.
OSM node POI name
2145 POI 9 Former Location of Edward Hopper’s Studio
6963 POI 10 High Line 10th Ave Amphitheatre
6361 POI 17 TurnStyle Underground Market
3505 POI 18 Under The Brooklyn Bridge
3291 POI 19 Union Square Park
3321 POI 20 Whitney Museum of American Art
Table 7.5: POIs for sequential basic, group 2
Based on the selected POIs, we compute for each group the travel costs. Here, we define
the travel time based on the travel time and use TSP approximations. In each compu-
tation, we use the POI Grand Central Terminal (with OSM ID 7090) as start and end
point.
For example, for group 0, the costs are computed in QGIS as follows:
SELECT * FROM pgr_TSP(
$$
SELECT * FROM pgr_dijkstraCostMatrix(
’SELECT osm_id as id , source , target , to_time_cost as cost ,
reverse_time_cost as reverse_cost , x1 , y1 , x2 , y2
FROM manhattan_ways’,






This leads us to the following costs for all three groups.
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Group Overall cost Cost per traveller
Group 0 1,362.42 68.12
Group 1 1,144.12 57.21
Group 2 1,299.26 1,299.26
Table 7.6: Costs for simulation series with sequential basic
For this example simulation, the median individual travel cost is 68.12.
7.3 Example simulation - driving in groups,
sequential iterative
The third simulation aims at yielding an example how travel costs behave for the com-
bination of sequential grouping and iterative voting protocol. We run a simulation series
with 1 run, 41 agents, 20 POIs, group capacity of 20, committee size of 5, a preference
dissatisfaction threshold of 0.7 and Foursquare-based preferences. In Table 7.7, we present
the resulting committees for the different groups, the corresponding OSM nodes and the
travel cost for each committee. For this example, the median individual travel cost is
443.40.
group id (size) committee corresponding OSM nodes aggregated cost
0 (12) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
1 (4) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
2 (3) {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
3 (3) {0, 1, 2, 4, 8} [6018, 6895, 6115, 2702, 2145] 1,330.14
4 (2) {4, 8, 9, 10, 11} [2702, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,083.44
5 (2) {8, 9, 10, 11, 12} [2145, 6963, 3290, 5276, 4657] 1,081.37
6 (2) {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
7 (1) {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986,4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
8 (2) {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} [2702, 4986, 4476, 5461, 2145] 1,598.73
9 (2) {4, 8, 9, 10, 11} [2702, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,083.44
10 (1) {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
11 (2) {0, 8, 9, 10, 11} [6018, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,104,21
12 (2) {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
13 (1) {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
14 (1) {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
15 (1) {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
Table 7.7: Resulting committees for sequential iterative with OSM nodes and costs
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7.4 Example simulation - driving in groups,
coordinated basic
The last simulation aims at aims at yielding an example how travel costs behave for the
combination of coordinated grouping and basic voting protocol. We run a simulation
series with 1 run, 41 agents, 20 POIs, group capacity of 20, committee size of 5, a join
threshold of 8 and Foursquare-based preferences. In Table 7.8, we present the resulting
committees for the different groups, the corresponding OSM nodes and the travel cost for
each committee. For this example, the median individual travel cost is 157.70.
group id (size) committee array aggregated cost
0 (11) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
1 (6) {0, 4, 5, 6, 7} [6018, 2702, 4986, 4476, 5461] 1,595.61
2 (5) {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
3 (9) {8, 12, 13, 14, 15} [2145, 4657, 6119, 6157, 4729] 1,020.96
4 (7) {4, 8, 9, 10, 11} [6018, 2145, 6963, 3290, 5276] 1,104,21
5 (2) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} [6018, 6895, 6115, 5559, 2702] 1,351.31
6 (1) {8, 16, 17, 18, 19} [2145, 6361, 3505, 3291, 3321] 1,299.26
Table 7.8: Resulting committees for coordinated basic with OSM nodes and costs
7.5 Summary for travel costs under different
combinations
In this section, we wanted to demonstrate how the inherent differences between the com-
binations result in differences regarding travel costs. In the main series we got the result
that both sequential iterative and coordinated basic yield smaller groups than sequen-
tial basic, and coordinated basic tends to yield larger groups than sequential iterative.
Consistently with this, we can rank the combinations according to the median travel costs
in the example simulations as follows: sequential basic yields lower travel costs than co-
ordinated basic, and coordinated basic yields lower travel costs than sequential iterative.
The travel costs when driving alone are higher than for all those combinations. Note that,
according to the results from the main simulation series, the preference dissatisfaction for
sequential basic is higher than for coordinated basic and sequential iterative, i.e. if you
look for a compromise between preference satisfaction and travel costs, one would use
coordinated basic.
Because our aim in this section was to only briefly demonstrate the differences regarding
travel costs, we stick to four example simulations. In further work, one could consider
simulations with different dissatisfaction and join thresholds to create a more detailed
picture.
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Chapter 8
Extended model with distance costs
We did not include travel costs in the original model as described in Chapter 4. In
this chapter, we consider the incorporation of distance costs (based on the distances
between the POIs) into an agent’s utility function as a promising extension of our model
to make it more realistic. We demonstrate several possibilities for the extension and their
effects qualitatively using several example scenarios. Note that this extension has not
been implemented in our simulation environment. In the following sections, we describe
the components of the model, explain the different possibilities of computing the distance
costs, outline an incremental approach and briefly summarise the results of this chapter.
8.1 Model components and considered POIs
In order to take distance costs into account for computing the travellers’ preferences, we
interpret the old preference function as “attractiveness” function and combine it with a
cost function in order to create the new preference/utility function. We also consider
three different possibilities for defining the cost function, as detailed below.
Attractiveness values For each traveller ti and POIs pj we define an attractiveness
value aij which corresponds to the preference prefij of traveller ti for pj as defined in
Chapter 4.
Cost/distance values For each POI pi, we define an inverse cost/distance value di. We
present three possibilities for computing the cost values.
• Distance to centroid: Here, we compute for each POI the distance to the centroid.
• Average distance: Here, we compute for each POI the average distance to all other
POIs.
• Distance to start/end: Here, we use as cost value for each POI the distance to the
start/end point.
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Overall function We combine the attractiveness values and inverse cost values by adding
them, using weights. The utility or preference value uij of POI pj for traveller ti is defined
as
uij = αi ∗ aij + (1− αi) ∗ dj.
Note that the higher the inverse cost value dj is, the higher the preference for POI pj
is. You can use different α-values for different agents to model that they have more or
less money: Consider two agents a1 and a2. Agent a1 has more money, with budgetary
weight α1 = 0.8. Agent a2 has less money, with budgetary weight α2 = 0.2. The rationale
behind using budgetary weights is that the lower the budget of an agent is, the higher the
influence of the cost value will be on its preference. The higher the budget of an agent
is, the higher the influence of the attractiveness value will be on its preference: Agents
with high budget will not pay so much attention to distance costs as agents with lower
budget.
Considered POIs For the following examples, we consider some concrete POIs from
Manhattan, see Table 8.1. We list the OSM ids in the overview table so that the rout-
ing examples below will be comprehensible. We will conduct tie-breaking based on the
abbreviations, not based on the full names.
OSM node POI name Abbreviation
5559 Bryant Park BP
4476 Chelsea Market CM
4986 Central Park CP
6119 One World Observatory OW
7090 Grand Central Terminal (start/end) GC
Table 8.1: Considered POIs
In Section 8.2, we give examples for computing the distance costs, including voting exam-
ples for the third possibility. In Section 8.3, we explain how to use an incremental voting
process, as opposed to using committee elections.
8.2 Computation of distance costs
In the following subsections, we explain the three possibilities for computing the dis-
tance costs, including examples. For the third possibility, we also describe two example
committee elections based on the computed distance costs.
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Figure 8.1: Example for computation of distance to centroid
8.2.1 Distance to centroid
A possibility for determining the cost values is to compute the distance of each POI to
the centroid over all POIs. For a simple polygon, the centroid is computed by summing
up the coordinates, and dividing by number of POIs. Then, we take for each POI the
distance to the centroid and normalise this value using the maximum distance between the
centroid and any POI. This approach is more suitable for networks with homogenously
distributed nodes. Consider as an example the graph depicted in Figure 8.1. We have the
following nodes and coordinates:
A with xA = 1, yA = 1
B with xB = 2, yB = 4
C with xC = 7, yC = 6
D with xD = 4, yD = 3
The coordinates (x, y) for the centroid X (marked in red) are computed as
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x =





1 + 4 + 6 + 3
4
= 3.5
The distances between the nodes and the centroid are
dist(A,X) =
√















(3.5− 4)2 + (3.5− 3)2 =
√
0.5 = 0.71
The maximum distance between any node and the centroid is dist(C,X) = 4.30. This
leads to the normalised distance values
dN(A) = 3.54/4.30 = 0.82
dN(B) = 1.58/4.30 = 0.37
dN(C) = 4.30/4.30 = 1.00
dN(D) = 0.71/4.30 = 0.17
and the inverse distance values
d(A) = 1− 0.82 = 0.18
d(B) = 1− 0.37 = 0.63
d(C) = 1− 1.00 = 0.00
d(D) = 1− 0.17 = 0.83
For an OSM network, we could compute the centroid, determine the shortest path from
each POI to the centroid (or the OSM node nearest to the centroid).
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8.2.2 Average distance
Another way to determine the cost/distance values is to compute the average distance of
each node to all other nodes. This can easily be computed based on a distance matrix.
For networks where the nodes are less homogeneously distributed, this approach is more
suitable.
Consider as example the graph as specified in Figure 8.2 and the corresponding distance
matrix in Table 8.2.
Figure 8.2: Example for computation of average distance
A B C D
A – 4 9 4
B 4 – 6 3
C 9 6 – 6
D 4 3 6 –
Table 8.2: Exemplary distance matrix














We normalise using the maximum average distance d(C) = 7.00, leading to the normalised
cost/distance values
dN(A) = 5.67/7.00 = 0.81
dN(B) = 4.33/7.00 = 0.62
dN(C) = 7.00/7.00 = 1.00
dN(D) = 4.33/7.00 = 0.62
and the inverse distance values
d(A) = 1− 0.81 = 0.19
d(B) = 1− 0.62 = 0.38
d(C) = 1− 1.00 = 0.00
d(D) = 1− 0.62 = 0.38
8.2.2.1 Real-world example
As small real-world example, consider the following 4 POIs in New York City:
• Bryant Park (BP) - OSM id 5559
• Chelsea Market (CM) - OSM id 4476
• Central Park (CP) - OSM id 4986
• One World Observatory (OW) - OSM id 6119
The distances specified in Table 8.3 were computed with pgrouting (Measurements in
km).
For example, the distance from Bryant Park to Chelsea Market was computed with the
following command.
SELECT * FROM pgr_dijkstraCost(
’select osm_id as id , source , target , to_length_cost as cost ,
reverse_length_cost as reverse_cost from manhattan_ways’,
5559, 4476, true);
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BP CM CP OW
BP – 3.04 4.37 6.75
CM 3.03 – 6.88 4.40
CP 4.31 6.68 – 10.36
OW 5.65 3.81 9.96 –
Table 8.3: Distance matrix for POIs in Manhattan
In the next step, we “correct” the matrix in order to render it symmetrical, see Table
8.4
BP CM CP OW
BP – 3.04 4.34 6.20
CM 3.04 – 6.78 4.11
CP 4.34 6.78 – 10.16
OW 6.20 4.11 10.16 –
Table 8.4: Symmetrical distance matrix for POIs in Manhattan
This leads to the average distance values
d(BP ) = 4.53
d(CM) = 4.64
d(CP ) = 7.09
d(OW ) = 6.82
and the normalised cost/distance values
dN(BP ) = 4.53/7.09 = 0.64
dN(CM) = 4.64/7.09 = 0.65
dN(CP ) = 7.09/7.09 = 1.00
dN(OW ) = 6.82/7.09 = 0.96
as well as the inverse distance values
d(BP ) = 1− 0.64 = 0.36
d(CM) = 1− 0.65 = 0.35
d(CP ) = 1− 1.00 = 0.00
d(OW ) = 1− 0.96 = 0.04
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8.2.3 Distances to start/end point
Another possible approach is to compute the distances between the POIs and the start/end
point of the tour. In this case, the start/end point is the Grand Central Terminal (GC)
with the OSM id 7090. All measurements are given in km. For this approach, we also
give an example for an election, using a committee voting rule.
8.2.3.1 Original distances
We compute the distance d(BP,GC) with
SELECT * FROM pgr_dijkstraCost(
’select osm_id as id , source , target , to_length_cost as cost ,
reverse_length_cost as reverse_cost from manhattan_ways’,
5559, 7090, true
);
which yields d(BP,GC) = 0.72
We compute the reverse distance d(GC,BP ) with
SELECT * FROM pgr_dijkstraCost(
’select osm_id as id , source , target , to_length_cost as cost ,
reverse_length_cost as reverse_cost from manhattan_ways’,
7090, 5559, true
);
which yields d(GC,BP ) = 1.03
The average distance is d(BP,GC) = 0.88.
Analogue, we compute the other distances
d(CM,GC) = 3.74, d(GC,CM) = 3.58, d(CM,GC) = 3.66
d(CP,GC) = 3.92, d(GC,CP ) = 3.99, d(CP,CG) = 3.96
d(OW,GC) = 6.30, d(GC,OW ) = 6.93, d(OW,CG) = 6.62
8.2.3.2 Normalised distances



















which yields the inverse cost values
d(BP ) = 0.87
d(CM) = 0.45
d(CP ) = 0.40
d(OW ) = 0.00
8.2.3.3 Example election with identical budgetary weights
Let us assume that three agents starting from the POI GC need to agree on two POIs out
of the ones specified in Table 8.1. Furthermore, we assume the following attractiveness
values of the agents for the POIs. As committee voting rule, we use Minisum-Approval
with k = 2.
BP CM CP OW
a1 0.96 0.93 0.97 0.91
a2 0.96 0.40 0.97 0.91
a3 0.10 0.93 0.97 0.99
Table 8.5: Attractiveness values
Then, the preference values of the agents for the POIs are computed as follows (with
α = 0.5 for all agents):
• agent 1
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.915
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0.93 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.69
– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.455
• agent 2
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.915
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0, 40 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.425
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– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.46
• agent 3
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.10 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.485
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0.93 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.69
– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.99 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.495
This leads to the to the Approval votes as defined in Table 8.6
BP CM CP OW
v1 1 1 1 0
v2 1 0 1 0
v3 0 1 1 0
Table 8.6: Resulting Approval votes
With lexicographic tie-breaking, the winning committee is {BP,CP}, and we visit the
POIs GC, BP and CP .
We compute the POI sequence via pgrouting with the following command
SELECT * FROM pgr_TSP(
$$
SELECT * FROM pgr_dijkstraCostMatrix(
’SELECT osm_id as id , source , target , to_length_cost
as cost , reverse_length_cost as reverse_cost ,
x1, y1, x2, y2
FROM manhattan_ways’,






8.2.3.4 Example election with different budgetary weights
For the second example election, we use the same assumptions as in the first example,
except for the budgetary weights: We assume the following weights.
α1 = 0.2 for agent 1
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α2 = 0.5 for agent 2
α3 = 0.2 for agent 3
The preference values of the agents for the POIs are computed as follows:
• agent 1
– BP: 0.2 ∗ 0.96 + 0.8 ∗ 0.87 = 0.888
– CM: 0.2 ∗ 0.93 + 0.8 ∗ 0.45 = 0.546
– CP: 0.2 ∗ 0.97 + 0.8 ∗ 0.40 = 0.514
– OW: 0.2 ∗ 0.91 + 0.8 ∗ 0.00 = 0.182
• agent 2
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.915
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0, 40 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.425
– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.46
• agent 3
– BP: 0.2 ∗ 0.10 + 0.8 ∗ 0.87 = 0.716
– CM: 0.2 ∗ 0.93 + 0.8 ∗ 0.45 = 0.546
– CP: 0.2 ∗ 0.97 + 0.8 ∗ 0.40 = 0.514
– OW: 0.2 ∗ 0.99 + 0.8 ∗ 0.00 = 0.198
which leads to the Approval votes as defined in Table 8.7
BP CM CP OW
v1 1 1 1 0
v2 1 0 1 0
v3 1 1 1 0
Table 8.7: Resulting Approval votes
Here, the committee {BP,CP} is the unique winning committee, and we visit the POIs
GC, BP and CP .
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8.3 Incremental approach
In the previous section, the considered voting example was conducted using committee
elections like in the original model described in Chapter 4, which means that cost values
were computed only once. Another possible approach is, instead of conducting a commit-
tee election, conducting a incremental procedure, i.e. using single-winner voting rules and
re-computing the cost values in each step. We consider an incremental procedure which
we define as follows: In each phase, we use single-winner voting on the set of POIs which
have not be chosen so far. For each not yet selected POI, a cost value is computed based
on the average distance of the POI to the already chosen POIs. In the first phase of the
procedure, the costs are determined via the distances between the start/end point and
the POIs as in Section 8.2.3.
8.3.1 Example with identical budgetary weights
As in Subsubsection 8.2.3.3, let us assume that three agents starting from the POI GC
need to agree on two POIs, with the attractiveness values as given in Table 8.5
If we assume α = 0.5 for all agents, the preference values of the agents for the POIs are
computed exactly as in the example election in Subsubsection 8.2.3.3.
• agent 1
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.915
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0.93 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.69
– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.455
• agent 2
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.915
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0, 40 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.425
– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.46
• agent 3
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.10 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.485
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0.93 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.69
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– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.99 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.495
This leads to the Approval votes as defined in Table 8.8 (identical to Table 8.6).
BP CM CP OW
v1 1 1 1 0
v2 1 0 1 0
v3 0 1 1 0
Table 8.8: Resulting Approval votes for the first phase
With an Approval score of 3, CP (Central Park) is the unique winner of this election.
For phase 2, we compute for the remaining POIs BP, CM and OW the average dis-
tance to the already chosen POIs GC and CP. To this end, we compute a partial distance
matrix as defined in Table 8.9.
GC BP CM CP OW
GC – 1.03 3.58 – 6.93
BP 0.72 – – 4.37 –
CM 3.74 – – 6.88 –
CP – 4.31 6.68 – 10.36
OW 6.30 – – 9.96 –
Table 8.9: Distance matrix for POIs in Manhattan for incremental procedure
In the next step, we render the distance matrix symmetrical, see Table 8.10
GC BP CM CP OW
GC – 0.88 3.66 – 6.62
BP 0.88 – – 4.34 –
CM 3.66 – – 6.78 –
CP – 4.34 6.78 – 10.16
OW 6.62 – – 10.16 –
Table 8.10: Symmetrical distance matrix for POIs in Manhattan for incremental proce-
dure
This leads to the average distances
d(BP ) = (0.88 + 4.34)/2 = 2.61
d(CM) = (3.66 + 6.78)/2 = 5.22
d(OW ) = (6.62 + 10.16)/2 = 8.39
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and the normalised distances
dN(BP ) = 2.61/8.39 = 0.31
dN(CM) = 5.22/8.39 = 0.62
dN(OW ) = 8.39/8.39 = 1.00
resulting in the inverse cost values
d(BP ) = 0.69
d(CM) = 0.38
d(OW ) = 0.00
The preference values of the agents are computed as follows:
• agent 1
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.69 = 0.825
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0.93 + 0.5 ∗ 0.38 = 0.655
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.455
• agent 2
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.69 = 0.825
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0, 40 + 0.5 ∗ 0.38 = 0.39
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.455
• agent 3
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.10 + 0.5 ∗ 0.69 = 0.395
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0.93 + 0.5 ∗ 0.38 = 0.655
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.99 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.455
This leads to the Approval votes as defined in Table 8.11
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BP CM OW
v1 1 1 0
v2 1 0 0
v3 0 1 0
Table 8.11: Resulting Approval votes for second phase
Both POI BP and POI CM have Approval score 2. With lexicographic tie-breaking, BP
wins the election. Overall, we choose the POIs CP and BP and visit the POIs GC, CP
and BP .
8.3.2 Example with different budgetary weights
For the second example, we use the same assumptions as in the previous example, except
for the budgetary weights: We assume the following weights.
α1 = 0.2 for agent 1
α2 = 0.5 for agent 2
α3 = 0.8 for agent 3
The preference values of the agents for the POIs are computed as follows:
• agent 1
– BP: 0.2 ∗ 0.96 + 0.8 ∗ 0.87 = 0.888
– CM: 0.2 ∗ 0.93 + 0.8 ∗ 0.45 = 0.546
– CP: 0.2 ∗ 0.97 + 0.8 ∗ 0.40 = 0.514
– OW: 0.2 ∗ 0.91 + 0.8 ∗ 0.00 = 0.182
• agent 2
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.87 = 0.915
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0, 40 + 0.5 ∗ 0.45 = 0.425
– CP: 0.5 ∗ 0.97 + 0.5 ∗ 0.40 = 0.685
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.46
• agent 3
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– BP: 0.8 ∗ 0.10 + 0.2 ∗ 0.87 = 0.254
– CM: 0.8 ∗ 0.93 + 0.2 ∗ 0.45 = 0.834
– CP: 0.8 ∗ 0.97 + 0.2 ∗ 0.40 = 0.856
– OW: 0.8 ∗ 0.99 + 0.2 ∗ 0.00 = 0.792
which leads to the Approval votes as defined in Table 8.12
BP CM CP OW
v1 1 1 1 0
v2 1 0 1 0
v3 0 1 1 1
Table 8.12: Resulting Approval votes for first phase
Note that CP is again the unique winner here, but that agent 3 approves of POI OW in
this election, as opposed to the first example.
Because the winner of phase 1 is the same as in the first example, the cost values for
the second phase are the same as in the first example.
For the second phase, the preference values of the agents are computed as follows:
• agent 1
– BP: 0.2 ∗ 0.96 + 0.8 ∗ 0.69 = 0.744
– CM: 0.2 ∗ 0.93 + 0.8 ∗ 0.38 = 0.49
– OW: 0.2 ∗ 0.91 + 0.8 ∗ 0.00 = 0.182
• agent 2
– BP: 0.5 ∗ 0.96 + 0.5 ∗ 0.69 = 0.825
– CM: 0.5 ∗ 0, 40 + 0.5 ∗ 0.38 = 0.39
– OW: 0.5 ∗ 0.91 + 0.5 ∗ 0.00 = 0.455
• agent 3
– BP: 0.8 ∗ 0.10 + 0.2 ∗ 0.69 = 0.218
– CM: 0.8 ∗ 0.93 + 0.2 ∗ 0.38 = 0.82
– OW: 0.8 ∗ 0.99 + 0.2 ∗ 0.00 = 0.792
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This leads to the Approval votes as defined in Table 8.13
BP CM OW
v1 1 0 0
v2 1 0 0
v3 0 1 1
Table 8.13: Resulting Approval votes for second phase
Note that BP is unique winner in this election as opposed to the second-phase election
in the previous example. Overall, we choose again the POIs CP and BP and visit the
POIs GC, CP and BP .
8.4 Summary
In this chapter, we described and demonstrated several approaches for incorporating dis-
tance costs in the preference generation. An approach which is useful for homogeneous
networks is using the distance to the centroid, which was demonstrated in Section 8.2.1.
For less homogenous networks, it can be useful to use the average distance of each POI
to all other POIs instead, as demonstrated in Section 8.2.2. Both of these approaches can
be used if you want to avoid biases which favour POIs close to the start/end point. If you
intentionally want to favour POIs close to the start/end point, you can use the distance
of each POI to the start/end point instead, as demonstrated in Section 8.2.3. If you want
to compute the cost values only once, you can use committee voting rules. If you instead
aim at a more fine-grained approach which considers in each step the already determined
POIs, you can use an incremental approach using single-winner elections as demonstrated
in Section 8.3.
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Chapter 9
Application: Agreeing on meeting points
In this chapter, we demonstrate in an excursus the generalisability of the voting ap-
proach, by sketching and discussing an alternative scenario and application of voting in
cooperative traffic management. This application was considered as part of a joint work
co-authored with Paul Czioska, Aleksandar Trifunović and Monika Sester. It has been
published in a joint publication, “Location- and time-dependent meeting point recom-
mendations for shared interurban rides” [Czioska et al., 2017]. The contribution of the
author of this dissertation has been suggesting voting approaches and discussing how to
apply those to the application.
The description of the scenario (Section 9.1), the model (Section 9.2) and the simulation
(Section 9.3) closely follows the formulations by [Czioska et al., 2017]. In Section 9.4, we
briefly discuss the simulation results regarding voting.
9.1 Scenario
The application considered deals with long-distance ridesharing (using privately owned
vehicles), which is a possible way of traversing long distances while sharing travel costs. It
is often used for traversing long distances and offers an alternative to trains and intercity
bus services, where travel costs can be shared among all passengers. When offering rides
between cities, the driver and the riders have to find suitable meeting points. There are
straightforward approaches such as choosing common, well-known locations. However,
since these locations are mostly part of the inner districts, they can lead to big detours.
Thus, another common approach is to develop recommendation systems which take better
reachable locations into account. Older approaches mostly focus on intra-urban rides
covering shorter distances. The joint paper presents a new recommendation procedure,
aiming to extend the meeting-point search by including public transportation to allow the
passengers to reach more remote meeting points. In this context, voting was used as part
of the meeting-point finding process; it was used as a means for riders and drivers to agree
on a meeting point from a set of possible suitable meeting points. [Czioska et al., 2017,
p.1-3, p.12]
134 Chapter 9 - Application: Agreeing on meeting points
9.2 Model
Following [Czioska et al., 2017, p.3-8., p.10], we explain the recommendation procedure
and in particular the operational phase. The recommendation procedure has three parts,
namely 1) preparation phase, 2) precomputing phase and 3) operational phase. The
preparation phase serves to process the raw data for preparing the precomputation. It
includes several steps, the first one is preparing the driving network. Because, from the
passenger perspective, precomputing the travel times from all possible passenger origins
is computationally inapplicable, in the second step, representative public transport entry
(PTE) nodes are created. It is assumed that the passengers use the public transportation
system, so these fictive origins will always be close to public transport stops. In the third
step, meeting point candidates are prepared. Subsequently, in the precomputing phase,
travel times are precomputed and stored in matrices. The operational phase consists of
the following steps, voting being the last one.
1. Estimation of driver arrival times at meeting point candidates
2. Determination of reachable PTE nodes for the passengers
3. Estimation of passenger arrival times at meeting point candidates
4. Computation of total travel times
5. Voting
It is important to recognise that when you consider several persons who need to agree
on a meeting point, they will most likely have different preferences regarding the possible
meeting points, not only because they have different distances to the possible meeting
points, but also because of other properties, for example (subjective) safety at the meeting
points, prominence, sheltering possibilities, accessibility, etc. [Czioska et al., 2017, p.12]
In order to aggregate the differing preferences into a socially acceptable agreement, we
applied voting. We discussed several possibilities for transforming individual preferences
into votes for the election. To keep the model simple, we disregarded aspects such as
safety or prominence and based the votes solely on the travel times to the possible meeting
points. We considered two voting rules, the first one being a range voting rule, where
each voter scores all candidates based on the inverse travel time. The scores are summed
up, and the candidate with the highest value wins, i.e. the election result is the meeting
point with the lowest total travel time. This is equivalent to optimising the travel times in
a utilitarian manner. We also considered a second voting rule which follows the minimax
principle. This is equivalent to optimising the travel time according to an egalitarian
manner. Here, the winner of the election is the meeting point that minimises the maximum
travel time. The idea behind this is to have a more balanced, fair distribution of travel
times. [Czioska et al., 2017, p.12f.]
It is also possible to assign an individual meaning of travel time to the votes using individ-
ual weights. This enables weighting the votes according to the urgency and can be useful
if one or multiple customers are under time pressure and have less time they can spend on
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the journey. Customers under high time pressure would then be favoured in the voting,
with increased probability for their higher ranked meeting points to be recommended.
[Czioska et al., 2017, p.13]
9.3 Simulation
In the context of the publication, the recommendation procedure was evaluated with a
simulation. In this section, we give an overview of the simulation details and the simulation
results regarding voting.
9.3.1 Technical components





• Intel Xeon E5410 with 32 GB RAM
9.3.2 Simulation setting and data
The model for the simulation is based on the medium-sized city of Braunschweig with
roughly 250.000 inhabitants. It includes a city centre with a historical core and a pedes-
trian precinct. The city centre is surrounded by a ring road and areas of high population.
The city also includes outer areas with lower population density and some industrial re-
gions. There is an outer street ring consisting of five motorways, with no motorway on the
eastern side of the city. Note that the city has a well-developed public transport system
including a tram network with 5 tram lines and a bus network with 37 bus lines, with the
main public transport lines operating at all times, except for a night break from 2 to 4
am. [Czioska et al., 2017, p. 13]
9.3.3 Travel times
For the computation of travel times for driving, walking and public transport, an instance
of OpenTripPlanner1 was used. OpenTripPlanner is a JAVA-based open-source multi-
modal routing engine. OpenStreetMap was used to obtain the necessary data for the street
1http://www.opentripplanner.org/
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network. As for the timetable information and the stop locations, those were obtained in
GTFS (General Transit Feed Specification)2 format from an open data pool. As a result
of the preparation phase, 380 PTE nodes were determined. [Czioska et al., 2017, p. 13]
9.3.4 Meeting points and inlet nodes
In order to find meeting point candidates, all petrol stations and the centroids of pub-
licly accessible and free parking places within the considered area were extracted from
OpenStreetMap, because these locations offer safe and convenient boarding possibilities.
In total, 705 meeting point candidates were extracted. Assuming a uniform distribution
of meeting points in the considered area (approximately 200 km2), there is an average
coverage of around 0.28 km2 per meeting point. Considering that the density of meeting
points is very low in non-built-up areas, the meeting point coverage in the city centre is
expected to be sufficient for the given purpose. As result after all refinement steps, 94
meeting point candidates were obtained. As inlet nodes, six locations on the motorways
surrounding the city were selected manually.[Czioska et al., 2017, p. 14]
9.3.5 Random demand
For the simulation, random demand was generated as follows: The groups for which meet-
ing points were determined consisted of one driver and one to three randomly selected
passengers. The driver route was randomly chosen among the six available inlet nodes.
To avoid the night break, the time of driver arrival at the inbound inlet node was cho-
sen at random between 6 am and 11 pm. As for the passenger origin locations, those
were randomly sampled based on residential building geometries within the service area.
The building information necessary for this step was obtained from the municipality of
Braunschweig. The probability of a building being chosen depends on its volume, i.e.
bigger buildings were chosen more often than smaller buildings. The rationale behind
this is that more people are living there, creating a higher demand. In the simulation, a
request consists of a driver route and a set of one to three passengers, which are selected
at random. [Czioska et al., 2017, p. 14]
9.3.6 Example meeting point recommendation
Figure 9.1, which is directly taken from [Czioska et al., 2017, p.16], shows an example
meeting point recommendation involving three passengers. The passengers start in the
central districts and use the public transport to reach the recommended meeting point
close to the motorway in the north of the city. The driver only has to take a minor detour.
[Czioska et al., 2017, p. 15]
2http://gtfs.org/
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Figure 9.1: Example meeting point selection with three passengers involved
9.3.7 Simulation results regarding voting
In this section, the simulation results regarding voting are described, following the expla-
nations in [Czioska et al., 2017, p.16f., p.19].
The differences between the range voting rule and the minimax voting rule are depicted,
based on different group sizes, which range from two (driver and one passenger) to five
(driver and four passengers). Table 9.1 is taken from [Czioska et al., 2017, p.19].
Voting of driver and ... 1 passenger 2 passengers 3 passengers 4 passengers
Equal results of both voting rules 59% 31% 30% 29%
Different results: Average late-
ness using minimax voting
12:29 min 5:32 min 4:30 min 3:57 min
Different results: Average maxi-
mum travel time using range vot-
ing
19:33 min 34:04 min 38:25 min 41:14 min
Different results: Average maxi-
mum travel time using minimax
voting
9:20 min 26:16 min 31:11 min 34:37 min
Table 9.1: Range voting vs. minimax voting (10,000 simulation runs)
The first row shows that for a group size of two, the two voting rules recommend the
same meeting point in 59% of the cases. This percentage decreases for larger groups: for
a group size of five, to a percentage of 29%.
The other rows refer to the case where the voting rules yield different meeting points.
The second row specifies the average additional lateness using minimax voting. The dif-
ference is fairly large for small groups, but decreases for larger groups; for group size five,
it is neglectable.
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Row three and four show the average maximum travel time for both voting rules. As
can be seen, for group size two there is a large difference. With minimax voting, the aver-
age maximum travel time is 9:20 minutes, as opposed to 19:33 minutes for range voting.
For larger groups, the difference between range and minimax voting decreases, i.e. the
advantage of minimax voting decreases for larger groups.
9.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we demonstrated another useful application of voting for creating consen-
sus in travel groups. Here, we focused on the effects of different ways to measure societal
welfare by comparing two simple voting rules which implement the utilitarian perspective
on the one hand and the egalitarian perspective on the other hand. For smaller groups,
minimax leads to a high improvement regarding the maximum travel time. For larger
groups, the difference between range and minimax voting regarding maximum travel time
decreases. As for the average lateness using minimax voting, it is high for smaller groups
and decreases for larger groups.
This means that, if one aims at fairer distribution of travel times, it makes sense to use
minimax voting, but it has to be noted that the advantage of minimax voting decreases
for larger groups. If the aim is instead to avoid delay for the group, it would make sense
to use the range voting rule, especially for smaller groups.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and Outlook
In this chapter, we summarise the contributions of this dissertation, describe limitations,
discuss strengths and weaknesses of the voting approach and give an outlook on possible
further work.
10.1 Contribution and limitations
In this thesis, we considered the topic voting for traveller groups in urban areas, motivated
by the situation that travellers are requested by traffic management to form groups and
need to agree on common destinations to visit. In our approach, we consider committee
voting rules as a means for meso-level decisions. We ask how several voting rules, voting
protocols and grouping algorithms compare regarding the target quantities group size,
preference dissatisfaction and organisational effort.
For our main simulation series as described in Chapter 6, we developed the agent-based
simulation tool LightVoting, see Chapter 5. We evaluated several algorithms, which are
depicted in Chapter 4 for the situation that travellers form groups in the vicinity of an
urban area and need to agree on common destinations to visit. We considered three
committee voting rules, Minisum-Approval, Minimax-Approval and Minisum-Ranksum,
as well as two grouping algorithms, sequential and coordinated, and two voting protocols,
basic and iterative.
Regarding the main simulation series, we arrive at the conclusion that out of the con-
sidered algorithms, in order to achieve a compromise between system and user goals, we
would recommend the voting rule Minisum-Ranksum in combination with the basic voting
protocol and the coordinated grouping algorithm, see Subsection 6.2.6.
We also briefly demonstrated how travel costs differ for different combinations of voting
protocols and grouping algorithms when assuming that the routing is conducted via TSP
approximations, see Chapter 7. It can be seen that the combination of coordinated
grouping and basic protocol yields a good compromise between preference satisfaction
and travel costs.
Furthermore, we offered some thoughts in Chapter 8 on how to develop a model which not
only takes simple traveller preferences into account but also distance costs. We present
three different possibilities for computing the distance costs. Furthermore, we consider
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two approaches for determining the winning POIs, committee voting rules versus an in-
cremental, more fine-grained approach where the costs are recomputed in each step and
the next POI is determined via a single-winner election.
In an excursus, we described a related application where voting is used in ridesharing to
agree on meeting points, see Chapter 9. We conclude that, especially for smaller groups,
it makes sense to use the minimax voting rule if one aims at fairer distribution of travel
times. If one aims at avoiding delay for the group, it would instead make sense to use the
range voting rule for smaller groups.
As described in Chapter 3, what is new in comparison to related works on collective
decision-making in traffic is that we focus on comparing the effects of several grouping
algorithms, voting rules and voting protocols on system and user goals. Other works on
collective decision-making in traffic set other points of emphasis, meaning that they for
example do not consider group formation, do not compare the effects of several voting
algorithms, use other voting algorithms or use other collective decision-making algorithms
than voting. The main contributions of this work are:
• We proposed to consider different voting protocols together with committee voting
rules as a means of collective decision-making for travellers who visit several POIs
together, following [Dennisen and Müller, 2015] and [Dennisen and Müller, 2016].
• We compared several voting rules, voting protocols and grouping algorithms regard-
ing their inherent effects on the user and system quantities group size, preference
dissatisfaction and organisational effort.
• We developed an agent-based simulation tool for evaluating different voting rules,
voting protocols and grouping algorithms.
• We concluded that out of the considered algorithms, we would recommend the com-
mittee voting rule Minisum-Ranksum in combination with the basic voting protocol
and the coordinated grouping algorithm in order to achieve a compromise between
system and user goals.
• We also briefly demonstrated how travel costs differ for different combinations of
voting protocols and grouping algorithms. The combination of the basic voting
protocol and the coordinated grouping algorithm yields a good compromise between
preference satisfaction and travel costs.
• We presented an extended model for taking distance costs into account when gen-
erating the preferences, describing different possibilities for computing the distance
costs and determining the winning POIs.
• In an excursus, we compared the effect of a utilitarian and an egalitarian voting
rule when agreeing on meeting points for a ride-sharing approach. We conclude
that it makes sense to use the egalitarian (minimax) voting rule if one aims at fairer
distribution of travel times, especially for smaller groups. If the aim is instead to
avoid delay for the group, it makes sense to use the utilitarian (range) voting rule
for smaller groups.
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Our work has some limitations, one being that we do not consider real-world constraints.
When conducting our simulations, we assumed “perfect” communication. Furthermore,
we considered a relatively small number of algorithms. We did not conduct simulations
for the extended model described in Chapter 8. Our model does not include the role of
financial incentives.
10.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the voting approach
The approach to use voting in cooperative traffic management has several strengths. One
aspect is that using voting as a decision mechanism can be combined, if so desired, with
integrated (anonymised) surveys of user preferences. These surveys can be conducted ad
hoc or via user profiles which are created before the concrete journey. Another strength
of voting is flexibility of architecture: It can be applied and implemented in both decen-
tralised and centralised manners. A decentralised implementation would enable restricting
the sharing of user data. Organising the travellers into groups which decide on common
decisions via voting offers advantages for both traffic management and the individual
travellers: Fewer, larger groups of travellers are better manageable and the larger the
groups, the smaller the travel cost is for the individual travellers.
Insights from Computational Social Choice can be used to design protocols and mecha-
nisms for different requirements. If an application is extremely prone to specific forms of
control, it would be sensible to use voting rules which are either immune to these forms of
control or resistant to them because the control problems are NP-hard under this voting
rule. Similarly, if an application is prone to specific forms of manipulation, it would be
advantageous to use voting rules for which these manipulation problems are NP-hard.
For example, the Coalitional Weighted Manipulation problem is NP-hard for more than
two candidates under the voting rules Borda and Veto (see [Conitzer et al., 2007]), i.e.
for these rules it is hard for coalitions of strategic voters to manipulate their votes such
that a specific candidate wins.
It should be noted that voting approaches have some weaknesses as well. For example,
the transmission of votes depends on reliable communication. If the communication is
not reliable, there can be stability problems. Every voting approach will be prone to some
forms of attacks such as strategic voting, control attacks, false identities, denial-of-service
attacks and others. There are also security issues such as data theft and eavesdropping.
All of those weaknesses need to be considered, weighed and addressed in concrete imple-
mentations for real-world applications.
10.3 Outlook
There are several possible approaches for future work. In the following, we describe three
future research opportunities and how LightVoting could be used for further research.
142 Chapter 10 - Conclusion and Outlook
10.3.1 Considering real-world constraints and requirements
In this dissertation, real-world constraints like communication-technological challenges
were not considered. For future investigations focused on behaviour under real-world con-
ditions, it could be sensible to adapt the simulation concept to consider constraints as pre-
sented in [Teixeira et al., 2018, Teixeira et al., 2019]. One main aim in their works was to
investigate the suitability of voting rules as collective decision-making mechanism in pla-
toon applications considering unreliable communication. One challenge for further works
could be to follow the underlying concept of [Teixeira et al., 2018, Teixeira et al., 2019] for
taking real-world constraints into account while setting other points of emphasis, such as
considering other target quantities and considering several grouping algorithms. Another
aspect for real-world applications is that user data need to be elicited and processed in a
privacy-conform way. Here, decentralised design and encryption techniques could be help-
ful. The voting rules should also be chosen carefully so that in applications where specific
forms of control or manipulation are likely, voting rules which are inherently protected
against those forms are preferred.
10.3.2 Considering additional algorithms and models
As mentioned above, only a limited number of algorithms was considered. For future
works, one could consider additional algorithms and models, for example other models
for preference generation, more voting rules, more refined iterative voting protocols or
more refined grouping algorithms. In the real world, travellers might not have preferences
over all possible POIs. For real-world investigations, it could be helpful to generate the
preferences based on surveys. This dissertation focused on committee elections. For future
work, it might be useful to also consider the more general case of combinatorial voting, see
for example [Lang and Xia, 2016]. It might be interesting to apply alternative solution
approaches for voting in combinatorial domains to the urban visitors scenario. It could
also be useful to consider single-winner voting rules, for example in the context of the
incremental approach as described in Chapter 8. An interesting extension might be to run
simulations for the extended model including distance costs as proposed in Chapter 8. In
particular, it would be interesting to compare the performance of the approach based on
pre-computed cost values for all POIs with the performance of the incremental approach
where in each phase, the cost values for the not yet selected POIs are re-computed.
10.3.3 Considering financial incentives
Another possible extension would be to consider the role of financial incentives to encour-
age ridesharing or platooning. This was for example considered by [Storch et al., 2020].
In this paper, the authors arrive at the conclusion that financial incentives have the
potential of significantly increasing the dissemination of ridesharing. In this vein, it
would make sense to incorporate different models for financial incentives into the voting-
based model presented in this dissertation and to investigate their effect. For example,
[Sebe et al., 2020] propose the notion of compensational platooning using automated ne-
gotiation between agents representing vehicles. Vehicles can offer monetary compensation
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to nearby vehicles to incentivise them to join together for a part of the route in the fu-
ture. One challenge for future research could be to combine the negotiation-based way
of decentralised platoon building as described in [Sebe et al., 2020] with the voting-based
approach of collective decision-making.
10.3.4 Further applications for LightVoting in research
In the following, we discuss how the simulation tool LightVoting as decribed in Chapter
5 could be used for application in research. We consider three use cases as depicted in
Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1: Use Cases 1, 2 and 3
UC1 aims at considering different settings for a parameter, for example dissatisfaction
threshold.
UC2 aims at considering new algorithms, for example a new voting rule.
UC3 aims at considering different algorithms with different settings for several param-
eters, similar to the main series in Chapter 6, but with a larger parameter space.
In UC1, one would consider different settings for a parameter for the already defined
algorithms to explore the space of this parameter more thoroughly.
One possibility for UC2 is exploring the effects of the extended model described in Chap-
ter 8. Another possibility is investigating the effects of additional voting rules or refined
versions of the iterative protocol or the coordinated grouping.
In the discussion of the results of the main simulation series (Subsection 6.2.6), we de-
scribed an example for UC3. According to the hypotheses generated based on the main
simulation series, it would make sense for further research to explore a larger parame-
ter space for Minisum-Ranksum under the combination coordinated grouping and basic
protocol with different numbers of travellers, different numbers of alternatives, different
group capacities and different join thresholds.
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Technically, the application of LightVoting for further research could be realised as follows,
see also Figure 10.2: We independently simulate different settings using LightVoting and
merging the results via a PostgreSQL database server. In the last step, the results can be
visualised.
Figure 10.2: Technical realisation
Figure 10.3: Concept view
In the following, we describe the concept view, see also Figure 10.3. Consider a traffic
researcher who wants to compare the simulation results for several different configurations.
This could be simulations with different settings for one parameter (UC1), simulations
for exploring the effects of new algorithms (UC2) or for exploring a large parameter
space for several parameters (UC3). The researcher, who acts as simulation configurator,
stores the configurations in the database. The simulation manager agent translates the
configurations into tasks. There are several simulation runner agents who regularly check
the database for still open tasks. The tasks can be independently processed by the
simulation runners, which is advantageous, especially for UC3, when exploring a large
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parameter space for several parameters. When a simulation runner is done with a task, it
marks the task as completed. The simulation manager regularly checks the database to
revise if all tasks are completed. If the tasks are completed, the simulation manager sends
the results back to the traffic researcher who then can visualise the results. Note that in
the case of UC2, the researcher needs an extended version of the code for implementing
further algorithms, which can be realised by creating an own branch of the simulation code
and specifying the branch name in the configuration. The simulation runner conducting
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Simulations for uniform preferences
Series 1: Minisum-Approval, uniform preferences, 100 runs each
Combination Threshold Quantity Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
sequential basic Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.90
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.16 0.25 0.34 0.50
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.60
sequential iterative DissThr 0.65 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.65
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.42 0.70
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.42 0.76
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.90
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.39
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.53
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.56
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.62
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.70
coordinated basic JoinThr 10 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.27 0.64
coordinated basic JoinThr 11 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.76
coordinated basic JoinThr 12 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.34 0.84
coordinated basic JoinThr 13 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.83
sequential basic Organisational Effort 3.00 9.00 14.00 19.00 34.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Organisational Effort 4.00 25.00 34.00 102.00 380.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Organisational Effort 4.00 14.00 21.00 31.00 290.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.65 Organisational Effort 4.00 11.00 16.00 22.00 267.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 21.00 260.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 262.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Organisational Effort 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 34.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Organisational Effort 3.00 22.00 38.00 51.00 117.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Organisational Effort 3.00 25.00 37.00 47.00 105.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Organisational Effort 3.00 26.00 34.00 43.00 91.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Organisational Effort 4.00 24.00 30.00 40.00 76.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Organisational Effort 4.00 22.00 29.00 40.00 69.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 10 Organisational Effort 4.00 26.00 34.00 41.00 73.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 11 Organisational Effort 6.00 17.00 25.00 33.00 54.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 12 Organisational Effort 7.00 19.00 26.00 33.00 50.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 13 Organisational Effort 6.00 19.00 25.00 32.00 48.00
sequential basic Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 16.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.65 Group Size 1.00 2.00 7.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Group Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Group Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 8.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 11.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 10 Group Size 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 15.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 11 Group Size 1.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 12 Group Size 1.00 4.00 7.00 11.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 13 Group Size 1.00 5.00 10.00 14.00 20.00
Table 10.1: MS-AV, Simulations for uniform preferences, c = 20
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Series 2: Minimax-Approval, uniform preferences, 100 runs each
Combination Threshold Quantity Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
sequential basic Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.30 0.39 0.48 0.74
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.38 0.50
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.23 0.33 0.43 0.60
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.27 0.36 0.46 0.70
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.28 0.37 0.46 0.79
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.39
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.50
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.50
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.55
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.66
coordinated basic JoinThr 10 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.67
coordinated basic JoinThr 11 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.73
coordinated basic JoinThr 12 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.21 0.30 0.39 0.80
sequential basic Organisational Effort 3.00 9.00 14.00 19.00 34.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Organisational Effort 5.00 30.00 41.00 137.00 378.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Organisational Effort 4.00 15.00 23.00 34.00 316.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Organisational Effort 5.00 11.00 16.00 22.00 299.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 249.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Organisational Effort 3.00 23.00 38.00 52.00 119.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Organisational Effort 3.00 24.00 37.00 47.00 102.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Organisational Effort 3.00 27.00 37.00 48.00 101.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Organisational Effort 3.00 24.00 30.00 39.00 77.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Organisational Effort 3.00 22.00 28.00 38.00 70.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 10 Organisational Effort 4.00 19.00 27.00 36.00 63.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 11 Organisational Effort 7.00 20.00 27.00 34.00 59.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 12 Organisational Effort 9.00 23.00 30.00 36.00 67.00
sequential basic Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 7.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Group Size 1.00 2.00 7.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Group Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Group Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 10.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 12.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 10 Group Size 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 17.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 11 Group Size 1.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 12 Group Size 1.00 4.00 7.00 10.75 20.00
Table 10.2: MM-AV, Simulations for uniform preferences, c = 20
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Series 3: Minisum-Ranksum, uniform preferences, 100 runs each
Combination Threshold Quantity Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
sequential basic Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.23 0.32 0.42 0.80
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.13 0.23 0.34 0.50
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.60
sequential iterative DissThr 0.685 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.21 0.30 0.41 0.68
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.70
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.78
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.23 0.32 0.42 0.80
coordinated basic JoinThr 30 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.56
coordinated basic JoinThr 40 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.68
coordinated basic JoinThr 50 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.72
sequential basic Organisational Effort 3.00 9.00 14.00 19.00 34.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Organisational Effort 5.00 22.00 32.00 98.00 353.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Organisational Effort 4.00 13.00 20.00 28.00 260.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.685 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 16.00 22.00 260.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Organisational Effort 5.00 10.00 16.00 21.00 265.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 260.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 34.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 30 Organisational Effort 4.00 26.00 34.00 42.00 75.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 40 Organisational Effort 8.00 20.00 28.00 35.00 54.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 50 Organisational Effort 7.00 18.00 25.00 32.00 49.00
sequential basic Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 19.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.685 Group Size 1.00 2.00 7.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Group Size 1.00 1.00 19.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 30 Group Size 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 10.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 40 Group Size 1.00 4.00 7.00 9.00 18.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 50 Group Size 1.00 6.00 11.00 14.00 20.00
Table 10.3: MS-RS, Simulations for uniform preferences, c = 20
Comparing dissatisfaction values for sequential basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MM-AV different: W = 6488600,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MS-RS different: W = 8814800,
p-value = 0.0001317 (significant)
Comparing dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
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• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MM-AV different: W = 6944600,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for Simulation MS-AV and MS-RS different: W
= 8787900, p-value = 0.0003536 (significant)
– alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV greater than for MS-RS: W =
8787900, p-value = 0.0001768 (significant)
Comparing dissatisfaction values for coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV smaller than for MM-AV: W =
6749800, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV greater than for MS-RS: W = 10312000,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing group size for sequential iterative, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV is greater than for MM-AV: W =
379560, p-value = 1.231e-07 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV is different from MS-RS: W =
173020, p-value = 0.4898 (not significant)
Comparing group size for coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV is greater than for MM-AV: W =
208360, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV different from MS-RS: W = 80296,
p-value = 0.5657 (not significant)
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Comparing organisational effort for sequential iterative, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for Simulation MS-AV greater than for MS-RS:
W = 8940567, p-value = 2.884e-07 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV smaller than for MM-AV: W =
7680924, p-value = 7.008e-12 (significant)
Comparing organisational effort for coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MM-AV greater than for MS-RS: W =
9535076, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV different from MS-RS: W = 8442418,
p-value = 0.7269 (not significant)
Minisum-Approval: Comparing dissatisfaction values for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si and cb different: W =
10625000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minimax-Approval: Comparing dissatisfaction values for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si and cb different: W =
10598000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Ranksum: Comparing dissatisfaction values for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si and cb different: W =
11837000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
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Minisum-Approval: Comparing group size for sequential iterative and
coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is smaller than for cb:
W = 80800, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minimax-Approval: Comparing group size for sequential iterative and
coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is smaller than for cb:
W = 208510, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Ranksum: Comparing group size for sequential iterative
and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is smaller than for cb:
W = 78061, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Approval: Comparing organisational effort for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is smaller than for cb:
W = 7059000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minimax-Approval: Comparing organisational effort for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is greater than for cb:
W = 13025000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Ranksum: Comparing organisational effort for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, uniform
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is greater than for cb:
W = 10489000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
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Simulations for Foursquare-based preferences
Series 4: Minisum-Approval, Foursquare-based preferences, 100 runs
each
Combination Threshold Quantity Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
sequential basic Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.15 0.58 0.77 1.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.83
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.84
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.48 0.86
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.04 0.33 0.62 0.84
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.07 0.45 0.73 0.90
sequential iterative DissThr 1.0 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.15 0.58 0.77 1.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.88
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.96
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.96
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.29 1.00
sequential basic Organisational Effort 3.00 9.00 14.00 19.00 34.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Organisational Effort 14.00 56.00 106.50 297.00 498.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Organisational Effort 13.00 51.00 88.00 275.00 496.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Organisational Effort 5.00 42.00 65.00 216.00 497.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Organisational Effort 5.00 28.00 40.00 97.00 453.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Organisational Effort 5.00 15.00 23.00 38.00 373.00
sequential iterative DissThr 1.0 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 34.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Organisational Effort 4.00 21.00 28.00 37.00 66.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Organisational Effort 7.00 18.00 25.00 34.00 56.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Organisational Effort 6.00 18.00 26.00 34.00 58.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Organisational Effort 7.00 16.00 23.00 32.00 53.00
sequential basic Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 14.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 15.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 8.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 1.0 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 12.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Group Size 1.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 15.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Group Size 1.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 15.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Group Size 1.00 2.00 6.00 8.00 19.00
Table 10.4: MS-AV, Simulations for Foursquare-based preferences
166 Appendix
Series 5: Minimax-Approval, Foursquare-based preferences, 100 runs
each
Combination Threshold Quantity Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
sequential basic Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.65
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.14 0.31 0.40 0.83
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.28 0.40 0.50 0.84
sequential iterative DissThr 0.625 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.40 0.58 0.60 0.85
sequential iterative DissThr 0.65 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.84
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.84
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.86
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.33 0.89
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.38 0.88
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.41 0.89
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.12 0.30 0.41 0.92
sequential basic Organisational Effort 3.00 8.75 14.00 19.00 34.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Organisational Effort 20.00 64.00 132.00 302.00 495.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Organisational Effort 13.00 48.00 79.00 246.00 495.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.625 Organisational Effort 5.00 18.00 28.00 77.25 452.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.65 Organisational Effort 5.00 10.00 16.00 21.00 401.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 21.00 323.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Organisational Effort 4.00 22.00 30.00 38.00 76.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Organisational Effort 6.00 18.00 25.00 34.00 56.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Organisational Effort 8.00 18.00 25.50 34.00 57.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Organisational Effort 8.00 19.00 25.00 33.00 54.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Organisational Effort 7.00 19.00 25.00 33.00 55.00
sequential basic Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 13.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 18.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.625 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.65 Group Size 1.00 1.00 19.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 12.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 6 Group Size 1.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 16.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 7 Group Size 1.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 8 Group Size 1.00 2.00 5.00 8.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 9 Group Size 1.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 20.00
Table 10.5: MM-AV, Simulations for Foursquare-based preferences
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Series 6: Minisum-Ranksum, Foursquare-based preferences, 100 runs
each
Combination Threshold Quantity Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
sequential basic Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.29 0.51 0.66 0.84
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.40 0.57
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.44 0.61
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.16 0.42 0.61 0.70
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.28 0.51 0.66 0.80
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.29 0.51 0.66 0.84
coordinated basic JoinThr 20 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.61
coordinated basic JoinThr 30 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.31 0.82
coordinated basic JoinThr 40 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.45 0.89
coordinated basic JoinThr 50 Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.13 0.33 0.61 0.93
sequential basic Organisational Effort 3.00 9.00 14.00 19.00 34.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Organisational Effort 18.00 55.00 104.00 295.00 498.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Organisational Effort 14.00 48.00 76.00 268.00 496.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Organisational Effort 5.00 20.00 33.00 101.00 453.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 257.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Organisational Effort 4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 34.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 20 Organisational Effort 8.00 17.00 24.00 34.00 57.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 30 Organisational Effort 9.00 21.00 29.00 36.00 60.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 40 Organisational Effort 7.00 15.00 21.00 28.00 53.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 50 Organisational Effort 7.00 14.00 19.00 26.00 42.00
sequential basic Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.5 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 16.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.6 Group Size 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 17.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.7 Group Size 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.8 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
sequential iterative DissThr 0.9 Group Size 1.00 1.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 20 Group Size 1.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 15.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 30 Group Size 1.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 40 Group Size 1.00 4.00 7.00 12.00 20.00
coordinated basic JoinThr 50 Group Size 1.00 6.00 10.00 16.75 20.00
Table 10.6: MS-RS, Simulations for Foursquare-based preferences
Comparing dissatisfaction values for sequential basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MM-AV different: W = 8241000,
p-value = 0.126 (not significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MS-RS different: W = 9628300,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing dissatisfaction values for sequential iterative, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for
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• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MM-AV different: W = 8013800,
p-value = 0.0002818 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MS-RS different: W = 9593800,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing dissatisfaction values for coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MM-AV different: W = 3462945,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV and MS-RS different: W = 11394576,
p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing group sizes for sequential iterative, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV different from
MS-RS: W = 1043292, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing group size for coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV greater than MM-
AV: W = 700066, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing organisational effort for sequential iterative, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV smaller than for MS-RS: W =
4265460, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-RS smaller than for MM-AV: W =
6638671, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Comparing organisational effort for coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis:
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• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV greater than for MS-RS: W = 8900488,
p-value = 1.873e-06 (significant)
• alternative hypothesis: distribution for MS-AV smaller than for MM-AV: W =
6603299, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Approval: Comparing group size for sequential iterative and
coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si smaller than for cb: W
= 238460, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minimax-Approval: Comparing group size for sequential iterative and
coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si smaller than for cb: W
= 234180, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Ranksum: Comparing group size for sequential iterative
and coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si smaller than for cb: W
= 45862, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minisum-Approval: Comparing organisational effort for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is greater than for cb:
W = 16437000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
Minimax-Approval: Comparing organisational effort for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is greater than for cb:
W = 16317000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
170 Appendix
Minisum-Ranksum: Comparing organisational effort for
sequential iterative and coordinated basic, Foursquare
Wilcoxon test result for alternative hypothesis: distribution for si is greater than for cb:
W = 16576000, p-value < 2.2e-16 (significant)
